University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Connecticut Law Review
2019

Misunderstanding Judy Norman: Theory as Cause and
Consequence
Martha R. Mahoney

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review

School of Law

CONNECTICUT

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 51

JUNE 2019

NUMBER 3

Article
Misunderstanding Judy Norman: Theory as Cause and
Consequence
MARTHA R. MAHONEY
Judy Norman shot her abusive husband during a late afternoon nap while he
rested before violently trafficking her that night. The sharp contrast between the
extreme violence and danger Judy faced and the denial of a self-defense instruction
triggered extensive academic debates about justification and the use of deadly force.
Norman became one of the most famous cases involving battered women, appearing
in many casebooks and hundreds of law review articles. Despite all this work, the
facts of the case contradict much of what scholars have said about Norman.
Misconceptions about expert evidence, “Battered Woman Syndrome,” and battered
women drive academic errors that affect evaluation of her need to act immediately,
including the timing of sleep and death and the idea that her perceptions of risk
were distorted. Almost all legal scholars failed to grapple with the looming threat
of violent, forcible sexual slavery and therefore did not explore the larger question
of whether that threat may justify deadly force in self-defense.
Battered woman syndrome and learned helplessness are terms of art. In law,
the term “battered woman syndrome” became a generic umbrella for expert
evidence whether or not the expert applied Lenore Walker’s original theory. For
decades, social scientists have applied other frameworks to understanding the
impact of battering, especially “survivor theory” and “coercive control.” From the
mid-1990s, the term “intimate partner violence and its effects” replaced battered
woman syndrome and learned helplessness, but syndrome terminology persisted in
legal contexts, giving Walker’s theory disproportionate influence. Simplified
concepts of the syndrome led some criminal law theorists to believe that critics of
the Norman holding must be relying on expert testimony about passivity and
helplessness to argue for change in the concepts of imminence and reasonableness.
In fact, the forensic expert at Judy Norman’s trial had applied the “coercive
control” framework that became more influential over time.
This Article analyzes facts and confronts doctrinal questions in light of current
social science. Replacing battered woman syndrome with “intimate partner
violence” and replacing learned helplessness with “. . . the effects of intimate
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partner violence,” we should reevaluate the literature on Norman and self-defense
to identify the best arguments and address new questions.
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Misunderstanding Judy Norman: Theory as Cause and
Consequence
MARTHA R. MAHONEY *
INTRODUCTION
A. The Norman Case in Court and in Legal Scholarship
Late in the afternoon of June 12, 1985, near Spindale, North Carolina,
John Thomas Norman (J.T.) was taking a nap before transporting his wife
Judy to a “truck stop” rest area where, every night, he forced her to sell sex.1
For two days, J.T. had beaten Judy continuously and threatened to maim her
and to kill Judy and her mother. His threats frightened Judy’s mother,
Laverne Laws, so much that Laverne borrowed a gun and put it in her purse.
Judy’s efforts to find help had failed. Afraid that a crying baby would wake
J.T. from his nap, Judy took the baby to Laverne’s house thirty yards away.
J.T. had not allowed Judy to eat for three days and she had a splitting
headache. She asked her mother for something for the headache; Laverne
said that there were pain pills in her purse in the next room. Judy opened the
purse, saw the gun, took it, walked across the road, and shot J.T. while he
slept.2

*

Professor and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, University of Miami School of Law. Portions of this
Article were presented at faculty workshops at Fordham University School of Law and the University of
Miami School of Law, and I am grateful to participants for their comments. Donna Coker and Ken
Casebeer provided many rounds of insights and priceless suggestions. I am deeply grateful to Mary Ann
Dutton, Mary Ann Franks, Madeleine Plasencia, and Stephanie Wildman for extended comments and
discussion, to Richard McAdams for suggesting that the Judy Norman case merited an article of its own,
to Holly Maguigan and Jessica Siegel for thoughtful comments and questions as the project got
underway, and to Robert Wolf for his thoughts, his time, and the transcript. Elizabeth McIntosh, Nicole
McLemore, Patrick McGee, Summer Galitz, and Mackenzie Garrity provided superb assistance with
research. Thanks also to Robin Schard and the reference librarians at University of Miami School of
Law. These generous helpers are not responsible for any mistakes that remain; all errors are my own.
1
Transcript of Record at 17, State v. Norman, No. 85-CRS-3890 (N.C. Super. Ct., Rutherford
County 1987) [hereinafter Transcript] (presenting testimony of Deputy Sheriff R.H. Epley that located
the Norman residence a mile or two outside of Spindale city limits); id. at 48 (presenting testimony of
Mark Navarra about trafficking Judy at the “truck stop”); id. at 128 (presenting testimony of Judy Norman
referring to a “truck stop” and clarifying that it was a “rest area” on I-85 near Kings Mountain, North
Carolina.). Judicial opinions used both terms. See State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 11
(N.C. 1989) (majority opinion) (using the term “rest area”); id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting) (using the
term “rest[ ]stop”); State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (using the
terms “truck stop” and “rest stop”).
2
For a description of the history of the marriage, see infra Part I.A.
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At Judy’s murder trial in 1987, a detailed record of violence, degradation
and threats emerged from thorough, intelligent work by her attorneys,
Robert Wolf and Robert Harris; the court-appointed forensic psychologist,
Dr. William Tyson; and the trial judge, John Gardner.3 Although Judge
Gardner denied Judy’s request for a jury instruction on self-defense, he had
appointed Dr. Tyson, admitted all evidence relevant to evaluating both
provocation and self-defense, and given the issue serious consideration until
the end of the trial.4 The jury convicted Judy of manslaughter.5 In 1988, an
appellate court ordered a new trial, holding that a jury could find J.T.’s sleep
to be only “a momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror” that might
show imminent threat of death or great bodily harm.6 In 1989, the North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that Judy had “ample time” to
find other ways to protect herself; they saw no evidence that could give rise
to either actual or reasonable belief that she faced imminent threat or needed
to use deadly force.7 Justice Harry Martin dissented, emphasizing not only
Judy’s fear but her inability to escape, the failure of her efforts to get help,
and the fears and perceptions of threat among the people closest to her.8
The sharp contrast between the violence and danger facing Judy Norman
and the denial of a self-defense instruction brought legal scholars into
extensive debates about justification and the use of deadly force. Norman
came to stand for a class of sympathetic defendants who killed in response
to horrifying abuse, under circumstances in which most scholars could not
see an imminent threat to justify self-defense.9 Hundreds of law review
articles cite the case, many casebooks include it as a principal case or note,
and scholarly debates on self-defense often focus on Norman.10
3
See infra note 262 04 and accompanying text (highlighting that Judge Gardner chose both of the
experts the defense called at trial and that, as a court-appointed expert, Dr. Tyson was available to testify
for either party); see also infra note 282 and accompanying text (explaining that Dr. Rollins had
performed Judy’s competency evaluation after the shooting).
4
See, e.g., infra note 270 (overruling objection to allowing expert opinion on whether Judy
reasonably believed it was necessary to kill her husband); see also Transcript, supra note 1, at 196–203
(considering other battered women’s self-defense cases during conference on jury instructions).
5
Transcript, supra note 1, at 22; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 9.
6
Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 592 (holding that a jury “could find that decedent’s sleep was but a
momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror by the decedent, [and] that defendant merely took
advantage of her first opportunity to protect herself”).
7
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13 (stating a conclusion that time was “ample” without referring to the
facts or explaining its reasoning).
8
Id. at 17 18 (Martin, J., dissenting).
9
See, e.g., Whitley R.P. Kaufman, Self-Defense, Imminence, and the Battered Woman, 10 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 342, 346 (2007) (describing Norman II as “the most widely-cited example of a battered
woman prevented from claiming self-defense solely by an application of the imminence rule” and citing
discussion by other scholars).
10
Some articles focus on the Norman case in detail. See Marina Angel, Why Judy Norman Acted
in Reasonable Self-Defense: An Abused Woman and a Sleeping Man, 16 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 65, 65 66
(2008) (arguing that Judy Norman’s action was reasonable); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 89–93 (1991) (reviewing
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Norman is one of the best-known cases in criminal law, but the scholarly
debates include serious errors explored in this Article. Many of these
mistakes rest on legal misunderstandings about the social science on
battering. Scholars often treat Norman as a case defined by “battered woman
syndrome” as they understand that term.11 Many misunderstand “learned
helplessness” as a literal term and assume that the legal argument for selfdefense rested on Lenore Walker’s application of “learned helplessness” to
battered women.12 This allowed myths about passivity and lack of helpseeking to confuse scholars about the content of expert testimony. “Battered
woman syndrome” is a term of art with different meaning in psychology
than in law. In law, many states made it a generic term for expert evidence,
whether or not that expert applied Walker’s theories. To clarify these issues,
encompass the breadth of knowledge in the field, and avoid
misunderstandings, psychologists have for decades described the subject of
expert knowledge as “battering and its effects” or “intimate partner violence
and its effects.”13
In the Norman trial, Dr. Tyson’s testimony applied a “coercive control”
framework that, along with “survivor theory,” became more influential and
better-supported than Walker’s “syndrome.” Subsequent work in social

Norman in detail and noting deadly threats, the threat of forced prostitution as “third-party rape,” and
attacks on Judy’s ability to leave). A Westlaw search of law reviews and journals on February 15, 2018
found 201 articles that cited Norman I, Norman II, or both decisions. For examples of scholarly
discussion, see, e.g., Whitley R.P. Kaufman, Self-Defense, Imminence, and the Battered Woman, in
CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 407 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan,
eds., 2009) (featuring a debate between several authors regarding imminence in self-defense with
substantial focus on Norman); Joshua Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters:
Reflections on Maintaining Respect for Human Life While Killing Moral Monsters, in CRIMINAL LAW
THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 264 68 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002)
[hereinafter Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters] (discussing Norman). For coverage
of Norman in casebooks, see SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 903 (10th ed. 2017) (principal case); CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN ET AL., FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE: CASES & MATERIALS 236 (5th ed. 2018); JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 576 (8th ed. 2017) (note).
11
See, e.g., Joshua Dressler & Holly Maguigan, Battered Women, Self-Defense, and the Law, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 1, 11 (2011) (noting that this section of the exchange is based on the
Judy Norman case); 15 (identifying Dressler’s concern as “the infusion of the Battered Woman Syndrome
evidence as the way to prove imminence . . . .”); Jane Campbell Moriarty, “While Dangers Gather”: The
Bush Preemption Doctrine, Battered Women, Imminence, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 30 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 24 (2005) (stating that Norman did not allow expert testimony because that
testimony would have made “[h]omicidal self-help . . . a lawful solution” (citing Norman II, 378 S.E.2d
at 15)).
12
For a discussion of concepts of “Battered Woman Syndrome” and “learned helplessness,” see
infra Part III; see also infra note 254 and accompanying text (quoting Joshua Dressler, “learned to be
helpless”); infra note 398 and accompanying text (“It is almost impossible to imagine that a human being,
rather than a thing, could really be that passive when abused.” (quoting Anne Coughlin)); infra note 440
and accompanying text (“addicted to abuse” (quoting George Fletcher)).
13
See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
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science would clarify some of the issues in Norman and illuminate the
evaluation of danger. 14
Cultural and social awareness also changed after Norman. In the 1980s,
research and policy proposals on sexual slavery and forced prostitution were
just emerging.15 After the late 1990s, states and the federal government gave
greater recognition to the dangers of trafficking, provided special visas for
victims, and took additional legal measures.16 It is not surprising that in the
1980s, judges, lawyers, and commentators saw forced prostitution as part of
a pattern of abuse rather than a harm that in itself might justify defensive
force. Nonetheless, scholars should have been able to understand Judy
Norman’s statements about the looming threat of violent prostitution, quoted
in the published opinions.17
The legal academy has spent a lot of time and ink on Norman, but much
of our work ignored important statements by Judy Norman and Dr. Tyson.
When legal scholars mine social science for nuggets to support what we
already believe, we miss complexity and evolving knowledge.
Misunderstandings about “battered woman syndrome” theory affected
scholarly analysis of the Norman case—in the subtitle of this article, “theory
as cause.” Significant misconceptions include the ideas that presenting
expert evidence constitutes a separate and distinct “battered woman
syndrome” defense, that “learned helplessness” is a literal term and not a
psychological term of art, and that expert testimony focuses on abnormal
perception. Professors also failed to grasp the urgency of the threat of
trafficking Judy identified at trial.18 And those mistakes had consequences:
debates that missed threats and relied on a vulgarized idea of “learned
helplessness” generated flawed legal theory proposals.
14
See infra notes 222–74 and accompanying text (highlighting some of the subsequent social
science work relevant to the Norman case).
15
See, e.g., KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY xi (1979) (explaining that when she
began writing her book, “the subject had been so effectively buried that there was hardly a trace of
evidence that women were being forced into prostitution and trafficked from one country to another”; xixiii (explaining the impact of the expansion of pornography and acknowledging the recency of work
against sexual slavery at the time of writing); 5-9 (explaining work with the concept of “female sexual
slavery,” and issues of research methodology).
16
See, e.g., Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1474 (2000) (delineating the various increased protections afforded by the U.S. government to
victims of sex trafficking as part of this act); see also infra note 494 and accompanying text (highlighting
other legislative changes relating to victims of sex trafficking).
17
State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 14 (N.C. 1989) (majority opinion); see also infra
notes 189, 199 202 and accompanying text (discussing the threat of violent prostitution that Judy
Norman faced).
18
These failures echo the judicial failure to see imminent threat when a man was on top of a woman
with his hands around her throat. See V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
1235, 1246–48 (2001) (discussing trial ruling in Commonwealth v. Watson, 431 A.2d 949 (1981)); id. at
1286 (“[E]ven when the cases are confrontational—when the gun is pointed at her—they still are not
seen as confrontational.”).
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This Article reconstructs Judy Norman’s experience from published
opinions and the trial transcript, supplemented by public records. Scholarly
mistakes about Norman were avoidable because most of the important facts
appear in the published opinions,19 but the transcript provides additional
examples of coercive control, danger, and other details important to applying
subsequent social science research. To help the reader distinguish the
material we should all have understood without additional aid from the
transcript, citations supporting facts will include references to the pages at
which these facts appeared in the opinions as well as in the transcript.
We will examine impending threat: the fear that J.T. was going to kill
Judy—expressed by eyewitnesses as well as the defendant—and Judy’s fear
of the forcible trafficking and torture that would commence when J.T. woke
from his nap. We will ask how the possibility or impossibility of escape
should be relevant to the time frame of threat. We will consider whether the
brief and uncertain remainder of an afternoon nap should make deadly force
unavailable to defend against either death or brutal trafficking. After
clarifying the content of expert testimony, we will evaluate scholarly
arguments about justification and self-defense in Norman, including the
proposal for an alternative defense based on duress and excuse. To illustrate
the ways in which preconceptions have overrun facts, we begin with a
circumstance that all three opinions described differently: At what time of
day did Judy Norman shoot J.T.?
A. What Time Was It and Why Does It Matter? A “Midnight Shooting”
During an Afternoon “Nap”
The majority opinion in the Supreme Court of North Carolina said Judy
had “ample time and opportunity to resort to other means of preventing
further abuse by her husband.”20 “Ample time” is relevant to the question of

19
Among the points that appear throughout this Article that should have been apparent in the
published opinions: J.T. Norman was napping before trafficking Judy, not asleep for the night; testimony
from Dr. Tyson, the psychologist, emphasized coercive control rather than Lenore Walker’s theory of
learned helplessness; Tyson’s testimony supported the reasonableness of Judy’s perception—his review
of the record showed no options she had overlooked; Judy’s behavior was not passive—she engaged in
urgent help-seeking; the most immediate threat Judy identified from the witness stand was forcible sex
trafficking that night—death came second; and the family was so convinced of his dangerousness that
they failed to intervene when they watched him burn her with a cigarette and when he trafficked her. See
infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (discussing whether J.T. was napping); infra Part II.B
(describing Dr. Tyson’s testimony about coercive control and help-seeking); infra note 199 and
accompanying text (discussing Judy Norman’s immediate fear of prostitution); Transcript, supra note 1,
at 48, 56, 66, 131 (showing various family members’ knowledge of cigarette burning and trafficking). In
addition, basic legal research would have revealed that, when the police told Judy they could not arrest
J.T. unless she “took out a warrant,” they were wrong—state law had changed years earlier to allow
warrantless arrest for domestic violence. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
20
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13 (N.C. 1989) (majority opinion).
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21

whether a threat was imminent. In addition, courts sometimes use the term
“imminent” to assess the likely progress of an ambiguous threat,22 so Judy’s
“opportunity to resort to other means” is directly relevant to whether deadly
force was necessary but might also be relevant to imminence.23
Each judicial opinion described the timeframe somewhat differently.
The appellate court described a “late afternoon . . . nap” with police
dispatched at 7:30 PM.24 In the North Carolina Supreme Court, the dissent
stated that J.T. lay down “[e]arly in the evening” and the majority said
simply, “evening.” But both the majority and dissent stated that the police
arrived at “night.”25
In fact, J.T. Norman napped and died by daylight, although the transcript
does not state when he lay down or how long he slept. June 12th was close
to the longest day of the year, and sunset was more than an hour away when
police received the call about his death and when they arrived.26 “Late
afternoon” and “early evening” are fair descriptions; some definitions of
“evening” apply as well. But the police did not arrive at “night”—a term
defined in relation to either sunset or darkness.27 The appellate court was
21
States use varying language to describe the temporal urgency required for justified self-defense:
imminent, immediate, or necessary to act immediately. See 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW
DEFENSES § 131(c)(1) (1984) (noting variations of language for imminence); see also WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4 (2d ed. 2016 update) (discussing variations in
terminology for imminence).
22
See Nourse, supra note 18, at 1252–53 (2001) (“The vast majority of imminence-relevant cases
in my survey look like the ‘standard’ self-defense case—a case, for example, in which the defendant
alleged that he saw a weapon, the victim was advancing, or there was a fight.” (footnotes omitted)); id.
at 1253 n.89 (citing a case in which one prisoner advanced toward another with his hand in his pocket).
23
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13 (majority opinion). As explored in Section I.B below, when courts
consider the availability of options in the evaluation of imminence, they concede that context matters to
assessing temporal urgency.
24
State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587–88 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
25
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting); id. at 11 (majority opinion).
26
See Complete Sun and Moon Data for One Day, U.S. NAVAL OBSERVATORY,
http://aa.usno.navy.mil/rstt/onedaytable?ID=AA&year=1985&month=6&day=12&state=NC&place=S
pindale (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) (showing complete sun and moon data for Wednesday, June 12, 1985).
The U.S. Naval Observatory calculator, Sun and Moon Data for One Day, found that in Spindale, North
Carolina, on June 12, 1985, sunset came at 8:43 PM and twilight ended at 9:13 PM. Id. Captain Price of
the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office was first on the scene, after receiving a call about J.T.’s death at
7:20 PM. Transcript, supra note 1, at 79. Deputy Epley received a call at 7:37 PM. and arrived at the
house at 7:49 PM. Id. at 17. The appellate opinion summarizes these times accurately as approximately
7:30 PM. Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 587.
27
“Night” has more than one definition, but almost all are anchored in relation to sunset or to an
identifiable level of darkness. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ABRIDGED 485
(William Sprague ed., 9th ed. 1915) (“As to what is reckoned night, and what day, for this purpose:
anciently the day was accounted to begin only at sunrising, and to end immediately upon sunset[.]”);
Black’s Law Dictionary has four separate definitions and the first three confirm the relationship to
darkness or sunset: “1. The time from sunset to sunrise. 2. Darkness; the time when a person's face is not
discernible . . . . 3. Thirty minutes after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise . . .” The fourth definition
in Black’s Law Dictionary – “evening” – could lead to confusion between evening and night, and some
of the references to police activity on June 11th and 12th. For additional clarification, the North Carolina
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correct and both opinions in the state supreme court were wrong on that
point.28
“Night” appears frequently in work by legal scholars. One author quotes
the appellate court on the “late afternoon . . . nap,” and only seven pages
later refers to a “midnight shooting.”29 Another refers to the afternoon “nap,”
then says that Judy Norman “had several hours to ‘cool off’ before she killed
her sleeping husband” and discusses whether “she could have just fled into
the night.”30 Authors who read in a long period of sleep cannot cite facts for
that time frame, and “midnight shooting” is a fantasy or projection with no
support in any account. These writers imagine a luxury of time that Judy did
not possess.
These subtle differences about time frame reveal questions important to
the temporal urgency of danger that are lost in arguments based on “night”:
How long could J.T. be expected to remain asleep? Did the judges
understand that he was napping before trafficking activity that night? That
the nap might last only minutes longer? Did the majority read in a longer
period when they coupled “night” and “sleep,” or when they treated the
Norman case as “somewhat similar” to a defendant who hid from a vengeful
enemy for eight hours before taking a shotgun to his home and killing him
while he slept?31 Should Judy’s proven inability to resist J.T.’s attacks matter
in evaluating the urgency of the impending threat? What quantum of time
would be ample for her to make yet another attempt to find help? How
should we consider uncertainty—does a reasonable person measure the time
remaining in a nap from the longest or the shortest possibility? And should
that estimate consider patterns recognized among abusers?32 I will argue that
burglary statute, judges adopted a light-based standard: it is night when not enough light remains to see
a person’s face without artificial lighting. State v. McKeithan, 537 S.E.2d 526, 533 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
On the day of the shooting, police would have been on the scene for some time; casual references in the
transcript sometimes include either term, “evening” or “night.” See Transcript, supra note 1, 43–45, 85
(using the terms “evening” and “night”).
28
Compare Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (indicating that police arrived in the evening), with
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 9 (stating that police arrived at night) (majority opinion), and Norman II, 378
S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting) (noting that police arrived in the evening around 8:00 PM).
29
Compare Joshua Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 457, 461 (2006) [hereinafter Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers]
(“afternoon . . . nap”) (quoting Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 587–89), with id. at 468 n.27 (“midnight
shooting”). See also Joshua Dressler, Feminist (or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law: Some
Critical Reflections, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1475, 1489 (2010) [hereinafter Dressler, Feminist (or
“Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law] (“[D]eadly force was not immediately necessary in the middle
of the night while J.T. slept.” (second emphasis added)).
30
See Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71
N.C. L. Rev. 371, 393 (1993) (“nap”); id. at 374–75 n.5 (“[O]f course, Ms. Norman had several hours to
‘cool off’ . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 393–94 (treating escape as impractical or unavailable and
discussing potential risk if she “just fled into the night”).
31
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13–14 (majority opinion) (citing State v. Mize, 340 S.E.2d 439 (N.C.
1986)).
32
In a thoughtful essay, Professor Joan Krause evokes the experience of parents:
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the mis-descriptions of time frame by judges and scholars reveal stereotypes
about impaired perception in battered women and, simultaneously, reveal a
problem in professorial attachment to our own interpretations: How else
could “afternoon” turn into “midnight” without anyone noticing the change?
Part I retells Judy Norman’s story chronologically. Part II reviews the
range of theories of intimate partner violence from the 1980s to the present,
unpacks the expert testimony at trial, and traces the way in which the
Norman appellate opinions recast expert testimony on “coercive control”
into a “syndrome” framework. Part III criticizes scholarly misreadings that
sprang from oversimplified and mistaken concepts about the “syndrome”
and battered women.
Part IV explores ways to clarify these misunderstandings. Courts and
scholars divide on whether sleep rules out imminent threat from the abuser.
Part IV.A covers contradictions in theories about the legal ramifications of
sleep, while Part IV.B explores questions about timing and threat that arise
if resistance to violent, forcible sex trafficking may justify the use of deadly
force in self-defense. Part IV.C addresses the relevance of witness
perceptions of threat to the jury’s evaluation of reasonableness, and Part
IV.D asks what interventions, if any, could have saved Judy Norman without
killing her husband. Focusing on imminence and justification, Part IV.E
addresses Joshua Dressler’s argument that justification must be unavailable
and an excuse defense based on duress would be a more principled and
effective way to address Judy Norman’s situation.
I. JUDY NORMAN’S STORY
A. History of the Marriage
Judy Ann Laws married John Thomas Norman when she was fifteenyears old and pregnant; he was five years older.33 Judy had two children by
Unless actually comatose, a sleeping abuser is merely seconds away from being an
awakened abuser—and research demonstrates that abusers (particularly when
intoxicated) tend to sleep lightly, demand that their partners be present when they
awaken, and resume the abuse immediately. . . . By way of loose analogy, as parents
of infants well know, a sleeping baby is merely seconds away from being a screaming
baby. Indeed, it would not be inaccurate to describe my daughter’s afternoon nap as
an “imminent meltdown”—one that my husband and I may be uniquely qualified to
predict.
Joan H. Krause, Distorted Reflections of Battered Women Who Kill: A Response to Professor
Dressler, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 555, 563 n.35 (2007).
33
Transcript, supra note 1, at 127. The majority opinion in the North Carolina Supreme Court
recognized implicitly how young Judy was when they married. See Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (“At the
time of the killing, the thirty-nine-year-old defendant and her husband had been married almost twentyfive years and had several children.”). Most testimony at trial focused on the period around J.T.’s death,
but prior abuse was of vital importance to understanding that period. Testimony from Judy herself, Dr.
Tyson, and Mark Navarra fills in some of the history and context of the marriage. Id. at 47 (Mark
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34

the year she turned eighteen. During the first five years of marriage, J.T.
did not abuse her.35 Sometimes she worked as a waitress, but after J.T.
started drinking and became abusive, she could no longer hold a job. J.T.
said she did not make enough money as a waitress; he would come to her
workplace and make her leave.36 He began forcing her into prostitution.37
While they still lived in North Carolina, Judy had her third child.38 J.T.
had family in Chicago, and they moved there in late 1968 or early 1969.39
The family lived on welfare and the money from Judy’s prostitution.40
Sometimes, J.T. threw her out of the house without a coat or shoes and
forbade her to come back without enough money; sometimes, she had to
sleep in the car.41 When he spent the money on alcohol, Judy shoplifted food
for the children.42
In Chicago, they had two more children.43 Judy gave birth to their fourth
child prematurely in 1969 after J.T. beat her and kicked her down a flight of
Navarra); id. at 126 (Judy); id. at 152 (Dr. Tyson). Public records drawing from the Social Security Death
Index show their dates of birth: J.T. Norman in 1940 and Judy Ann Laws in 1945. John Norman, SOCIAL
SECURITY DEATH INDEX 1935–2014, https://www.ancestry.com (under “Search” and “Birth, Marriage
& Death” search in the first name field for “John,” last name field “Norman,” birth year field “1940,”
and “North Carolina” in the location field); Judy A. Norman, SOCIAL SECURITY DEATH INDEX 1935–
2014, https://www.ancestry.com (under “Search” and “Birth, Marriage & Death” search in the first name
field for “Judy A.,” last name field “Norman,” birth year field “1945,” and “North Carolina” in the
location field).
34
See Jerry Dean Norman, NORTH CAROLINA BIRTH INDEXES, https://www.ancestry.com (citing
Jerry Dean Norman as born in 1961); Robert Thomas Norman, NORTH CAROLINA BIRTH INDEXES,
https://www.ancestry.com (citing Robert Thomas Norman as born in 1962 to John and Judy).
35
See Transcript, supra note 1, at 134 (stating that abuse began after five years, when he began
drinking); see also State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
“Norman was an alcoholic. He had begun to drink and to beat defendant five years after they were
married.”).
36
See id. at 136 (stating that when she worked as a waitress he would force her to quit, describing
how he came to one of her jobs and forced her to walk out twice in one day, and concluding that “[h]e
wouldn’t let [her] work like that” because she did not make enough money).
37
See id. at 128 (describing how he would beat her if she did not prostitute); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d
at 10 (stating that her husband “forced her to make money by prostitution . . . .”).
38
See Phyllis Christine Norman, NORTH CAROLINA BIRTH INDEXES, https://www.ancestry.com
(citing Phyllis as born to John and Judy in 1968).
39
See Transcript, supra note 1, at 137 (quoting that Judy’s son was “shot in Chicago” and her
husband had relatives in Chicago).
40
See id. at 145 (referencing testimony of Judy Norman that family lived on welfare and she worked
as a prostitute).
41
See id. at 55–56 (recording testimony of Mark Navarr, who lived with J.T. and Judy in Chicago
and North Carolina for about a year and a half and observed these conditions).
42
Id. at 136.
43
The move to Chicago took place between November 1968, when Phyllis was born in North
Carolina, and August 1969, when John Wayne Norman was born prematurely in Chicago. See supra note
38 (establishing that Phyllis Christine Norman was born in North Carolina in 1968); see also Transcript
supra note 1, at 149 (stating that Judy’s “son was born in ’69 in Chicago.”). Loretta, the youngest child,
was born in December 1978. See North Carolina Voter Registration, LEXISNEXIS,
https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/gateway.page (follow “Public Records” to “Voter Registration”
hyperlink; search First Name field for “Loretta” and Last Name field for “Hines” and select the State as
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44

stairs. The appellate opinion described this attack during pregnancy and
noted correctly that four of Judy’s five children were still living at the time
she shot J.T.45 That led some scholars to infer that the premature baby had
died,46 but the transcript reveals an even more extreme form of control over
Judy. John Wayne Norman weighed only one and a half pounds at birth.
During the six months he remained in the hospital, J.T. forbade Judy to visit
him.47 When John Wayne finally left the hospital, J.T. gave the baby to his
sister to raise. Judy did not see the boy until he was twelve years old when
he found her and asked to live with her. She said yes.48
Whatever Judy feared in that moment at the top of those stairs, she could
not have imagined that if she and the baby both survived, they would have
no contact for twelve years (even if they had argued about giving the baby
to his sister, she would not have anticipated an attack that risked the baby’s
life). The abuser enhances power and control when the target cannot prepare
physically or emotionally against pain, fear, and loss.49 The most dangerous
batterers use knowledge they gain through intimacy to inflict pain and fear
with unique effectiveness for a particular victim.50 And Judy was vulnerable.
She had no right to legal counsel in her effort to find safety with her children
or regain custody of her son, and her criminal record for prostitution and

“North Carolina”); Judy Norman, Harrelson Funeral and Cremation Services, http://hosting9639.tributes.com/obituary/show/Judy-Norman-95106577 (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) (stating in Judy’s
obituary that Loretta Hines was her daughter). The family did not return to North Carolina until late 1983.
See Transcript, supra note 1, at 190 (verifying through Lemuel Splawn’s testimony that J.T. had been
away for almost twenty years).
44
Transcript, supra note 1, at 151; State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App.
1988).
45
Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 587. Cf. State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989)
(stating that Judy had “several children”).
46
See Jane Maslow Cohen, Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do They Mean to Morality and for
the Criminal Law?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 757, 787 n.64 (1996) (“When Mrs. Norman was pregnant with
her fifth child, her husband beat her and kicked her down a flight of steps, causing the premature birth,
and death, of the baby the next day.”); Tania Tetlow, Criminalizing "Private" Torture, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 183, 199 (2016) (“He knocked her down the stairs while she was pregnant, which resulted in the
death of their child.”).
47
See Transcript, supra note 1, at 151 (testimony of Judy Norman) (stating his birth weight, that
“he stayed in the hospital for six months,” and that her “husband wouldn’t even let [her] go see him”).
48
See id. (stating that “my husband’s sister kept him until he was twelve (12) years old” and
indicating that John Wayne Norman was still living with Judy at the time of the trial).
49
Cf. HARLAN K. ULLMAN & JAMES P. WADE, DEFENSE GROUP INC., SHOCK AND AWE:
ACHIEVING RAPID DOMINANCE xxiv (1996) (explaining the goal of the experts who developed the
military campaign strategy of “Shock and Awe” was “to affect the will, perception, and understanding
of the adversary to fit or respond to our strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and
Awe”).
50
EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 241
(2007) (describing the “technology” of coercive control—the methods that make threats credible,
punishments compelling, and escapes difficult).
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shoplifting would have increased her fear of turning to courts for help.51
Given the high risk of failure and the credibility of J.T.’s threats to kill, she
probably did not consider legal action.
Abuse was linked to J.T.’s drinking. He hit Judy “most every
day . . . whenever he got drunk.”52 Judy said that they “got along very well
when he was sober”53 and that he was “a good guy” when he was not drunk.54
But the drinking—and abuse—continued. He beat her with his fists, with a
baseball bat, and with household items turned into weapons, including
bottles, glasses, an ashtray, a shoe, and a flyswatter.55 When he beat her, she
cried but did not fight back.56 Beyond physical violence and unpredictable
terror, he forced her to sleep on the floor, sometimes to eat pet food from the
dog dish, and sometimes to bark like a dog.57
Judy tried fleeing in search of help. In 1973, before Chicago had any
hotlines or shelters,58 she was admitted for treatment at Chicago-Reid
Mental Health Center.59 There, she described battering incidents and was
diagnosed with injuries consistent with abuse. Two days later, she left after
J.T. arrived at the hospital and made frightening threats.60
At trial, Judy’s lawyer asked why she had not left her husband. She
answered that she had left him many times: “I’ve . . . stayed all night in
hotels to get away from him; he’d find me. I’ve walked to my son’s house
with no coat on . . . in snow to get away from him.”61 Whenever she left,

51

See Transcript, supra note 1, at 136 (testimony of Judy Norman) (describing arrests in Chicago
for shoplifting and prostitution).
52
Id. at 57 (testimony of Mark Navarra); State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C.
1989) (majority opinion); State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
53
Transcript, supra note 1, at 181 (testimony of Dr. Rollins); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (majority
opinion).
54
Transcript, supra note 1, at 144 (testimony of Judy Norman); Norman II, 328 S.E.2d at 10.
55
Norman II, 328 S.E.2d at 10 (stating that physical abuse included striking her with various
objects); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 587 (“He would beat defendant with whatever was handy-his fist, a fly
swatter, a baseball bat, his shoe, or a bottle”); see Transcript, supra note 1, at 54 (“fly swatter”), 65 (“ball
bats”), 66 (“shoe”), 129 (“ashtray”; “fist”), 130 (“broke bottles and glasses on her and hit her with
shoes”).
56
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 21 (Martin, J., dissenting). Subsequent research would reveal that
resistance strategies work for some women but are much less effective than many other strategies. Lisa
Goodman et al., Women’s Resources and Use of Strategies as Risk and Protective Factors for Reabuse
Over Time, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 311, 327–32 (2005). In addition, resistance increases the
risk of increased violence. Id. at 329–30.
57
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 587; Transcript, supra note 1, at 65.
58
See History, CONNECTIONS FOR ABUSED WOMEN & THEIR CHILDREN, www.cawc.org/missionhistory/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) (describing the development of domestic violence services provided
by Connections for Abused Women and their Children (CAWC), including the first organizational
meeting leading to a task force (1976), first hotline (1977), and first shelter (1979)).
59
Transcript, supra note 1, at 162 (testimony of Dr. Tyson).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 135.
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62

“[h]e’d come and find me and he’d beat me up.” J.T. controlled the money-Judy had no way to get another place to live. She had nowhere to go, and
he had threatened to kill her if she left.63
The record hints at extraordinary violence in J.T. Norman’s family but
does not provide details. Judy testified in court about what happened to one
of her sons who died in Chicago:
A. [He] was shot . . . .
Q. Was that while he was beating his wife?
A. It was prior . . . to him beating on her, yes.64
Then Judy’s attorney asked, “What happened to [J.T.’s] brother’s wife in
Chicago?”65 Any harm that befell Judy’s sister-in-law would have made
J.T.’s threats more credible,66 but the judge sustained that objection and
another when Judy’s lawyer asked whether John Wayne, raised by her
husband’s sister, was violent toward the other children.67
Judy may have hoped that life would improve when they returned to
North Carolina in November 1983.68 Her oldest son stayed in Chicago. The
household included three of their children (Phyllis was seventeen at the time
of her father’s death, John Wayne was fourteen, and Loretta was six) as well
as Phyllis’s baby, Little Mark, and her boyfriend Mark Navarra.69 The new
residence was in the heart of Judy’s family, in a community of small cinder
block houses one or two miles outside Spindale.70 Her mother, sister, and
grandmother lived in adjoining houses or just across a small country road.71
In general, strong social support reduces the recurrence of violence, so
hope for change would have been rational. For women who experience the
most severe violence, however, social support networks make no difference
to the frequency or intensity of violence; severe violence is equally likely to
recur no matter how much social support she has.72 In his last days, J.T.
62
Id. (testimony of Judy Norman). Judy further testified that she “couldn't leave him. He threatened
to kill me if I’d leave. I’ve left him, and he’d come and find me, and then beat me.” Id. (emphasis added).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 137; see also Death Certificate, Robert Norman (Chicago 1982).
65
Transcript, supra note 1, at 137.
66
Batterers sometimes make threats by referring to other incidents of death and violence. STARK,
supra note 50, at 2451.
67
Transcript, supra note 1, at 137–38; id. at 151.
68
Id. at 145. The family returned from Chicago in November and spent two Christmases in North
Carolina. Id.
69
Id. at 183 (stating that her son remained in Chicago); id. at 67, 70, 72, 151 (describing members
of household).
70
Id. at 17 (testimony of Deputy R.H. Epley).
71
Id. at 83–84 (testimony of Laverne Laws).
72
Goodman et al., Women’s Resources and Use of Strategies, supra note 56, at 330–31. In general,
“social support [was] critical to victims.” Id. at 330. “[E]ven taking into account the severity of prior
violence and other key predictors, participants’ social support networks protected them against future
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73

spoke angrily of Judy’s family, which suggests that they tried to support
her, but their presence did not protect her. Mark Navarra said of this physical
abuse: “[H]e did it a lot when other people was around; he was showing off
or something.”74
Judy might also have hoped for improvement when J.T. participated in
mental health counseling on a “sporadic” basis.75 Even after separation,
battered women are more likely to attempt to work out relationships when
their partners participate in counseling.76 J.T.’s counselor, Charlie Paige,
testified at trial that he had seen Judy in the course of his work with J.T. and
observed black eyes and bruises on her face and shoulder.77
Her life in North Carolina was consistent with life in Chicago—
violence, forced prostitution, death threats, and humiliation. Judy’s
daughter, Phyllis, testified, “She would beg him not to make her to go out
. . . . He would just slap her and tell her to get on out there and do what a
woman’s supposed to do.”78 Daily, J.T. took her to the truck stop more than
forty-five minutes away.79 He demanded that she bring back at least one
hundred dollars each day and beat her if she did not get enough money.80
Sometimes Phyllis and Mark went with her to avoid the violent attacks J.T.
made when he took Judy.81
The majority said that J.T. made “humor” of her prostitution in front of
family and friends,82 but that sanitized summary misses the lessons about
violence.” Id. However, for one-fourth of study participants who “had experienced the most severe
violence, social support did not serve as a protective factor. Reabuse was equally likely at every level of
social support. For these women, it may be that the violence was so severe that the support of family and
friends was not sufficient to stop or prevent it.” Id. at 330–31.
73
Transcript, supra note 1, at 82.
74
Id. at 57, 87, 194; State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); State
v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989) (majority opinion).
75
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; Transcript, supra note 1, at 92 (testimony of Charlie Paige). Early
on the day of his death, Judy urged J.T. to accept help for alcoholism. Id. at 139; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d
at 10 (majority opinion). The record does not show what moved J.T. to enter counseling, but there is no
evidence in the record of events that would trigger mandatory participation, so it may have been
voluntary.
76
See, e.g., EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER: BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN
ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 4, 87–88 (1988) (identifying batterer participation
in counseling as one of the strongest predictors that a woman would leave shelter and return to the
batterer).
77
Transcript, supra note 1, at 97.
78
Id. at 63 (testimony of Phyllis Norman).
79
Id. at 63–64, 128 (describing “truckstop” as a rest area near Kings Mountain). According to
Google Maps, it takes about forty-five minutes to drive from Spindale to Kings Mountain; I-85 is a short
distance past Kings Mountain—the rest stop would be farther. Directions from Spindale, NC to Kings
Mountain, NC, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.maps.google.com (enter “Spindale, NC” into the search
field, then follow the “Directions” hyperlink, and search the destination field for “Kings Mountain, NC”).
80
Transcript, supra note 1, at 64; State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App.
1988); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (majority opinion).
81
Transcript, supra note 1, at 128.
82
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (majority opinion).
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power that J.T. built into Judy’s humiliation. When he had friends over to
drink, J.T. would command their six-year-old daughter, Loretta, to tell his
friends what her mother did for a living.83 Loretta had to answer, “Momma
sucks dicks,” and if she failed to say it, he would “whup her.”84 The visitors
would laugh, and Judy would hang her head.85 Phyllis said this happened all
the time.86 With every performance by Loretta, J.T. proved again that Judy’s
children could be used to hurt her, and that if they tried to protect her, they
would suffer.
Judy could drive, but driving did not mean freedom. When she left, J.T.
would find her and force her to return.87 When they traveled, J.T. would
make her take the wheel—a method often used by kidnappers—and beat her
while she struggled to control the vehicle.88 Mark Navarra testified that two
weeks before his death, as the family left to drive to Chicago for a visit, J.T.
told Judy he would “beat her from the house to the State line.” 89 J.T. poured
hot coffee on Judy and beat her while she drove, and “that went on for a
while . . . . I couldn’t go to sleep because . . . when he got to hitting her; he’d
reach over and hit her, and she’s swerv[ing] in and out of the road . . . it was
going on quite a bit.”90
There were additional indications that her children were in danger. J.T.
tried to make his daughter Phyllis go into prostitution.91 Dr. Tyson testified
that there was evidence J.T. had begun to make threats against the children.92
Although the regime was much the same, it could not be described as
stable. This was deliberate and studied instability—a pattern in which J.T.’s
predictable ability to carry out threats and inflict pain combined with
unpredictable attacks that used both violence and nonphysical methods to
maintain control. The continuing patterns included reliance on Judy’s
income, forcing her to sell sex against her will, turning her compliance into
another weapon against her, and sometimes even horror (the denial of
83

Transcript, supra note 1, at 72–74.
Id. at 73–78 (testimony of Phyllis Norman); id. at 193 (testimony of Lemuel Splawn). Phyllis
told the judge that her father would “whup” her sister if she did not say it; when the jury returned, the
judge admitted the testimony about what Loretta said but sustained the objection to what J.T. would do
if she did not say it. Id. at 78.
85
Id. at 76. When asked, “What did your momma do at that time?” Phyllis Norman answered, “She
just drops her head; she can’t do nothing ‘cause if she’d say something, my dad would get up and beat
her.” Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 135.
88
Id. at 133–34.
89
Id. at 58.
90
Id. at 59; see also infra notes 155–97 and accompanying text (describing additional incidents of
beating Judy while she was driving).
91
See Transcript, supra note 1, at 67 (indicating that Phyllis answered “yes” to a question about
this attempt by her father). The prosecutor’s objection was sustained and the transcript has no further
details. Id.
92
Id. at 170.
84
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contact with one son, the death of another in an act of domestic violence,
and the prospect of having her daughter pushed into prostitution).93 Another
thread also ran through both Chicago and North Carolina: Judy’s efforts to
find help met with frustration.
On the night of June 10 and morning of June 11, Phyllis and Mark went
with Judy to the truck stop.94 J.T. arrived later, already drunk.95 He said Judy
did not have enough money and began hitting her in the face with his fist.96
He poured hot coffee on her.97 When she tried to escape, he slammed the car
door against her.98 This was brutal coercion, but the family did not describe
it as different from other days at the truck stop.
In the early morning hours of June 11, they were on the way home,
driving two cars because J.T. had come separately.99 The police stopped J.T.
and arrested him for drunk driving, and he spent the rest of the night in jail.100
He called Judy, and her mother, Laverne, bailed him out; he was released in
the morning.101
B. Assessing Threat: Crisis and Death
This Section follows the last day and a half of J.T.’s life. His threats
became more grotesquely abusive and lethal. Judy was very frightened.
After she tried to kill herself, the pace quickened further and she sought help
urgently. Her mother, daughter, and social workers tried to help, but the
violence and threats got worse. The dissent in the North Carolina Supreme
Court would point to the actions and perceptions of eyewitnesses in
assessing danger, the credibility of J.T.’s threats, and the reasonableness of
Judy Norman’s fear. To understand the family’s fear of J.T., readers must
face a hard question: If someone held your own mother in front of your eyes
and put out a cigarette forcibly on her collar bone, what threat would be
sufficient to make you stand still and take no action?

93

Id. at 67, 137, 151.
Id. at 48; State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989); id. at 19 (Martin, J.,
dissenting); State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
95
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588.
96
Transcript, supra note 1, at 128–29 (testimony of Judy Norman, describing J.T. punching her in
the face); id. at 49 (testimony of Mark Navarra, stating that J.T. punched Judy). See also Norman II, 378
S.E.2d at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting) (noting that Phyllis testified that J.T. had beaten her mother after
arriving); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (indicating that J.T. was “hitting defendant in the face with his
fist”).
97
Id. at 48–49 (testimony of Mark Navarra); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (noting that J.T. threw
hot coffee on Judy at the truck stop).
98
Transcript, supra note 1, at 129.
99
See id. (indicating that J.T. drove a car borrowed from Judy’s sister).
100
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588;
Transcript, supra note 1, at 49, 57 (testimony of Mark Navarra); id. at 129 (testimony of Judy Norman).
101
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting); Transcript, supra note 1, at 129.
94
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1. June 11th
J.T. reacted violently to the experience of arrest and jail. He returned
home on June 11th in a state of unprecedented rage. 102 He began hitting Judy
immediately and kept it up all day, slapping her and throwing “anything that
was in his reach” at her, including glasses, ashtrays, and beer bottles.103 He
asked her to make him a sandwich but then threw it on the floor and
demanded that she make another.104 He threw the second sandwich on the
floor as well and told Judy that he did not want her to touch it. She used a
paper towel to handle the bread and luncheon meat for the third sandwich.
He smeared it in her face.105
Judy’s mother Laverne said that by late afternoon, Judy was unusually
frightened: “She was real nervous, and she didn’t act like herself; she acted
scared all the time.”106 This description implies that Judy did not usually
manifest such extreme fear, another indication that even though violence
was a daily event, the intensity of violence and indications of danger were
increasing. The police received a call about a domestic quarrel, and Officer
Price said that he arrived after dark.107 Judy’s face was bruised and she was
crying.108 She said J.T. had been beating her all day and that she “could not
take it any longer.”109 Officer Price advised her to go to the county jail to
“take out a warrant on him.”110 She said if she did that, he would kill her.111

102
Transcript, supra note 1, at 49–50 (testimony of Mark Navarra) (discussing how J.T. returned
from jail and “started with Judy”; id. at 57–58 (stating that J.T. “looked real mad,” angrier than Navarra
had ever seen him); id. at 131 (testimony of Judy Norman) (discussing J.T.’s behavior after returning
from jail); See also Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (stating that “[t]he defendant's evidence also tended to
show that her husband seemed angrier than ever after he was released from jail and that his abuse of the
defendant was more frequent); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (stating that when J.T. “was released from
jail the next morning, on 11 June 1985, he was extremely angry and beat defendant”).
103
Transcript, supra note 1, at 129 (testimony of Judy Norman); see also Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at
588 (describing J.T.’s anger and violence upon release from jail).
104
Transcript, supra note 1, at 50 (testimony of Mark Navarra).
105
Id. at 131 (testimony of Judy Norman); see also Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (discussing the
sandwich incident); id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting) (discussing the sandwich incident); Norman I, 366
S.E.2d at 588 (discussing the sandwich incident).
106
Transcript, supra note 1, at 81 (testimony of Laverne Laws); see also Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at
588 (“Defendant’s mother said defendant acted nervous and scared.”).
107
Transcript, supra note 1, at 35 (testimony of Donald Price) (describing time of this June 11th
incident as after 8:00 or 8:30 PM and noting that it was already dark; but cf. Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 19
(Martin, J., dissenting) (stating time as 8:00 PM but not mentioning the testimony about darkness).
108
Transcript, supra note 1, at 36 (testimony of Donald Price).
109
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588;
Transcript, supra note 1, at 36 (testimony of Donald Price).
110
Transcript, supra note 1, at 39 (testimony of Donald Price).
111
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (stating that the sheriff’s deputies advised Judy Norman to file a
complaint, but “she was afraid her husband would kill her if she had him arrested”); id. at 19 (Martin, J.,
dissenting) (discussing that the police officer told Judy Norman “he could do nothing for her unless she
took out a warrant on her husband,” but if she did, she said he “would kill her”); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d
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Officer Price told her he could not do anything for her until she got “a
warrant in my hand where I could place him under arrest.”112
Some years before the events in Norman in 1985, the Norman case,
which occurred in 1985, a warrant would have been necessary. As in most
states, police could make warrantless arrests for misdemeanors only if they
witnessed the violent act or saw threats involving property or physical
injury.113 In 1979, however, North Carolina had passed an act permitting
warrantless arrests in domestic violence cases.114 Officer Price’s statement
reflected a gap between law and practice that the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994 (VAWA) addressed by funding law enforcement training
programs.115
When Officer Price left without arresting J.T., Judy went into the
bathroom with a cup of coffee and took seventeen or eighteen “nerve
pills.”116 Judy had never brought coffee to the bathroom before, and Phyllis
wondered why she had done it. Phyllis went into the bathroom and found
the empty pill bottle.117 Laverne was at the house and heard Phyllis tell her
father that Judy had taken some pills. J.T. shouted that they should let her
die; he threatened to cut Judy’s heart out and cut off her breast.118 He cursed

at 588 (“The officer advised [Judy Norman] to take out a warrant on her husband, but [she] responded
that if she did so, he would kill her.”); Transcript, supra note 1, at 39 (testimony of Donald Price).
112
Transcript, supra note 1, at 39 (testimony of Donald Price); see Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 19
(Martin, J., dissenting) (“The officer told her that he could do nothing for her unless she took out a warrant
on her husband.”). Laverne also believed J.T. would kill Judy if she “took a warrant out.” Transcript,
supra note 1, at 90 (testimony of Laverne Laws).
113
See Lisa G. Lerman, Expansion of Arrest Power: A Key to Effective Intervention, 7 VT. L. REV.
59, 64–67 (1982) (explaining the technical aspects of warrantless arrests); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law
of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970–1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 61–63 (1992)
(explaining the national movement to push for warrantless arrest).
114
See Act of Jan. 10, 1979, ch. 561, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 592–93 (providing remedies for
domestic violence); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-5 (Supp. 1979) (“Local law enforcement officer . . . is
authorized to take whatever steps are reasonably necessary to protect the complainant from harm.”). This
act authorized warrantless arrests for violations of protective orders. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-4
(Supp. 1979); Lerman, supra note 113, at 67 (citing the North Carolina statute section 50B-4 as requiring
police to make arrests when there is probable cause of spousal assault).
115
See, e.g., Factsheet: The Violence Against Women Act, WHITE HOUSE,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/vawa_factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 6,
2018) (“VAWA funds train over 500,000 law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and other
personnel every year.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NJC152159, GRANTS TO COMBAT VIOLENT CRIME
AGAINST WOMEN: PROPOSED REGULATIONS 2–3 (1994) (discussing the national impact of Violence
Against Women Act of 1994).
116
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588; Transcript, supra note 1, at 67–68
(stating that Judy Norman took coffee to the bathroom); id. at 132 (referring to “nerve pills”).
117
Transcript, supra note 1, at 67–68 (testimony of Phyllis Norman).
118
Id. at 81–82 (testimony of Laverne Laws).
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and said, “Call your brothers . . . I’m not scared of your whole family . . .
I’ll kill you, your mother and your grandmother.”119
Laverne called for an ambulance. When it arrived, Judy at first refused
to go to the hospital. She was beginning to lose consciousness; Laverne
thought Judy might die before she agreed to go.120 J.T. fought the paramedics
and refused to let them help Judy.121
In the sole example of outright defiance in this story, seventeen-year-old
Phyllis said to her father, J.T., “I ain’t letting my mother die because of
nobody.”122 She told Judy, “Momma, you’re going.”123 With Laverne’s
assistance,124 Phyllis walked her mother out past her raging father and put
Judy in the ambulance.125 J.T. continued to disrupt the paramedics; they
complained that it was hard to treat Judy and called for backup.126
Officer Price had not driven far when he received the call to return to
the Norman residence to help with J.T.127 He found a chaotic scene. J.T.
shouted that they should “[l]et the bitch die.”128 Price said they were there to
save a life, showed J.T. a club or flashlight, and threatened to arrest him: “I
started to grab him and he ran into his house . . . .”129
The paramedics worked on Judy, who appeared to be unconscious, and
took her to the hospital.130 J.T. reacted with fury, telling Phyllis to take her
“bastard” baby and get out.131 The Norman children fled and stayed the night
at Laverne’s mother’s house.132
Meanwhile, Laverne obtained a gun. J.T.’s death threats frightened her:
“He might have killed the whole family, and [I was] especially scared that
119
Id. at 82 (testimony of Laverne Laws); see Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting)
(quoting J.T. as saying “I’ll kill you, your mother and your grandmother”); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588
(“Norman also threatened to kill defendant, defendant’s mother, and defendant’s grandmother.”).
120
Transcript, supra note 1, at 82–83.
121
Id. at 36–37 (testimony of Donald Price); see Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (“[J.T.] told
[paramedics] to let [Judy Norman] die.”); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (“[J.T.] Norman was interfering
with emergency personnel who were trying to treat [Judy Norman].”).
122
Transcript, supra note 1, at 68 (testimony of Phyllis Norman).
123
Id. at 83 (testimony of Laverne Laws).
124
Id. at 55, 83 (testimony of Mark Navarra and Laverne Laws).
125
Id. at 68, 83 (testimony of Phyllis Norman and Laverne Laws).
126
Id. at 37, 39–40 (testimony of Donald Price).
127
Id. at 39.
128
State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Norman
(Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989) (stating that J.T. said they should let Judy die); (Martin, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the statement that they should let “the bitch die;” Transcript, supra note 1, at 37
(testimony of Donald Price).
129
Transcript, supra note 1, at 37, 40 (testimony of Donald Price); see also Norman II, 378 S.E.2d
at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting) (“[T]he officer was compelled to chase [J.T.] into the house.”); Norman I,
366 S.E.2d at 588 (“The law enforcement officer reached for his flashlight or blackjack and chased
Norman into the house.”).
130
Transcript, supra note 1, at 37 (testimony of Donald Price).
131
Id. at 83 (testimony of Laverne Laws).
132
Id.
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133

he would kill [Judy].” Two years earlier, Judy’s sister Janice had been the
victim of a violent home invasion.134 Janice carried a gun in her purse.135
After Laverne called the paramedics, she placed Janice’s gun in her own
purse and took it away.136
At the hospital, the emergency medical staff pumped Judy’s stomach.137
Charlie Paige, a psychologist from the mental health center, was on call that
night. He had seen J.T. occasionally for mental health counseling and had
seen Judy when she accompanied J.T.138 Paige interviewed Judy when she
woke up, sometime after 1:00 AM, and found her anxious and depressed.139
Laverne had joined Judy at the hospital.140 Charlie Paige encouraged
Judy to accept help and suggested prosecuting her husband for abuse.141
Initially, Judy was angry, but she and Laverne agreed to go to the mental
health center in the morning to consider prosecution.142 During the interview
with Paige, Judy said that she should kill her husband for what he had done
to her.143 Paige urged her to enter the Prevention of Abuse in the Home
(PATH) domestic violence shelter, but Judy was worried about her children
and wanted to stay with them.144 Paige gave Laverne a card for the shelter.145
The hospital released Judy at about 2:30 AM.146 Paige had advised Laverne

133

Id. at 82.
See id. at 116 (testimony of Janice Dyer) (testifying that, on September 4, 1983, Bobby Shepherd
broke into her house, stabbed her, attempted to rape her, and killed her niece).
135
Id. at 82 (testimony of Laverne Laws).
136
Id. Laverne took the gun to her own mother’s house nearby. Id. Later, Judy found the gun in
Laverne’s purse at Laverne’s house. Id. at 141 (testimony of Judy Norman). See also State v. Norman
(Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 19–20 (N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting) (describing Laverne's acquisition
and Judy's discovery of the gun).
137
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10 (majority opinion); see also Transcript, supra note 1, at 97
(testimony of Charlie Paige) (testifying that Judy had her stomach pumped).
138
Transcript, supra note 1, at 92, 97 (testimony of Charlie Paige).
139
Id. at 92–93 (explaining further that “anxiety” meant feeling “nervous” and “depressed” meant
feeling “hopeless [and] helpless.”). The majority opinion in Norman II omits the testimony about anxiety
and nervousness, reporting only her depression and anger. Norman II, 378 S.E.2d. at 10.
140
See Transcript, supra note 1, at 93 (testimony of Charlie Paige) (testifying that he discussed
possibilities with Judy and Laverne).
141
Id.; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10.
142
Transcript, supra note 1, at 93 (testimony of Charlie Paige); State v. Norman (Norman I), 366
S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that Judy was “angry and depressed”); Norman II, 378
S.E.2d at 10 (stating that Judy “agreed to go to the mental health center the next day to discuss”
prosecution or commitment, but she “seemed depressed” and “expressed considerable anger toward her
husband”).
143
Transcript, supra note 1, at 95 (testimony of Charlie Paige); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 10–11.
144
Transcript, supra note 1, at 96–97 (testimony of Charlie Paige).
145
Id. at 87 (testimony of Laverne Laws).
146
Id. at 88.
134
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that Judy should not return home that night, so Judy spent the rest of the
night at her grandmother’s house.147
2. June 12th
J.T. reacted to Judy’s suicide attempt with more rage.148 Judy went to
the mental health center where the staff advised her to sign papers to have
J.T. committed for his alcoholism. Judy went back and told him “J.T.,
straighten up. Quit drinking. I’m going to have you committed to help
you.”149 He answered, “If you do . . . I’ll see them coming and before they
get here, I’ll cut your throat.”150
Stories from that last day illustrate J.T.’s methods of control and the
inability of the people around them to stop his violence. Judy went to an
appointment at the food stamp office.151 At home, J.T. asked Mark Navarra
to go with him to bring her back, and Mark agreed.152 A clerk interrupted
Judy’s food stamp interview to say that J.T. was there demanding that she
go home.153 Judy became very upset and began to cry. The eligibility worker
locked the door “for safety sake” to give Judy time to calm down before she
left.154 J.T forced Judy, still groggy from the pills, to drive home, and he hit
her as they went.155 The car swerved.156 Mark told J.T. that “if he was going
to hit her, let me drive or wait until we get home . . . .”157 It is not clear
whether this request to delay a beating would have functioned as a
confrontation with J.T., and the record does not show how J.T. responded.
A little while later, they were in the car again, and J.T. was using the
same tactics. His friend, Lemuel Splawn, had invited J.T. to drive with him
to Spartanburg to pick up Splawn’s paycheck.158 Splawn was not expecting
147

Id. at 88–89; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting) (stating that Judy spent the rest
of the night at her grandmother’s house); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (“On the advice of the therapist,
defendant did not return home that night, but spent the night at her grandmother's house.”).
148
See Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (“The next day, 12 June 1985, the day of Norman’s death,
Norman was angrier and more violent with defendant than usual.”).
149
Transcript, supra note 1, at 139 (testimony of Judy Norman); see also id. at 94 (Paige observed
her presence at the center); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting).
150
Transcript, supra note 1, at 139; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11 (majority opinion); id. at 20
(Martin, J., dissenting).
151
Transcript, supra note 1, at 101–02 (testimony of Revonda Hipps, eligibility specialist); cf.
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11 (majority opinion) (stating that Judy went to “the social services office that
day to seek welfare benefits”).
152
Transcript, supra note 1, at 59–60 (testimony of Mark Navarra).
153
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11; Transcript, supra note 1, at 101 (testimony of Revonda Hipps).
154
Transcript, supra note 1, at 101–102.
155
Id. at 133–34 (testimony of Judy Norman).
156
Transcript, supra note 1, at 84 (testimony of Laverne Laws) (“He made her drive the car back
home from the food stamp office and she was from one side of the road to the other.”).
157
Id. at 60 (testimony of Mark Navarra).
158
Id. at 191 (testimony of Lemuel Splawn); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting);
State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
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159

Judy, but she was with J.T. when he arrived —which had the effect of
preventing her from engaging in more help-seeking. J.T. drove at first, but
then he pulled over and told Judy to drive. Still affected by the overdose,
Judy struggled to control the car.160 J.T. said she was following a truck too
closely and began slapping her, then poured beer over her head.161 Splawn
said, “[t]here’s no use in that. If you’re going to act like that, just take me
back home.”162 J.T. said he was going to go to sleep. “[H]e laid his head on
the arm rest, put his feet over towards her and then took his foot and kicked
her up the side of the head.”163 Splawn also testified that as they arrived to
pick up the check, J.T. threatened to “cut her breast off and shove it up her
rear end.”164
Judy had not eaten in three days.165 There was no food in the house on
June 12th.166 The young people had to go out if they wanted anything to
eat.167 Laverne sent some groceries, but J.T. made Judy put the food back in
the bag.168 He said she was not going to eat.169 Phyllis brought her a
doughnut from Laverne, but J.T. smashed it into Judy’s face.170
Laverne had been trying to help. In addition to sending food, she went
with Judy to the hospital and the food stamp office, and she had called the
paramedics on the 11th.171 On the afternoon of the 12th, when six-year-old
Loretta told her that J.T. was beating Judy again, Laverne called the police,
but they said they could do nothing without a warrant.172 She stated that she
did not try to get a warrant because “they wouldn’t accept a warrant from
me and he told her if she ever took a warrant out for him he would kill
her.”173 The police did not arrive.174

159

Transcript, supra note 1, at 191.
Id. at 133–34 (testimony of Judy Norman).
161
See id. at 133–34, 191–92 (testimony of Judy Norman and Lemuel Splawn); Norman II, 378
S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting) (describing J.T.’s assaults on Judy); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588
(same).
162
Transcript, supra note 1, at 192 (testimony of Lemuel Splawn).
163
Id.
164
Id.; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588.
165
Transcript, supra note 1, at 66 (testimony of Phyllis Norman); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20.
166
Transcript, supra note 1, at 66 (testimony of Phyllis Norman); id. at 137 (testimony of Judy
Norman).
167
Id. (testimony of Judy Norman); see also id. at 51 (testimony of Mark Navarra) (stating that
Phyllis had some money from babysitting, so they went to McDonald’s).
168
Id. at 70 (testimony of Phyllis Norman).
169
Id.; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting).
170
Transcript, supra note 1, at 131–32 (testimony of Judy Norman); State v. Norman (Norman I),
366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
171
Transcript, supra note 1, at 82, 85 (testimony of Laverne Laws).
172
Id. at 90.
173
Id.
174
Id.; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588.
160
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The advocates at PATH were trying to help. They called Laverne to
arrange for Judy to come meet with them to discuss shelter, talked with both
Laverne and Judy’s grandmother, and tried unsuccessfully to have Judy
brought to the phone.175 When Laverne’s call to police did not bring help,
she called PATH.176 PATH called the police,177 which apparently resulted in
Officer Price being dispatched to the Norman house. While Price was on the
way, he received a second call that a man had been shot.178
Meanwhile, that afternoon, the family had watched without interfering
while J.T. put out a cigarette on Judy’s collarbone.179 Testimony about this
incident came from two witnesses as well as from Judy herself.180 When
asked about Judy’s reaction, Mark Navarra said, “It hurt her . . . . [S]he was
scared.”181 When Judy’s lawyer asked Phyllis what she had done to try to
stop her father from treating her mother like this, she answered, “I was
scared to do anything. I begged him not to hit her.”182 The cigarette burn was
more than a method of inflicting pain. It showed Judy again that no one—
not even the daughter who stood up to J.T. the previous day and saved her
life—would act to stop him.
After the cigarette burn, J.T. sat cursing for a while and then told Judy,
“[l]et’s go lay down.”183 She started to lie on the smaller bed, but he said,
“[n]o, bitch . . . [d]ogs don’t sleep on beds, they sleep [on] the floor.”184 A
little while later, Phyllis came in—not to ask her mother to watch her baby,
but to get J.T.’s permission.185 In the following quotes from the transcript,
phrases important to time span or perceptions of danger are italicized. Judy
described what happened after she lay down on the floor:
A. [I]t wasn’t but a little bit till my daughter came in there and
she says, “Daddy,” says, “Let momma watch the baby while I
go to the store.” And, he says, “All right.” So I got the baby
175

Transcript, supra note 1, at 98–99 (testimony of Ann Lancaster).
Transcript, supra note 1, at 87 (testimony of Laverne Laws). In response to a question, Laverne
answered that she had called PATH, but the prosecutor’s objection was sustained, and she did not
describe the call. Id.
177
Id. at 99–100 (testimony of Anne Lancaster).
178
Id. at 42 (testimony of Donald Price) (describing two calls; first about a quarrel then about a
shooting).
179
Id. at 131 (testimony of Judy Norman); State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C.
1989); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588.
180
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting).
181
Transcript, supra note 1, at 53 (testimony of Mark Navarra).
182
Id. at 67 (testimony of Phyllis Norman).
183
Id. at 140–41 (testimony of Judy Norman); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin J., dissenting).
184
Transcript, supra note 1, at 140–41 (testimony of Judy Norman); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20
(Martin, J., dissenting); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588.
185
Transcript, supra note 1, at 141 (testimony of Judy Norman); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20
(Martin, J., dissenting) (stating that “Phyllis came in and asked her father if defendant could take care of
her baby”); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (stating that J.T. Norman “assented” to having Judy watch the
baby).
176
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and I had him on the bed. I was sitting in the floor watching
him so he wouldn’t fall off and J.T. just finally went to sleep.
Q. What happened then?
A. The baby started crying and I snuck up and took him out
there to my mother’s. I said, “Momma, watch him. I’m scared
he’ll wake J.T. up, and he’ll start fussing again.” And, I give
her the baby. I said, “Give me something for the headache; my
head is busting.” [Laverne] says, “I’ve got some pain pills in
my purse.” So I went in there to get the pain pills and the gun
was in there, and I don’t know, I just seen the gun, and I took
it out, and I went back out there and shot him.186
Judy shot three times into the back of J.T.’s head while he lay
sleeping.187
Phyllis testified that after the shots, she ran into the bedroom and saw
her mother with a gun:
A. I grabbed the gun, and I hollered, “No,” and she turned it
loose to me . . . . I looked at my dad’s head. I seen the blood
and I dropped the gun, and I ran out of the room and hollered
that he killed her. I kept on hollering, “He killed her.”
....
Q. Why did you think he’d killed her?
A. Because I would always think that he would kill her.
....
He would always said that he would kill her. He kept on telling
her and everybody else he would kill her.
....
[He said it] the day he got shot. He would say it every day. It
was constantly . . . .188
At trial, Judy’s lawyer asked her why she had killed him. She wept while
she answered:
A. Why? Because I was scared of him and I knowed when he
woke up, it was going to be the same thing, and I was scared
when he took me to the truck stop that night it was going to be
worse than he had ever been. I just couldn’t take it no more.

186
Transcript, supra note 1, at 141 (testimony of Judy Norman) (emphasis added); Norman II, 378
S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting).
187
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 9; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589.
188
Transcript, supra note 1, at 61–62 (emphasis added) (testimony of Phyllis Norman).
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There ain’t no way . . . even if means going to prison. It’s better
than living in that. That’s worse hell than anything . . . .
Q. On that day, when he threatened to kill you, did you believe
him?
A. Yes. I believed him; he would, he would kill me if he got a
chance. If he thought he wouldn’t a had to went to jail, he
would a done it . . . .189
On this fear, let us take Judy Norman at her word. On the night of the
shooting, she told a deputy sheriff that she shot J.T. because she had taken
“all she was going to take from him”190—but that statement does not
contradict her terror at the prospect of even more violent trafficking that
night. Defense witnesses corroborated J.T.’s threats of death and Judy’s
inability to escape violent trafficking.191 The crisis had brought intense fear
and urgent help-seeking, but the help she sought and others tried to give had
not protected her. She believed terrible things were going to happen—the
threat of death and the certainty of imminent, vicious, violent sexual
trafficking—and she could neither defend against them nor escape.
She feared that he was going to kill her. So did her family.192 J.T.’s
repetitive threats did not undermine his credibility: the testimony showed
that Judy, Laverne, and Phyllis all feared his lethal threats. Judy was certain
that she could not get away, and so was everyone around her.193 Judy and
Laverne both believed that J.T. would kill her instantaneously if she took out
a warrant or signed papers to have him committed.194
Even while Judy pursued a variety of strategies to find help, she
responded to specific deadly threats with strategies that studies would later

189
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11, 14; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589; Transcript, supra note 1, at 142
(emphasis added).
190
Transcript, supra note 1, at 27 (testimony of Deputy Sheriff R.H. Epley).
191
In a slightly different argument, Whitley Kaufman points to the anger in Judy’s statement at the
hospital that she should kill J.T. for what he had done to her. Kaufman, supra note 9, at 366. Kaufman
treats this as evidence that Judy killed J.T. over past wrongs rather than fear about future danger—
basically, acting for revenge rather than from fear. But anger over past wrongs does not contradict terror
in the present. The debate with regard to Norman turns on whether the judge should have allowed the
jury to consider self-defense. The jury would have weighed evidence of both anger and terror in
determining whether Judy had acted based on actual and reasonable fear.
192
Transcript, supra note 1, at 61–62 (testimony of Phyllis Norman); id. at 82 (testimony of Laverne
Laws). Part IV.C infra explores the relationship between eyewitness perception and reasonableness and
discusses the treatment of that issue in the dissent.
193
See Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 18 (Martin, J., dissenting) (analyzing imminence in light of
captivity).
194
Transcript, supra note 1, at 90, 139; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (recounting Judy’s statements
that J.T. threatened to kill her if she tried to have him committed and that he would kill her if she took
out a warrant).
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195

call “placating.” She complied—she did not defy him on those points.
Compliance with those threats did not mean that she was behaving passively
but rather that she found his death threats credible.196
Judy would not leave her children.197 Therefore, for safety, J.T. would
have to be removed effectively. But he had made a credible threat that she
would die before law enforcement could remove him.198 And as long as she
avoided the steps that would bring immediate death, she would not be able
to predict any particular instant at which a lethal attack would happen.
From the witness stand, Judy described her immediate fear that the
forced prostitution looming before her would be unendurable. She said, “it
was going to be the same thing”—beatings and forced sex with strangers.199
But she did not say that her experience would be the same as the beatings
and hot coffee two nights earlier. “[W]hen he took me to the truck stop that
night it was going to be worse than he had ever been.”200 That fear was
consistent with her suicide attempt the previous night. Both her attempt to
kill herself and her action in shooting J.T. followed incidents that proved she
could not get help and preceded the time at which he would force her to the
truck stop.
Threats of trafficking and death do not contradict each other. J.T. had
convinced the family that he would kill her.201 The threat of trafficking was
so clear, so about-to-happen-that-night, that the opinions do not treat it as a
threat but as a fact. It happened every day. If he wanted another $100, he
could kill her later.
For trafficking, the meaningful acts would not have to wait until night.
The record does not state the time at which J.T. planned to leave. Because
driving to the truck stop would take more than forty-five minutes, they could
leave during daylight and arrive after dark.202
195
See Lisa Goodman et al., The Intimate Partner Violence Strategies Index: Development and
Application, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 163, 169 (2003) [hereinafter Goodman et al., Strategies
Index] (explaining that placating strategies are “intended to change batterer behavior without challenging,
and possibly even supporting, his sense of control”).
196
Stereotypes can make avoidance of a credible threat of death seem like passivity instead of active
self-preservation.
197
Transcript, supra note 1, at 96-97 (testimony of Charlie Paige) (testifying repeatedly that Judy
would not go to the PATH shelter because she was concerned about her children and wanted to be with
them). Cf. id. at 170 (testimony of Dr. Tyson) (stating that after her suicide attempt Judy began to fear
that if she were gone J.T. would transfer the abuse he had heaped on her to her children and her family).
198
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting).
199
Id. at 11 (majority opinion).
200
Id. (emphasis added).
201
See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 1, at 61–62 (testimony of Phyllis Norman) (testifying that J.T.
said “constantly” that he would kill Judy Norman).
202
See Directions from Springdale, NC to Kings Mountain, NC, supra note 79 and accompanying
text (“[I]t takes about 45 minutes to drive from Springdale to King’s Mountain.”); for a discussion of
daylight and nightfall, see supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining that there was still daylight
remaining when J.T. Norman was killed).
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From the moment J.T. opened his eyes, events would move rapidly
toward torture and prostitution. The trafficking event would begin when he
started transporting her, or even sooner, when he began beating her to force
submission and move her toward the car. Judy could not escape while she
drove.
On their previous trip to the truck stop, J.T. had punched her in the face
while forcing her to sell oral sex. It is difficult to imagine the peculiar
humiliations and forms of pain she would face on a night when he was
angrier than ever. “[W]orse than he had ever been” as not mere conjecture
from Judy—it had abundant support in the witnesses’ descriptions of
spiraling, escalating rage and danger.
3. A Summary of Judy’s Strategies
Eighteen years after Judy shot J.T., a major study created an index of
thirty-nine strategies women use to deal with abuse and evaluated the
effectiveness of those strategies.203
Within the twenty-four hours before J.T.’s death, Judy used at least nine
strategies from the index. She used at least three of nine formal network
strategies: talking to a doctor or nurse about abuse, consulting a mental
health counselor and trying to get J.T. help for alcohol or substance abuse.
Of four strategies classified as “informal network,” Judy tried two: talking
to family or friends about protecting herself and staying with family the
night she left the hospital.204 Judy also tried one of four “legal” strategies:
talking to the police.205 The officer told her incorrectly that he could not
arrest J.T. without a warrant; indirectly, the officer acted as if no crime
occurred when J.T. fought paramedics and shouted they should let her die
after her suicide attempt. As Victoria Nourse points out, the police conveyed
a message that legal help was not available.206
During those twenty-four hours, Judy had sought help from several
sources: the police (who did not arrest J.T.), the food stamp office (where
203

Goodman et al., Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 168.
See State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that Judy
talked to family about protecting herself and stayed with family the night she left the hospital); Goodman
et. al., Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 184 (listing the four informal network strategies).
205
See Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 588 (noting that Judy told a police officer that “her husband had
been beating her all day and she could not take it any longer”); Goodman et. al., Strategies Index, supra
note 195, at 184 (listing the four legal strategies).
206
Nourse focuses on the failure of police to arrest J.T. for attempting to prevent the paramedics
from rescuing Judy after her suicide attempt and shouting that they should let her die. Victoria Nourse,
After the Reasonable Man: Getting Over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
33, 46 (2008) (“Norman’s best claim . . . is . . . that she suffered from an ongoing course of felony conduct
to which the authorities not only did nothing when done in their presence (let her die), but acted in ways
suggesting that there was no violation of law.”). Nourse argues that “the question is whether Norman can
be analogized to one who, quite literally, has been remitted to a state of nature where the government has
abandoned her to the government of her murderous husband, with no legal recourse.” Id.
204
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J.T. interrupted her visit to get her back), and the mental health center (where
she began efforts to have him committed, which halted when she believed
his threat to kill her). She also sought help at the hospital—though she was
unconscious when transported there, she talked with staff voluntarily when
she woke up. Laverne also used some of the strategies from the index,
including calling the police (a legal strategy) and obtaining a weapon (safety
planning).207
In addition, Judy used two of the five “placating” strategies in the index:
she tried to keep things quiet for him and did whatever he wanted to stop the
violence. In the abstract, placating and resisting may seem contradictory. In
fact, these are two of the strategies most frequently chosen by battered
women and, at times, by the same woman in trying to deal with violence.208
A follow-up study found that direct resistance was the strategy most
associated with the recurrence of abuse.209 Therefore, if Judy could not get
away, she was probably wise not to fight back directly.
Evaluating resistance is a more complicated issue. Judy used either one
or two resistance strategies in that twenty-four-hour period. The question is
whether to classify suicide as resistance, and authorities differ on that point.
Although suicide does not appear in the Strategies Index, some social
scientists treat it as a form of resistance.210 Captivity and impossibility of
escape would seem to be the predicates for treating suicide as resistance, as
in the historic example of captured Africans who refused to become slaves
by jumping off slave ships;211 otherwise, suicide has a very different quality.
Captivity and the possibility of escape are at the core of much of the debate
on the Norman case. Judy definitely adopted a “resistance” strategy when
she used a weapon against J.T.
She did not try to leave for the shelter. Separation is a resistance strategy
that Judy had tried in the past without success, and for which J.T. had
threatened death. (At trial, Dr. Tyson would summarize the failed efforts that

207

See Goodman et al., Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 183–84 (listing legal strategies and
safety planning strategies).
208
Id. at 178.
209
Goodman et al., Women’s Resources and Use of Strategies, supra note 56, at 328.
210
Compare Goodman et al., Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 178 (omitting suicide from a list
of resistance strategies), with Brittany E. Hayes, Women’s Resistance Strategies in Abusive
Relationships: An Alternative Framework, 3 SAGE Open, July–Sept. 2013, at 1, 4 (classifying suicide
as a form of resistance) (citing Margaret Abraham, Fighting Back: Abused South Asian Women’s
Strategies of Resistance, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE, CLASS,
GENDER, AND CULTURE 253 (Natalie J. Sokoloff & Christina Pratt eds., 2005)).
211
Telephone interview with Sherrilynn Bevel, Ph.D. (July 18, 2016). At the time of the interview,
Dr. Bevel was a doctoral candidate in the Political Science Department at the University of Chicago. Her
degree was conferred in December 2018, and currently she is the Director of Training and Special
Projects, The Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence, I am grateful to Sherri Bevel for this
insight.
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212

convinced her she could not try again.) If Judy could not have J.T.
removed, she had to bring her family with her, but it is not clear whether she
could have taken the household. Phyllis had a baby and a boyfriend, Phyllis
and Mark could not stand up to J.T., and there was no hint that either had
steady work on which to survive. Some shelters have age limits on male
children,213 and the record does not reveal whether the shelter would have
accepted John Wayne Norman, the teenager who had come back to Judy
only recently, or Mark Navarra, who was not related to Judy by blood or
marriage. The threats against family members that Laverne found credible
and J.T.’s interest in prostituting Phyllis would have kept Judy from leaving
her family behind.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE EXPERTS
A. Analytical Frameworks and Research on Intimate Partner Violence
In the late 1970s, researchers developed more than one theory to explain
dangerous and sometimes lethal patterns of violence by men against women.
In books published in 1979 and 1984, psychologist Lenore Walker linked
two of her theories in a pattern she called “Battered Woman Syndrome”214:
a “cycle of violence” that moved through stages of tension building, violent
explosion, and remorseful loving behavior, which Walker had found in twothirds of the battering relationships she studied; and her application of
Martin Seligman’s “learned helplessness” theory of depression to battered
women who could not control or escape the violence against them.215 (Later,
Seligman found problems with this application of his theory and pointed out
that passivity can be an appropriate instrumental response to danger.)216

212
See Transcript, supra note 1, at 163 (testimony from Dr. Tyson explaining her effort to get help
in Chicago in 1973); infra text accompanying notes 271–72 (summarizing Dr. Tyson’s account of Judy’s
efforts to find help); infra text accompanying notes 331–38 (same).
213
See Escaping with Older Kids, DOMESTICSHELTERS.ORG (Jan. 27, 2016),
https://www.domesticshelters.org/domestic-violence-articles-information/escaping-with-older-kids
(“Depending on how they’re staffed, some shelters may only take male children under a certain age—
usually the limit is somewhere between 12 and 18 . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
214
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 45–70 (1979); see generally LENORE E. WALKER,
THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) (analyzing and discussing issues related to the battered
woman syndrome and linking the “cycle of violence” and “learned helplessness” in her theory).
215
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 214, at 45–70 (discussing and applying
Seligman’s theory).
216
CHRISTOPHER PETERSON ET AL., LEARNED HELPLESSNESS: A THEORY FOR THE AGE OF
PERSONAL CONTROL 239 (1993) (criticizing Walker’s application of Seligman’s learned helplessness
theory to battered women, and noting tension in Walker’s work between learned helplessness and the
idea that battered women’s fears are appropriate responses to real dangers, and pointing out that passivity
can be instrumental).
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Other approaches emerging in this period that went on to greater influence
in social science included “survivor theory” and “coercive control.”217
“Battered woman syndrome” became a term of art with distinct
meanings in different fields.218 In psychology, the term identifies Walker’s
psychological theory. In legal contexts, the term “battered woman
syndrome” is often generic—an umbrella term for expert evidence on
intimate partner violence and its effects, whether the expert will or will not
apply Walker’s theories.219
Battered women’s self-defense cases do not always use expert
testimony, but experts can be critically important.220 Although some states
217
See LEE H. BOWKER, BEATING WIFE BEATING (1983) (studying women who solved the problem
of violence without leaving the relationship, an approach that is part of survivor theory); R. EMERSON
DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY 15
(1979) (“We propose that the correct interpretation of violence between husbands and wives
conceptualizes such violence as the extension of the domination and control of husbands over their
wives.”); GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 76, at 11 (naming and describing survivor theory); LEWIS
OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE: FACTS REPLACING MYTHS 78–139 (1985) (including literature review and a
chapter on coercive control).
218
See Martha R. Mahoney, Why Didn’t WE Leave? Confronting the Failure of Legal Scholars to
Move On from a “Syndrome” Framework for Intimate Partner Violence (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Why Didn’t WE Leave?], at 1 (defining “term of art” and explaining that
“battered woman syndrome” became a term of art with different meanings in different fields); 11–14
describing analytical frameworks for expert knowledge on intimate partner violence, including Lenore
Walker’s “Battered Woman Syndrome”); 15 (describing 1996 report from National Academy of Science
that described “battered woman syndrome” in passing as a framework applied to testimony in legal
cases); 17–20 (describing the development of “battered woman syndrome” as a “term of art” and
explaining how legal research methods perpetuated that term as a description of expert evidence).
Elizabeth Schneider explains that in law the phrase “battered woman syndrome” applies even more
broadly to include additional phenomena, in contrast to its specific use in psychology (“[Walker
originally used the term] as a clinical description of certain psychological effects that the trauma of
battering produces in women. Paradoxically, “battered woman syndrome” is now used as a catch-all
phrase by the media and in courtrooms to describe a great range of issues: a woman’s prior responses to
violence and the context in which those responses occurred; the dynamics of the abusive relationship; a
subcategory of post-traumatic stress disorder; or woman abuse as a larger social problem.”) ELIZABETH
M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 23–24 (2000).
219
SCHNEIDER, supra note 218, at 23–24.
220
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE VALIDITY
AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT
RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT vi-xiv (1996),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/batter.pdf [hereinafter VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE] (summarizing
findings from three reports assessing validity of expert evidence, its admissibility, the legal role of this
evidence). For some of the earliest, path-breaking descriptions of considerations in using expert evidence
in women’s self-defense cases, see generally WOMEN’S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(ELIZABETH BOCHNAK, ed.1981). See Susie Macpherson et al., Expert Testimony, in WOMEN’S SELFDEFENSE CASES, supra, at 87–97 (discussing the risks and benefits of “expert testimony on the
phenomenon of battering,” id. at 88, a variety of potential experts including mental health professionals
and law experts who have worked with battered women, id. at 90–91, and describing two types of expert
evidence—general testimony on domestic violence, its patterns, and its effects, id. at 93, and individual
evidence with expert testimony, id. at 94–97). See also Betty Levinson, Using Expert Testimony in the
Grand Jury to Avoid a Homicide Indictment for a Battered Woman: Practical Considerations for Defense
Counsel, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 239, 242–44 (1986).
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refer to evidence in general terms such as the effects of “intimate partner
violence,” many use the term “Battered Woman Syndrome” to describe the
subject of expert testimony.221 Lenore Walker’s “syndrome” theories never
defined or limited the theories other experts could apply. Experts provide
general information on intimate partner violence and may provide clinical
evaluations; law professors should not assume that clinical testimony on
“learned helplessness” defines the field.222 Some scholars who began within
a “syndrome” framework came to emphasize help-seeking and social
context by the 1990s.223 The persistence of “syndrome” terminology made
Walker’s early framework seem more durable in law than in other fields.224
Ultimately, Walker’s theory has had more influence in law than it had
in social science, but legal actors understood it differently than did social
221
As of the mid-1990s, about half the states had statutes on admissibility that referred specifically
to expert testimony on “battered woman syndrome” or “battered spouse syndrome.” VALIDITY AND USE
OF EVIDENCE, supra note 220, at 16. The other half referred more generally to “the nature and effects of
‘domestic violence,’ ‘family violence’ or ‘physical, sexual or psychological abuse’ on the beliefs,
behavior and perceptions of the person being abused.” Id. The California statute originally referred to
“Battered Woman Syndrome” evidence, but the legislature amended it, effective 2005, to refer to
“Intimate partner battering and its effects.” S. 1386, 2003–2004 Leg., 2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004) (codified
as amended at CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 2018)).
222
For example, in People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996), Lee Bowker, a sociologist, was
the expert admitted under the “battered woman syndrome” evidence statute. Id. at 3. Bowker was an
expert on help-seeking; he had studied strategies women used to end violence in their relationships
without leaving. Id. He emphasized the efforts battered women made and the constraints they faced.
Battered women employed “strategies to stop the beatings, including hiding, running away, counterviolence, seeking the help of friends and family, going to a shelter, and contacting police.” Id. His
discussion of remaining in a relationship emphasized social circumstances and constraints including
“lack of money, social isolation, lack of self-confidence, inadequate police response, and a fear (often
justified) of reprisals by the batterer.” Id.; cf. BOWKER, supra note 217, at 68–70 (listing several strategies
that battered women employ to protect themselves from their abusers, most of which are non-violent).
Expert testimony on battering and its effects (without dependence on syndrome terminology) had been
admitted since the 1970s, often without judicial resistance. See WOMEN’S SELF-DEFENSE CASES., supra
note 220, at 289–300 (providing chart of fifty of the first one-hundred cases coordinated by the Women’s
Self-Defense Project).
223
See, e.g., MARY ANN DUTTON, EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATTERED WOMAN: A MODEL
FOR ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 41–42 (1992) (naming formal and informal help-seeking
strategies used by battered women to escape, avoid, and protect themselves against abuse); Mary Ann
Douglas, The Battered Woman Syndrome, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 39, 43 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed., 1987) (“It is essential to
remember that learned helplessness is often based on the realistic belief that it is not safe to engage in
help-seeking behaviors.”); see also Kathleen J. Ferraro, The Words Change, but the Melody Lingers: The
Persistence of the Battered Woman Syndrome in Criminal Cases Involving Battered Women, 9 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 110, 113 (2003) [hereinafter Words Change but Melody Lingers] (discussing active
help-seeking strategies and how social constructs of femininity “define[] working women, lesbians, and
women of color as ‘less feminine.’”).
224
See, e.g., Mary Ann Dutton et al., Update of the “Battered Woman Syndrome” Critique
VAWNET 3 (2009), http://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/2016-09/AR_BWSCritique.pdf
(“It is in the legal (rather than clinical) arena that BWS continues to be most firmly embedded and to
receive the most attention.”). See infra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing explanation by
sociologist Kathleen Ferraro of changes in the field and the persistence of “syndrome” concepts).
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scientists. Legal actors who treated “learned helplessness” as a literal term
distorted Walker’s theory. That approach ignored both her repeated criticism
of the idea that battered women were in fact helpless and her
acknowledgment of both the genuine possibility of lethal danger and the
increased danger of lethality at the time of separation.225
The belief that Walker meant literal helplessness led some legal scholars
to assume that experts would describe a battered woman’s sense of
entrapment as a belief that a reasonable person would not share, usually
described as only a subjective belief. For example, Joshua Dressler
supported the relevance of expert evidence to the defendant’s subjective
belief but not to reasonable belief: “Although some subjectivization of the
‘reasonable person’ standard is appropriate . . . it is a contradiction in terms
to describe the ‘reasonable person’ as one who suffers from emotional
paralysis or whose fear causes her to misperceive reality.”226 To be fair,
Walker’s work created some ambiguity on this point because she believed
women could perceive options to escape more clearly when they overcame
learned helplessness.227 Nonetheless, her rejection of absolute helplessness
was clear and consistent.
As sociologists and psychologists studied coercive control, they
examined the patterns and effectiveness of physical and nonphysical

225
See, e.g., LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 42 (2d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter BWS 2d 2000]. Walker stated that:

[T]he issue of the woman’s response to violent attacks . . . has been further clouded
by the mythology that she behaves in a manner that is either extremely passive or
mutually aggressive. Rather, . . . battered women develop survival or coping skills
that keep them alive with minimal injuries.
Id. at 40. “Learned helplessness was confused with being helpless, and not its original intended
meaning of having lost the ability to predict that what you do will make a particular outcome occur.” Id.
at 116. Reflecting the better-known aspect of her theory, Walker stated in the same work that, “There is
also some evidence that [survival or coping] skills are developed at the expense of escape skills.” Id. at
40.
226
See Dressler, supra note 10, at 269 (“Even if syndrome evidence is properly introduced to
support a battered woman's subjective belief that the sleeping abuser is an imminent threat to her life,
there is no basis for claiming that such a belief is reasonable unless the ‘reasonable person’ is
characterized as a ‘reasonable battered woman suffering from BWS.’”); see also Dressler, supra note 29,
at 464 (“How can we say that a belief is reasonable when we are judging the reasonableness from the
perspective of someone who, by definition, [because of Battered Woman Syndrome] is experiencing a
set of symptoms that renders her state of mind abnormal?”); cf. Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman
Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
45, 95–96 (1994) (treating learned helplessness as “a form of psychological impairment” and battered
woman syndrome as a mental disorder or mental illness).
227
Walker makes similar statements about overcoming learned helplessness repeatedly. See, e.g.,
BWS 2d 2000, supra note 225, at 118 (“If a woman is to escape such a relationship, she must overcome
the tendency to learned helplessness survival techniques . . . . She must learn to use escape skills
compatible to the survival behaviors already adopted.”).
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228

measures men used to entrap and control women. Batterers chose coercive
methods based on intimate knowledge of their partners, using approaches
that would cause the most humiliation or fear or that would best demonstrate
the futility of resistance.229 Details of abusive behavior varied in different
relationships because coercive control was an evolving experiment
performed on a living target.230 Personal threats may have vastly different
power over different women. For example, a threat to tell an employer that
a woman had not completed the college degree on her resume might threaten
job loss and inability to support a family for one person, but the same threat
might be less important to someone in a job based more on performance than
credentials.
In 1988, Edward Gondolf and Ellen Fisher proposed survivor theory as
an alternative to learned helplessness.231 From their own data and Lee
Bowker’s study of women who ended the violence without ending their
relationships,232 Gondolf and Fisher found that “the majority of women
made extremely assertive efforts to stop the abuse.”233 In 2008, sociologist
Michael Johnson summarized these developments: “[S]urvivor theory has
been the mainstream feminist analysis of battered women for at least twenty

228

See, e.g., DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 217, at 15 (treating violence as “the extension of the
domination and control of husbands over their wives”); OKUN, supra note 217, at 113–19 (comparing
coerecive control in Chinese communist thought control with woman abuse).; R. Emerson Dobash &
Russell P. Dobash, Wives: The ‘Appropriate’ Victims of Marital Violence, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 426, 434
(1978) (emphasizing uses of violence by men to control wives and maintain hierarchy). See also STARK,
supra note 50, at 113–14 (describing “entrapment enigma”).
229
See STARK, supra note 50 at 206 (explaining the personal quality of coercive control).
230
See id. at 112–32 (detailing the different dimensions of coercive control).
231
GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 76, at 11. Goodman et al. summarize Walker’s use of learned
helplessness, criticism by scholars—including Walker—of the idea that battered women were passive in
response to violence, and discuss the development of survivor theory:
Based on [Gondolf & Fisher’s] survey of 6,612 victims of IPV [intimate partner
violence] in Texas shelters and Bowker’s . . . survey of 1,000 community women, [the
survivor] theory held that battered women actually become increasingly active in their
attempts to stop violence as it grew more frequent or severe. Not only were
participants in these studies more likely to seek help as the violence worsened, but
they also were also likely to seek a wider variety of forms of help. A number of other
studies—both qualitative and quantitative—have since demonstrated support for the
finding that IPV victims are tremendously active and persistent in their attempts to
stop the violence.
Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 165–66 (internal citations omitted).
232
See BOWKER, supra note 217, 63–73 (1983) (noting that women used a variety of informal
strategies in their attempts to stop the abuse themselves, from within their relationships, with varying
levels of success).
233
See id. 21–29 (describing the statistical demographics and testimonials of the couples involved
in the study); GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 76, at 28–37 (detailing analytical models of help-seeking).
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years. Feminists long ago debunked the idea that battered women were
helpless victims.”234
Survivor theory “now dominates our understanding of the reactions of
women to intimate terrorism. The core idea is that battered women respond
to severe abuse with innovative coping strategies and active
help-seeking.”235 Survivor theory was consistent with coercive control, but
not with Lenore Walker’s “syndrome.”236 Gondolf and Fisher did not find
learned helplessness in battered women; rather, they said that
professionals—such as social workers—developed learned helplessness
because their efforts to help battered women were frustrated by the
extraordinary obstacles the women faced.237 Scholars also began to identify
different types of domestic violence—for example, distinguishing “common
couple violence” or “situational couple violence” from coercive control,
intimate terrorism, or “patriarchal terrorism.”238
In a 1993 law review article, psychologist Mary Ann Dutton criticized
problems with “syndrome” terminology and adopted the term “battered
women’s experiences” to describe the subject of expert evidence.239 Dutton
rejected Walker’s treatment of “Battered Woman Syndrome” as a subset of
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),240 pointing out that battered
women’s reactions to abuse either might not be explained by PTSD or might
234
MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM, VIOLENT
RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE 133 (2008) [hereinafter TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE].
235
Id. at 49 (footnote omitted).
236
See id. at 133 (offering an analysis of mandatory arrest and prosecution policies as support).
237
GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 76, at 22–23.
238
See MICHAEL S. DAVIS ET AL., NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP, CUSTODY
EVALUATIONS WHEN THERE ARE ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PRACTICES, BELIEFS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL EVALUATORS 16 (2010) (discussing typologies proposed by
Johnson); TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 234, at 6–7 (describing typologies of
violence); Evan Stark, Coercive Control, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 166, 170 (Nicky
Ali Jackson ed., 2007) (discussing Johnson’s typology and Stark’s distinction between ordinary “fights”
and “partner assaults” where violence “was used to hurt or control a partner rather than to resolve a
conflict”); Claire Dalton et al., High Conflict Divorce, Violence, and Abuse: Implications for Custody
and Visitation Decisions, 54 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 11, 14 (2003) (distinguishing “conflict-initiated” and
“control-initiated” violence); Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 181 (“[I]ncreasing evidence points to
the need to distinguish between what Johnson called ‘patriarchal terrorism’ (ongoing violence in the
context of coercion and control) and ‘common couple violence’ (discrete acts of violence that exist
outside a context of coercion and control).” (citation omitted)).
239
Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of
Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1196 (1993) [hereinafter Understanding
Women’s Responses: A Redefinition]. As of May 2019, a Westlaw search showed that this article had
been cited 160 times in law reviews and journals.
240
See, e.g., Lenore E. Walker, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Women: Diagnosis and
Treatment of Battered Woman Syndrome, 28 PSYCHOTHERAPY 21, 21 (1991) (“Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) comes closest to describing battered woman syndrome, the group of psychological
symptoms often observed after a woman has repeatedly experienced physical, sexual and/or serious
psychological abuse.” (citation omitted)).
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241

not meet the specific criteria for PTSD. Emphasizing the variety of
women’s responses to violence, Dutton reframed expert analysis through
four questions:
(1) The cumulative history of violence and abuse experienced
by the victim in the relationship at issue, including, where
relevant, the nature and extent of violence or abuse in a
specific episode;
(2) The psychological reactions of the battered woman to the
batterer’s violence;
(3) The strategies used (or not used) by the battered woman in
response to prior violence and abuse, and the consequences of
(or the expectations that arise from) those strategies; and
(4) The contextual factors that influenced both the battered
woman’s strategies for responding to prior violence, and her
psychological reactions to that violence.242
A 1996 report to Congress mandated by the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA) recommended the terms “battering and its effects” or “battered
women’s experiences” and criticized the term “battered woman syndrome”
for its susceptibility to misunderstanding and stereotyping.243 Some forensic
experts already used the recommended approach; others adopted it.244
241

See Understanding Women’s Responses: A Redefinition, supra note 239, at 1198–1200
(comparing battered women’s reactions with specified PTSD criteria). A woman’s psychological
response may not meet PTSD criteria for one or more reasons: (1) Her reactions are not considered
“clinical” phenomena, and thus do not appear within diagnostic nomenclature; (2) her reactions are either
more circumscribed than the full spectrum PTSD diagnosis or are not characteristic of PTSD per se;
and/or (3) her reactions are indicative of an even more complex clinical picture than that suggested by
PTSD. Id.
242
Id. at 1202 (footnote omitted).
243
See VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE, supra note 220, at xii–xiii (summarizing the benefits of
using the terms “battering and its effects” or “battered women’s experiences”). The working group for
the report included representatives from agencies and organizations including the Office of Policy
Development, the Office of Justice Programs, the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics of the Department of Justice; the National Institute of Mental Health, the Administration for
Children and Families, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation of the
Department of Health and Human Services, as well as the National Association of Women Judges. Id. at
v.
244
See, e.g., KATHLEEN J. FERRARO, NEITHER ANGELS NOR DEMONS: WOMEN, CRIME, AND
VICTIMIZATION 166 (2006) [hereinafter NEITHER ANGELS NOR DEMONS] (“The use of expert testimony
on the effects of battering in criminal trials has changed since it was first introduced in the early 1980s.”
(footnote omitted)); Words Change but Melody Lingers, supra note 223, at 111 (describing Ferraro as a
sociologist with extensive experience as an expert at trial beginning in 1983 and having conducted
training on the effects of battering for law enforcement officers, attorneys, and other groups). Ferraro
described her own experience with changing knowledge and terminology: “Although I originally used
the language of syndrome . . . in accordance with the literature of the time, since 1995 I have described
my testimony and expertise as being about ‘the effects of battering,’ as suggested in the literature and by
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After the mid-1990s, research on violence against women increased
exponentially. VAWA poured tens of millions of dollars into research,
allowed pilot programs, and required evaluations of the pilots.245 The
ensuing expansion in knowledge did not rest on the terminology of
“syndrome” or “helplessness.” Some cases and codes did not use syndrome
terminology, and some courts and some legal scholars began to recognize
the change.246
By 2005, Dutton and other psychologists had produced a model of
coercive control that illustrated the patterns and dynamics that linked

the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women.” Id. (footnote omitted). Ferraro
attributes the persistence of syndrome terminology and framework to its consistency “with dominant
paradigms for viewing violence against women as individualistic pathology.” Id. at 110.
Also, in 1996, a report by the National Academies of Science did not mention “learned
helplessness.” See generally PANEL ON RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN v–vi (Nancy A. Crowell & Ann W. Burgess eds., 1996)
(explaining the background of the report). “Battered woman syndrome” appeared only fleetingly as a
term used in some legal cases that was not a “recognized psychiatric syndrome.” Id. at 84.
245
See, e.g., Carol E. Jordan, Advancing the Study of Violence Against Women: Evolving Research
Agendas Into Science, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 393, 398 (2009) (“An examination of the annual
reports issued by [the National Institute of Justice] reveals that between 1995 and 2005, more than $50
million was awarded in [violence against women]-related research grants.”) (citations omitted)).
246
For judicial recognition of rejection of the “syndrome” framework, see, e.g., People v.
Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 7 n.3 (Cal. 1996). The Humphrey court used the term “battered woman
syndrome” only because the Evidence Code section and cases considered in the opinion used that term.
Id.
We note . . . that according to amici curiae California Alliance Against Domestic Violence et al., “.
. . the preferred term among many experts today is ‘expert testimony on battering and its effects’
or ‘expert testimony on battered woman’s experiences.’ Domestic violence experts have critiqued
the phrase ‘battered woman’s syndrome’ because (1) it implies that there is one syndrome which
all battered women develop, (2) it has pathological connotations which suggest that battered women
suffer from some sort of sickness, (3) expert testimony on domestic violence refers to more than
women’s psychological reactions to violence, (4) it focuses attention on the battered woman rather
than on the batterer’s coercive and controlling behavior and (5) it creates an image of battered
women as suffering victims rather than as active survivors.”
Id. (quoting Brief for California Alliance Against Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant, People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996) (No. S045985)). After Humphrey, the California
legislature changed the statutory terminology to “battering and its effects” in 2001 and then to “intimate
partner battering and its effects” in 2004. S. 1386, 2003–2004 Leg., 2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004) (codified as
amended at CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 2018)).
For other examples of courts and commentators recognizing the changed framework in the 1990s,
see Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1048 n.3 (Fla. 1999) (noting that amicus curiae criticized use of
the term “battered woman’s syndrome” but continued to use the term because Lenore Walker had used
it at trial); Diane R. Follingstad, Battered Woman Syndrome in the Courts, in 11 HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOLOGY 485, 485–486 (Alan M. Goldstein & Irving B. Weiner eds., 2003) (criticizing the syndrome
framework); Joan S. Meier, Notes From the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal
Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1314–17 (1993)
(explaining revisions to syndrome framework); Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From
Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 976–82 (detailing the changes to
the legal response to partner violence).
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controlling behavior with intimate partner violence. This is an example of
expert analysis that does not apply a “syndrome” formula or predict any
particular response by the woman. Rather, experts organize common
phenomena into cognizable and well-established patterns in battering.
If learned helplessness had in fact been the cornerstone of expert
evidence, then these changes in terminology and the recognition of a variety
of responses to violence might have undermined its effectiveness in court—
but research and experience showed that was not the case. The earliest
litigation on battered women’s self-defense often used expert testimony on
battering that was admitted without reliance on “syndrome” terminology.248
In 1996, a study of three alternative trial strategies—the Walker approach,
the Dutton approach, and no expert at all—found that experts helped jurors
reach more lenient conclusions, but excluding the terms “battered woman
syndrome,” PTSD, and “learned helplessness” did not change the way jurors
utilized the testimony.249
The use of expert knowledge in law raised questions of evidence and
substantive law.250 To the extent that some work in criminal law theory relied
heavily on Walker’s syndrome or “learned helplessness” as predicates for
analysis of battering and legal testimony, the shift in framework challenged
that analysis and its relevance in scholarly debates. But even as
psychologists and sociologists discarded the term “syndrome” with its
prescriptive implications, criminal law theorists embarked on a new round
of extensive debates in which “syndrome” terminology and its implications
had profound importance.251 Law professors used a research style created
for work with judicial precedent. When they saw the words “battered woman
syndrome” and read judicial summaries of Walker’s work in the early cases,
they looked back at Walker’s definitions and treated those early theories as
predictors of what experts on intimate partner violence would say—largely
247
Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: Toward a New
Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743, 746 (2005) (illustrating coercive control); see infra Appendix
(same); see also MARY ANN DUTTON ET AL., DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF A COERCIVE
CONTROL MEASURE FOR INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT 4 (2005),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214438.pdf (same).
248
See discussion of expert testimony, Macpherson et al., supra note 220, at 87–104 (discussing
expert testimony at length without referring to a “syndrome.”).
249
Regina A. Schuller & Patricia A. Hastings, Trials of Battered Women Who Kill: The Impact of
Alternative Forms of Expert Evidence, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 168 n.3, 171, 182–83 (1996); see also
NEITHER ANGELS NOR DEMONS, supra note 244, at 166–68 (describing the effects of various types of
expert witness testimony); Words Change but Melody Lingers, supra note 223, at 111 (describing
experience of a forensic expert).
250
For a magisterial analysis of the law of self-defense including comprehensive discussion of
evidence issues, see Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in
Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 409–31 (1991)
251
See infra Section III.B (describing ways in which legal scholars misunderstood and misapplied
the concept of “battered woman syndrome”).
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ignoring the cases, articles, books, and reports that had moved past the
syndrome framework.252
In addition to misunderstanding theories applied in expert testimony,
legal scholars often over-simplified Walker’s theories. Some authors
confused the psychological theory of learned helplessness with literal
helplessness.253 Learned helplessness had several definitions, but none of
them meant the woman had “learned to be helpless.”254 Even though
virtually all courts admitted expert evidence as relevant to reasonableness,
several scholars treated that testimony as if it must concern only abnormal
psychology and, therefore, could be relevant only to a defendant’s
“subjective” state of mind.255

252
For examples of statutes, articles, and reports applying other theories or criticizing “syndrome”
theory, see supra notes 221–65, 239–88 and accompanying text. See also SCHNEIDER, supra note 218,
at 23 (“The use of the term ‘battered woman syndrome’ has intensified the general confusion about
domestic violence and battered women, and has increased the likelihood that the law will be misapplied
to battered women when they seek protection in the courts or appear as defendants.”); VALIDITY AND
USE OF EVIDENCE, supra note 220, at i–ii (“Among the most notable findings was the strong consensus
. . . that the term ‘battered woman syndrome’ does not adequately reflect the breadth or nature of the
scientific knowledge now available concerning battering and its effects.”); Sue Osthoff & Holly
Maguigan, Explaining Without Pathologizing: Testimony on Battering and Its Effects, in CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 226 (Donileen R. Loseke et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005)
(“Unfortunately, it did not take long for some scholars and practitioners to mischaracterize this BWS
testimony . . . .”); Marina Angel, The Myth of Battered Woman Syndrome, 24 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV.
301, 302 (2015) (noting that a “bad result” of Walker’s invention of the term “Battered Woman’s
Syndrome” is “that the term ‘syndrome’ is associated with mental illness, which created the perception
that battered women are mentally defective”); Angel, supra note 10, at 65 (“Discredited theories that
label abused women who kill their abusers as suffering from insanity, a syndrome, or learnedhelplessness, must be rejected.”); Holly Maguigan, It’s Time to Move Beyond “Battered Woman
Syndrome,” 17 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 50, 50 (1998) (reviewing DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, MORE
THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME SOCIETY, AND THE LAW) (explaining the challenge
of explaining “the impact of intimate partner violence without appearing to pathologize battered women
and deny their reason and capacity”; noting that for some years before her 1998 essay, many experts had
“offered instead testimony described more generally as relating to “battering and its effects” because
Walker’s “cycle of violence” and “learned helplessness” fail to “capture the full experience of battered
women, and it risks subjecting them to stereotypes which deny their great diversity and which portray
them as helpless and incapacitated.”).
253
See SCHNEIDER, supra note 218, at 80 (“Lawyers . . . have primarily focused on the passive,
victimized aspects of battered women’s experiences—their ‘learned helplessness’ . . . .”).
254
Cf. Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 470 (“Thus, we would
test the abused woman . . . against the standard of reasonable firmness, not one who has learned to be
helpless.”); see Dutton, supra note 239, at 1197 (“Originally, battered woman syndrome was defined as
the psychological sequelae to domestic violence. The definition emphasized ‘learned helplessness,’ a
theory originally developed to explain why some animals fail to protect themselves in certain situations.
The theory was reformulated in terms of human depression, and was eventually applied to victimization.”
(footnotes omitted)).
255
See infra Part III (“Stereotypical ideas about expert evidence persisted.”); see also Nourse, supra
note 22, at 1279 (“Jurisdictions flirted with or adopted ‘reasonable woman’ standards; indeed, a majority
have, by legislative fiat if not judicial decision, permitted the admission of expert syndrome testimony
based on the defendant’s ‘subjective state,’ known as battered woman syndrome.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Among professors, jurors, and the public, one of the sticking points in
understanding battered women’s experiences is the conflict between each
person’s own perceived autonomy and the impact of violence and control
that Evan Stark calls the “entrapment enigma.”256 Many people find it
difficult to imagine how anyone can force another person to do something
against their will—especially when they do not see forcible constraints on
kidnap victims or visible chains holding a prisoner.257 Research on coercive
control addressed that question by studying nonphysical methods of control
and their interaction with intimate partner violence.258 Common threads in
expert testimony include the interaction of help-seeking and constraint with
the circumstances that create a lack of options, controlling tactics and
strategies of survival and resistance, and the reasons why well-established
patterns of abuse and control are effective.259
B. What Experts Really Said at Trial: Dr. William Tyson (Forensic
Reconstruction and Coercive Control) and Dr. Robert Rollins
(Psychiatric Evaluation and Competency)
“It worked in Korea and it worked in J. T. Norman’s home.”260
Judge Gardner appointed forensic psychologist Dr. William Tyson as an
expert.261 Court-appointed experts do not represent either side.262 Either
party can depose these experts, either party or the court can call them; either
party—including the party that called the witness—can cross-examine them;
their compensation comes from funds provided in criminal cases.263 Dr.
Tyson retained an investigator and made an exhaustive independent
256

See STARK, supra note 50, at 113–14 (“And yet, the same question, ‘Why doesn’t she leave
him?’ or its obverse, ‘Why does she stay?’ continues to gnaw at the moorings of the domestic violence
revolution. . . . This chapter deals with the entrapment enigma: why women who are no different from
any of us to start, who are statistically normal become ensconced in relationships where ongoing violence
is virtually inevitable, and are prone to develop a unique problem profile when they do so.”).
257
Id. at 113.
258
See, e.g., infra Appendix (containing Dutton and Goodman’s Model of Coercion in Intimate
Partner Violence).
259
See NEITHER ANGELS NOR DEMONS, supra note 244, at 167 (listing “many factors” that
“influence women’s perceptions of their safety and alternatives in a violent relationship”).
260
Transcript, supra note 1, at 165 (emphasis added) (testimony of Dr. William Tyson).
261
Id. at 107, 155 (statement by Mr. Robert W. Wolf and testimony of Dr. William Tyson).
262
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 706(a) (2018) (“The court may appoint any expert witnesses
agreed upon by the parties . . . .” (emphasis added)).
263
See id. at Rule 706(a)–(b) (“The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the
parties . . . . A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his findings, if any; his deposition may be
taken by any party; and he may be called to testify by the court or any party. He shall be subject to crossexamination by each party, including a party calling him as a witness . . . . The compensation thus fixed
is payable from funds which may be provided by law in criminal cases . . . .”).
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investigation of the facts so that he could base his analysis on empirical
findings rather than the memory or opinion of any one person.264
His testimony applied a coercive control framework. He emphasized the
importance of degradation and humiliation as strategies to break the spirit of
a human being and make that person more vulnerable to abuse.265 Through
coercive control, Tyson linked the details of humiliation, such as forcing
Judy to eat from pet dishes and bark like a dog, with the physical violence.266
Dr. Tyson compared Judy’s experience to the experience of prisoners of
war. Invoking the reactions of soldiers to violence and degradation, the
military model is generally male or at least not distinctively female. Unlike
Walker’s “learned helplessness,” Tyson’s approach did not emphasize
unique feminine vulnerability or compare human beings to Seligman’s lab
animals:
It was part of the process that whenever you want to brainwash
somebody, dehumanize them, degrade them, bring them
completely under your power and remove whatever humanity
they have; those are the kinds of things that you do. It’s
consistent with the kind of behavior that was observed in
prisoner of war camps during the Second World War as
practiced by the Nazis; it’s consistent with the type of
behavior, deprivation of information; deprivation of normal
human functioning that was consistent in the brainwashing
techniques of the Korean War. Anything that will reduce and
degrade an individual’s concept of themselves as human and

264

Transcript, supra note 1, at 156–58 (testimony of Dr. William Tyson). Dr. Tyson defined
“empirical facts” as those determined to be reliable, with agreement that they had happened, and not
dependent on the memory or impressions of any one witness. Id. at 158. He interviewed Judy Norman
and Laverne Laws twice, first in a meeting partially attended by her lawyers and then after he had
obtained all the materials. Id. at 156–57. He obtained background materials and information on sources
from her lawyers. Id. at 156. He got records on the Norman family from the Rutherford County
Department of Social Services. Id. He obtained Dr. Rollins’s forensic report from Dorothea Dix Hospital
and reanalyzed and interpreted the raw test data. Id. He obtained records from Judy’s hospitalization at
the Chicago-Reid Mental Health Center from July 21 through July 23, 1973, and records from the Illinois
Department of Mental Health and Disabilities. Id. at 156–57. He retained an investigator, and together
they obtained interviews and/or records for both Judy and J.T. from several agencies: the RutherfordPolk Area Mental Health Program; the Prevention of Child Abuse in the Home, Inc.; the PATH Program
of Forest City; Rutherford County Emergency Medical Services; Rutherford County Sheriff’s
Department employees who had contact with Judy as responders; investigative officers; jailers;
employees of the county Emergency Medical Services who had contact with Judy or J.T. around the time
of his death; and employees of PATH who had contact with Judy or family members around that time.
Id. at 157–58.
265
Id. at 161–65 (testimony of Dr. William Tyson).
266
Id. at 164.
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make them totally dependent on the oppressor. It worked in
Korea and it worked in J. T. Norman’s home.267
Dr. Tyson linked Judy’s belief that death was inevitable to the fear that
if she left the children behind, the violent abuse would transfer to them.268
The prosecutor argued that the defense could not ask Dr. Tyson whether
Judy reasonably believed it was necessary to shoot her husband because the
defendant could not have been defending herself from someone who was
asleep.269 Because the standard for self-defense was not whether there was
actual danger, but whether it reasonably appeared to the defendant that
danger existed, the judge allowed the question.270 Dr. Tyson’s answer
addressed both Judy’s actual belief and the rational factors supporting that
belief:
Yes . . . . [I]n examining the facts of this case and examining
the psychological data . . . Mrs. Norman believed herself to be
doomed . . . to a life of the worst kind of torture and abuse,
degradation that she had experienced over the years in a
progressive way; that it would only get worse, and that death
was inevitable . . . . I believe she also came to the point of
beginning to fear for family members and her children, that
were she to commit suicide that the abuse and the treatment
that was heaped on her would be transferred onto them. There
is evidence that Mr. Norman had begun to make threats . . . .
....
The answer very simply is, yes, I think Judy Norman felt that
she had no choice, both in the protection of herself and her
family, but to engage, exhibit deadly force against Mr.
Norman, and that in so doing, she was sacrificing herself, both
for herself and for her family.271
Dr. Tyson gave further support to the reasonableness of Judy’s belief
when he summarized the evidence from his independent review of the
record:
Mrs. Norman didn’t leave because she believed, fully believed
that escape was totally impossible. There was no place to go
267
Id. at 164–65 (emphasis added); see also State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 17–18
(N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting) (discussing portions of this part of Dr. Tyson’s testimony); State v.
Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 589 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (same).
268
Transcript, supra note 1, at 170.
269
Id. at 168.
270
Id. at 166–69.
271
Id. at 170–71; see also Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11 (discussing the same quotation from Dr.
Tyson’s testimony); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589 (same).
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. . . . [S]he had left before; he had come and gotten her . . . .
She had gone to the Department of Social Services. He had
come and gotten her. The law, she believed the law could not
protect her; no one could protect her, and I must admit, looking
over the records, that there was nothing done that would
contradict that belief. She fully believed that he was
invulnerable to the law and to all social agencies that were
available; that nobody could withstand his power. As a result,
there was no such thing as escape.272
Dr. Tyson’s evaluation followed a full investigation. His review validated
Judy’s perception that help was not available and the law could not protect
her. But over the years that followed, only the dissent and one law review
article quoted the statement that the record did not contradict her.273
The lawyers asked both experts whether Judy fit the “profile” of an
abused spouse, and both agreed that she did.274 Dr. Tyson said she “fit[] and
exceed[ed] the profile.”275 He described different types and levels of
battering in terms notably different from the central focus on psychological
“learned helplessness” in Walker’s “syndrome.”276 His description was
closer to, though not identical with, the typology of intimate partner violence
that sociologist Michael Johnson would develop ten to twenty years later.277
Dr. Tyson distinguished terroristic abuse and degradation (the pattern that
Johnson calls “intimate terrorism”) from ongoing marital violence (similar
to Johnson’s situational couple violence).278
272
Transcript, supra note 1, at 163 (emphasis added); see also Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 17 (Martin,
J., dissenting) (discussing the same quotation from Dr. Tyson’s testimony); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589
(same).
273
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 17 (Martin, J., dissenting); Mahoney,, supra note 10, at 92.
274
See Transcript, supra note 1, at 159, 175–76 (concluding Judy Norman fit the profile of an
abused spouse); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11 (majority opinion) (same); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589
(same).
275
Transcript, supra note 1, at 159; Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 17 (Martin, J., dissenting); Norman I,
366 S.E.2d at 589.
276
Compare Transcript, supra note 1, at 159–61, with THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra
note 225, at 118 (discussing learned helplessness as the resultant depression and helplessness of a period
of violence that diminishes a “woman’s motivation to respond.”).
277
See TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 234, at 5 (identifying four types of domestic
violence that “constitute a typology of individual violence that is rooted in information about the couple
and defined by the control context within which the violence is embedded . . . .”).
278
Id. at 5–12. For Tyson, the “simplest” level of violence involved occasional fights without severe
violence; the “second stage” involved sustained fighting and violence, a prolonged vendetta “punctuated
by the wife getting slapped or in some cases, the husband; or beaten [] in some way that ends that current
round of the fight.” Transcript, supra note 1, at 159–60. Implicitly, this analysis emphasizes some control
(ending the argument by violence), but does not include terrorism and lethality. Both of these stages have
some similarity to Michael Johnson’s common couple violence. See TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, supra note 234, at 11–12, 115 (“What makes it situational couple violence is that it is rooted
in the events of a particular situation rather than in a relationshipwide [sic] attempt to control.”).
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Dr. Tyson testified that J.T.’s abuse had characteristics different from
ordinary abuse. The abuse of Judy Norman had progressed “far beyond what
would be called ‘[w]ife battering or family violence,’ and into a realm which
could be only considered as torture, degradation and reduction to an animal
level of existence, where all behavior was marked purely by survival . . .
.”279 Dr. Tyson distinguished J.T.’s violence from “disagreements or fighting
between a husband and wife” and described “a deliberate, studied, and
effective attempt to completely subordinate another human being[,]
humiliating them and degrading them to the point where they became less
than human.”280 For Tyson, Judy’s belief that escape was impossible was her
conclusion after previous efforts.
Dr. Robert Rollins, clinical director of the forensic unit at the state
mental hospital, did use the term “syndrome” in testimony.281 Rollins had
evaluated Judy’s competency to stand trial and administered several
psychiatric tests, but he had not hired an investigator or reviewed the
evidence.282 He testified that Judy fit the profile of an abused spouse.283 He
diagnosed her with “marital problems” followed by “abused spouse
syndrome” in parentheses.284 To Rollins, the “syndrome” involved a
situation in which one spouse achieved control over the other through “both
psychological and physical domination.”285 He emphasized individual
psychological vulnerability to abuse saying that abused women usually
lacked “a strong sense of their own adequacy . . . [or] a lot of personal or
occupational resources.”286 In contrast, Walker had addressed the impact of
abuse on women with professional careers and resources.287 He came closer
to Walker in describing the effects of a long period of physical abuse
emphasizing control and the belief in the inability to escape.288

279

Transcript, supra note 1, at 160–61. See also Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589 (quoting substantial
portions of Dr. Tyson’s testimony).
280
Transcript, supra note 1, at 161.
281
Id. at 176.
282
See id. at 172–74 (discussing Dr. Rollins’s credentials); id. at 175 (explaining psychiatric
evaluation and testing).
283
Id. at 175–76.
284
See id. at 174–78 (discussing abused spouse syndrome and “marital problems” diagnosis); State
v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 1989) (discussing Dr. Rollins’ testimony); Norman I,
366 S.E.2d at 589 (same).
285
Transcript, supra note 1, at 177.
286
Id.; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589.
287
See THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 214, at 21–23 (discussing the myths that middle-class,
well educated women are abused less frequently than poorer, less educated women); BWS 2d 2000,
supra note 225, at 7–8 (discussing the impact that abuse has on women and the factors that make it
difficult for them to leave).
288
“[T]he abused spouse comes to believe that the other person is in complete control; that they
themselves are worthless and they cannot get away; that there’s no rescue from the other person.”
Transcript, supra note 1, at 177; Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589.
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Rollins left open a question that the terminology of “syndrome” and
“learned helplessness” sometimes muddled: Would a reasonable person in
these circumstances form the same set of beliefs? He said “Mrs. Norman had
the ability to make decisions, and understand herself to the extent of the
average person.”289 When Judy’s lawyer asked whether she reasonably
believed it was necessary to use deadly force, Rollins replied that Judy
believed it was necessary.290 Much of his testimony tended to support Judy’s
perceptions, but he did not discuss Judy’s efforts to escape or her lack of
options.
Regarding Tyson’s coercive control approach, some readers may
question his analogy between prisoner of war camps in Korea291 and a small
house in Spindale, North Carolina. They may not see the Norman home as
duplicating the conditions of captivity in a prison camp. Lenore Walker tried
to address that gap when she treated “learned helplessness” as an answer to
the question of why a woman had not left a violent relationship.292 But her
approach makes an implicit concession to the false premise underlying that
question—the idea that leaving had been possible and that it would have
brought safety.293 Tyson did not share Walker’s approach to this question.
On the issue of entrapment, Dr. Tyson emphasized Judy’s escape attempts,
the reasons for the failure of those attempts, her concern about danger for
the children, and her lack of material resources. He could find no
possibilities that Judy had overlooked.294
Judges and scholars who read meekness and paralysis into this story
misunderstand both “learned helplessness” and Dr. Tyson’s testimony. To
Martin Seligman, who coined the term, and in much of Lenore Walker’s
work, “learned helplessness” meant giving up low-probability strategies that
289
Transcript, supra note 1, at 181. Dr. Rollins had also used the term “syndrome” in a portion of
his report that did not reach the jury. See id. at 185–87 (including a query by Judge Gardner, a conference
with Judy Norman, and the defense decision not to introduce it).
290
Id. at 178; State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989); id. at 18 (Martin, J.,
dissenting); Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 589. In addition, the judge and attorneys used the phrase “battered
spouse syndrome” a few times outside the presence of the jury in general reference to evidence on the
effects of battering—for example, in a discussion of the admissibility of the history of violence by Judy
Norman’s father against Judy’s mother. Transcript, supra note 1, at 148–50. This context fits the common
legal usage of “battered woman syndrome” as a term referring generally to use of expert testimony in
battering cases. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text (“In legal contexts, the term ‘battered
woman syndrome’ is often generic, an umbrella term for expert evidence on intimate partner violence
and its effects . . . .”).
291
Transcript, supra note 1, at 164 (containing Dr. Tyson’s testimony that compared the
dehumanization process that J.T. inflicted on Judy to Nazi deprivation tactics and the brainwashing
techniques utilized during the Korean War).
292
THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 214, at 43 (introducing Learned Helplessness as a sociallearning theory that helps to describe why women stay in violent relationships).
293
See Why Didn’t WE Leave?, supra note 218, at 22–25 (explaining that “why didn’t she leave?”
is a classic example of a “loaded question” or complex fallacy).
294
See supra note 272 and accompanying text (quoting testimony of Dr. Tyson).
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295

failed and choosing high-probability strategies. Walker stated that women
took that approach because they had lost the ability to predict successful
outcomes for low-probability strategies.296 Seligman notes that people may
appear to be passive while they plan the next attempt at a solution.297
But the very term “helplessness” is misleading. Consider a military
commander confronted by an overwhelming enemy force. There are no
reinforcements that can reach him. In a direct battle, victory would be
impossible. Scholars would not describe the decision to retreat or reorganize
into a guerrilla-style force as “learned helplessness.” We would recognize
this as common sense and tactics.
When the experts said Judy had come to believe she could not get away,
and the law would not help her, they described her assessment of the
situation. That assessment did not, in itself, imply incorrect or impaired
perception. Dr. Tyson’s statement that he saw nothing in the record to
contradict her provided direct support for the rationality of her perception.298
After Judy’s conviction, the defense brought Dr. Tyson back at
sentencing. He described Judy’s diagnosis as “Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder-Chronic Type.”300 Tyson described PTSD as symptoms that follow
a psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside the range of
normal human experience.299 Judy’s PTSD was “chronic-type” because the

295
See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 216, at 8 (describing how helplessness studies measure a
person’s passivity versus activity in certain situations and whether they take certain actions with varying
probability of success); see also Lenore E.A. Walker, Psychology and Violence Against Women, 44
American Psychologist 695, 698 (1989) (comparing her findings regarding battered women to Martin
Seligman’s studies and stating that battered women “increasingly choose actions that have the highest
probability of success in minimizing pain and enhancing survival rather than taking a chance that they
might be hurt more seriously or killed if they tried to escape.”).
296
See Walker, supra note 240, at 24–25 (citing Seligman and Walker’s earlier works explaining
that learned helplessness does not mean that a woman is helpless; it means that because she cannot predict
successful outcomes for low-level probability behaviors, she will only resort to behaviors that have a
high probability of success); Lenore E. A. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome is a Psychological
Consequence, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 133–35 (Richard J. Gelles &
Donileen R. Loseke eds. 1993). Walker acknowledges that “the name Seligman gave to his theory is
unfortunately confusing . . . .” Id. She says the term “does not mean they learn to behave in a helpless
way . . . . Even if learned helplessness were another way of labeling the [“Battered Woman Syndrome,”]
which it is not, the process does not suggest the alleged helplessness or inherent weakness of battered
women.” Id. at 135.
297
See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 216, at 239 (criticizing the application of learned helplessness
theory to battered women and pointing out that passivity can be instrumental). This framework seems to
concede something to the appearance of passivity and behaviors that the Strategies Index would classify
as placating—a less “passive” term. Goodman et al., Strategies Index, supra note 195, at 169.
298
Transcript, supra note 1, at 163.
300
Id. at 235.
299
Id.

2019] MISUNDERSTANDING JUDY NORMAN: THEORY AS CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCE

719

symptoms had “been in existence for more than six months following the
initiation of the stresses.”300
The term “helplessness” does not appear until sentencing, where it is not
used as a term of art, but rather grouped with anxiety and depression.301 Dr.
Tyson testified that Judy could be rehabilitated and overcome the aftermath
of abuse: “her anxiety and depression could be relieved; . . . her feelings of
helplessness and despair and uselessness and worthlessness that have been,
just to be frank, beaten into her over the last twenty years . . . .”302 He
suggested vocational training, working, getting a GED, volunteering, and
“doing what normal members of the community do to contribute to society;
something she’s been deprived of doing.”303
Almost immediately, judges and scholars retelling Tyson’s testimony
changed its emphasis and coverage.304 Most noticed only the statements
about Judy’s sincere beliefs, not the support for those beliefs that emerged
from his independent investigation and review of the record. The retold story
framed false dichotomies between entrapment and the struggle for selfpreservation, between help-seeking and the experience of frustration and
despair. This version of the story would frame legal scholarship for decades,
and law school classrooms would structure discussion of Norman and
imminence around stereotypes of “battered woman syndrome.” Part III.D
analyzes the process through which testimony on coercive control turned
into Walker’s “syndrome” in the opinions.
C. Judy Norman Through Differing Forensic Lenses
Despite differences in emphasis and overarching frameworks among
various experts and theories, common threads emerge in expert testimony,
which is “usually much more comprehensive” than many critics suggest:
most experts “testify both about the social and practical experiences of
battered women, and about the psychological impact of being battered.”305
Even in the early cases describing expert testimony on “battered woman
syndrome,” “expert testimony rarely focused solely on the psychological
consequences of being battered. . . . Rather, . . . [it] included discussion of
300
Id. at 235–36. The prosecutor asked Dr. Tyson whether his diagnosis differed from that of Dr.
Rollins, who recorded a diagnosis of “marital problems” followed by “abused spouse syndrome.” Id. at
182. Tyson said that Rollins’s diagnosis was more “conservative,” that Tyson had more facts on which
to base his diagnosis, and that the doctors had discussed and agreed on the issue. Id. at 239–40.
301
In the text of the transcript, the only other use of “helpless” appears in the mental health
counselor’s definition of depression. See id. at 92–93 (describing Mrs. Norman’s state of depression as
feeling “hopeless” and “helpless”).
302
Id. at 238.
303
Id.
304
See legal scholarship addressed infra Part III (detailing assumptions and errors of scholars on
Battered Woman Syndrome).
305
Osthoff & Maguigan, supra note 252, at 231.
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the practical realities of having an abusive partner and what is today called
testimony about battering and its effects.”306 This Section applies two
distinct frameworks to the Norman case to illustrate similarities, differences,
and the relative susceptibility to misunderstanding.
1. “Battered Woman Syndrome”–Lenore Walker
If Lenore Walker had testified at Judy Norman’s trial, she would—like
other experts—have provided general information on domestic violence, the
social and practical experiences of battered women, and the psychological
impact of battering. In self-defense cases, that information would be relevant
both to whether the defendant actually believed a threat was imminent, and
to whether a reasonable person would have shared that perception.307 The
balance of social context and psychological factors in her testimony varied,
though law professors generally noted only her psychological theories.
The comparison of two other judicial opinions that summarized
Walker’s testimony shows the various threads in her work.308 One example
included both social context (emphasizing actual danger and obstacles to
leaving) and psychological reactions to violence (framed largely within the
“syndrome” and “learned helplessness”):309
Terminating the relationship usually has adverse economic
consequences. Separating from a battering partner may be
very dangerous, and the battered woman is aware of the
danger. The batterer may have threatened to kill the battered
woman or to abscond with the children if she leaves. Many
battered women have tried to leave and been unsuccessful. In
a battering relationship, the woman loses self-esteem, is
terrified, and does not have the psychological energy to leave,
resulting in “learned helplessness” and “a kind of
psychological paralysis.” . . . “Learned helplessness” is
another aspect of BWS. The battered woman often does not
know why she is beaten on any particular occasion. The
306

Id.
See People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“[S]elf-defense may be
analyzed as having two requirements: (1) the defendant’s acts causing the victim’s death were motivated
by an actual (also referred to as ‘genuine’ or ‘honest’) belief or perception that (a) the defendant was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily injury from an unlawful attack or threat by the victim and (b)
the defendant's acts were necessary to prevent the injury; and (2) a reasonable person in the same
circumstances would have had the same perception and done the same acts.”), overruled by People v.
Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996).
308
See id. at 177–78 (describing Dr. Walker’s expert testimony); Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044,
1048 (Fla. 1999) (discussing the analysis Dr. Walker gave in the field of Battered Woman Syndrome),
superseded by statute, Chapter 2005-27, 2005 Fla. Laws 199 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§
776.012–013, 031–032 (2018)).
309
See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (discussing the dangers of leaving and the psychological reactions
in Battered Woman Syndrome).
307
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violence is perceived by the woman as “random and aversive
stimulation.” Because of its randomness, she believes she is
incapable of doing anything to prevent the abuse and, as a
result, feels helpless.310
In the other case, the judicial summary of Walker’s testimony did not
emphasize “learned helplessness” even though Walker had testified at trial.
That opinion listed four reasons that Walker identified to explain why that
defendant did not retreat from a confrontation—only one of which was
psychological: “[S]he felt that she was unable to leave because she had just
given birth seven weeks earlier; she had been choked unconscious; she was
paralyzed with terror; and experience had taught her that threats of leaving
only made her husband more violent.”311
In general, Walker’s testimony emphasized the “cycle of violence” and
“learned helplessness” theories that formed the lens through which she
interpreted a defendant’s actions and perceptions.312 In Norman, there was
no evidence of a cycle of tension building, violence, and remorseful
romance. The absence of that cycle would have posed no problems for
Walker’s theory, however, because she never claimed that the cycle would
be found in all abusive relationships.313
Walker treated the “syndrome” as a subcategory of PTSD.314 She
believed the advantage of a PTSD diagnosis was its emphasis on traumatic
stress rather than on unique violence among intimate partners. To Walker,
PTSD implied the possibility of healing after violence ended; she believed
that diagnosis would help avoid stereotypes about battered women.315
Walker acknowledged that some battered women did not have symptoms of
PTSD,316 but she would have agreed with Dr. Tyson’s testimony at
sentencing about PTSD in Norman and of course with Dr. Rollins’s addition
of battered spouse syndrome to the diagnosis of marital problems.

310
Id. In Aris, the appellate court found Walker’s testimony relevant only to Aris’s actual belief,
not to reasonableness. Id. at 179–80. The California Supreme Court soon overruled Aris, explicitly
recognizing relevance to reasonableness. People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1996).
311
See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1048 (summarizing from Walker’s expert testimony at trial). The
Florida Supreme Court recognized that battered women face danger when separation from violent
relationships and did not discuss learned helplessness. Id. at 1052–55.
312
See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (discussing the theory of “learned helplessness” and how victims
of domestic violence perceive violent situations).
313
See BWS 2d 2000, supra note 225, at 127–28 (“In 65% of all cases . . . there was evidence of a
tension-building phase prior to the battering. In 58% of all cases there was evidence of loving contrition
afterward.”).
314
Id. at 117.
315
See id. at 104 (explaining that individuals with PTSD may “respond to therapy” when they are
in a safe environment).
316
See id. at 28–29 (indicating that PTSD “frequently develops after direct experience of trauma,”
suggesting that it is not always present after trauma).
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Most law professors missed a crucial aspect of Walker’s theory: in
describing psychological reactions to the inability to stop violence, Walker
was not concerned with the accuracy or reasonableness of the woman’s
perceptions that she could not escape or stop the attacks.317 When law
professors assumed that “learned helplessness” meant an unusual inability
to see solutions, they misconstrued her point about psychological responses:
Walker applied the term even when a woman’s perceptions were accurate
and would have been shared by anyone in her position. Walker herself
contributed to these misunderstandings: she usually stated clearly that
“learned helplessness” did not mean a woman was literally helpless, but at
times her testimony conveyed passivity or dysfunction.318
Walker recognized that help-seeking increased as violence increased,
which could have allowed her framework to describe Judy Norman’s urgent
help-seeking as “learned helplessness.” The Norman case evinced no
absence of help-seeking. Walker would also have explained that battered
women develop keen insight into the circumstances and cues that predict
violence, that they understand when situations become more dangerous and
that often they have no realistic options. 319
If Walker had testified in Norman, her evidence would have been more
complex than the usual treatment in law reviews, but her terminology and
approach would have remained susceptible to oversimplification. The jurors
might have taken “learned helplessness” literally (as the appellate courts did
later): that term might have displaced the detailed explanation of the defeat
of Judy’s help-seeking that Walker would also have provided. When courts
and commentators formed that misunderstanding of the term, they
transformed defeated help-seeking and brutally-coerced submission into
imagined descriptions of passivity or impairment in battered women.320
2. Intimate Partner Violence and Its Effects – Mary Ann Dutton and
Others
Mary Ann Dutton focuses on the variety and complexity of responses
that women have to violence and on the context within which violence takes
place and women seek solutions.321 Her work, like that of many experts,
317

Lenore E. Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 525, 528–32

(1978).
318
See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 638 F. Supp. 1120, 1138 (W.D. La. 1986) (“Dr. Walker
testified that this learned helplessness theory explains why women stay in an abusive relationship. She
described this learned helplessness as ‘a woman’s loss of her voluntary will.’ These women ‘go into a
survival mode to learn to cope . . . . They can do that quite well but they can’t really escape.’ ” (citations
omitted)).
319
See BWS 2d 2000, supra note 225, at 116–25 (discussing learned helplessness in battered
women).
320
See infra Part III.B (providing examples of scholarly discussion of helplessness or passivity).
321
See Dutton, supra note 239, at 1215–26 (discussing the various psychological responses women
have to domestic violence, as supported by academic literature).
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began in the 1980s within the framework of “battered woman syndrome.”322
Dutton became one of the leading scholars who transformed the dialogue by
the early 1990s.323
Dutton goes beyond approaches that focus on victim characteristics such
as trauma history and reactivity to explain the variety of women’s responses
to violence. Dutton emphasizes the importance of cognitive threat appraisal,
which involves, firstly, the level of risk or threat posed by the abuser but also
includes potentially additional factors that can contribute to threat appraisal,
such as her exposure to the abuser’s violence over time and her physical and
emotional state.324 “The reality of continuing risk—sometimes for years
following termination of the relationship—makes the phenomenon of
[Intimate Partner Violence] vastly different . . . from stranger rape, combat,
and most other forms of interpersonal violence.”325
For many law professors, the concept of expert testimony has been so
completely defined by Lenore Walker’s theory and particularly by “learned
helplessness” that it is not easy to envision expert testimony that would take
a different approach. In the Appendix to this Article, the Model of Coercion
in Intimate Partner Violence326 provides a sophisticated illustration of
threats and actions as well as the impact of those threats and actions and
responses to them. The expert can explain these dynamics and apply them
to the particular case.
Applying Dutton’s framework, the expert would provide information on
intimate partner abuse and its context and address the history of violence and
abuse in this relationship and the woman’s psychological responses to
322
See, e.g., Douglas (later Dutton-Douglas or Dutton), The Battered Woman Syndrome, supra note
223, at 39–53 (applying battered woman syndrome terminology and discussing battered woman
syndome); Ferraro, supra note 223, at 111 (“Although I originally used the language of syndrome in my
own testimony in accordance with the literature of the time, since 1995 I have described my testimony
and expertise as being about ‘the effects of battering,’ as suggested in the literature and by the National
Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women.”).
323
For examples of representative leading scholarship of the period, see Ferraro, supra note 223. at
110 (describing persistence of the term “battered woman syndrome” among judges and attorneys
“[d]espite the clarity of arguments rejecting the use of the term [] in favor of testimony describing the
full range of social, institutional, relational, and psychological impacts of battering” and describing legal
actors as relying on “a mythical stereotype that constricts perceptions of what ‘real’ battered women look
like”), 111 (explaining change in terminology of expert witness); Follingstad, supra note 246 (discussing
battered woman syndrome in the courts and the major legal issues in the use of battered woman
syndrome); Osthoff & Maguigan, supra note 252 (reviewing developments in social science and the law
and discussing the current use of social science testimony in battered women’s homicide trials); Dutton,
supra note 239, at 1196 (“Referring simply to testimony concerning battered women’s experiences,
rather than to ‘battered woman syndrome,’ more accurately captures the range of information typically
covered in expert testimony.”).
324
Mary Ann Dutton, Complexity of Women’s Response to Violence: Response to Briere and
Jordan, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1277, 1278–80 (2004).
325
Id. at 1277.
326
See Dutton & Goodman, supra note 247, at 746 fig.1 (providing schemata illustrating the
dynamics of coercive control in intimate partner violence); see infra Appendix (same).
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327

abuse. The expert would also describe the strategies with which women
respond to abuse and the strategies this woman used (or did not use).
Strategies have consequences—the expert would explain the effects,
successes, and failures of the woman’s strategies; the expectations she
formed as a result; and the contextual factors that affected the woman’s
choice of strategies in response to violence and her psychological reactions
to that violence.328 In Judy Norman’s case, expert explanation would help
jurors understand both the strategies Judy adopted and the reasons that she
did not pursue others.
For Dutton, PTSD illustrates the methodological problem when experts
rely only on the effects of past violence. She points out that a flashback from
prior violence caused by PTSD “might explain why a particular woman
(unrealistically, but understandably) perceives her partner’s behavior as
threatening . . . ; however, it provides little clarity in explaining why she
might perceive realistic danger from an intimate partner.”329 Dutton’s
approach would apply clinical forensic analysis to each issue separately,
including the danger of leaving children with the abusive partner.330 The
assessment of the level of risk—risk of death, looming certainty of
trafficking worse than she had ever known—was a core issue in Judy
Norman’s trial.
At trial, Dr. Tyson’s testimony addressed many of the issues that
Dutton’s work later brought together.331 He described J.T.’s violence against
Judy and the extreme degradation and dehumanization that accompanied
that violence.332 He summarized the strategies Judy had adopted and the
outcome of those strategies.333 He emphasized contextual factors, including
her desire to protect the children, the threats and violence that had forced her
to return whenever she tried to leave, her conviction from past experiences
that outright defiance of J.T. would bring worse violence or death, and the
failures that convinced her “the law could not protect her.”334 Dr. Tyson also
testified about her psychological responses when help-seeking failed. He
327

See Dutton, supra note 239, at 1193–1203 (offering a framework for examining, in the context
of the legal system, the diversity of women’s responses to violence; criticizing and redefining battered
woman syndrome).
328
See id. at 1202 (explaining that these four components allow the expert witness “to within the
overall social context, the various legal issues to be considered by the factfinder”); 1226–31 (reviewing
the academic literature and discussing the array of strategies that battered women use in attempting to
stop the violence).
329
Dutton, supra note 324, at 1278.
330
Id. at 1279.
331
Compare testimony of Dr. Tyson, supra notes 264–80 and accompanying text (quoting and
summarizing Dr. Tyson’s testimony), with the questions formulated by Dr. Dutton, supra note 242 and
accompanying text (quoting and discussing the four questions posed by Dr. Dutton).
332
Transcript, supra note 1, at 164.
333
Id. at 171.
334
Id. at 163.
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said that she could find no way to escape worsening torture and degradation
and he explained that she shot J.T. in an attempt to save herself and her
family.335
That account contains no formula like the cycle of violence. It does not
imply inaccuracy or distortion in Judy’s judgment—Dr. Tyson’s testimony
supported her perceptions. Feeling unable to escape was not learned
helplessness in that she had not stopped trying—even on that last morning,
Judy was still trying to find help. Her continuing inability to find help was
part of her appraisal of her risk.
A well-founded belief cannot be reduced to the psychological response
that it may elicit. Focusing solely on psychological responses—and
misunderstanding those responses—leads law professors to lose track of
what experts actually say in these cases. Confusion about the content of
expert testimony leads in turn to bad policy recommendations by scholars,
explored further in Parts III and IV below.
These self-defense cases need experts because the questions are
difficult. Most jurors do not know enough about intimate partner violence to
formulate Dutton’s queries or answer them without expert help. Expert
analysis could help jurors who struggle to understand the woman’s
experience and evaluate her credibility. Experts may also help avoid the
impediments created by myths and stereotypes while jurors evaluate the
woman’s story, the sincerity of her belief in the need to use deadly force,
and the reasonableness of that belief.
D. After Conviction: The Appellate Path from Coercive Control to
“Battered Woman Syndrome”
1. Post-Conviction—Dignity, Personhood, and
Sentencing and in Petitioning for Clemency

Community

at

Judge Gardner denied the self-defense instruction,336 but his instruction
on manslaughter clarified that provocation could include terror as well as
rage.337 The jury convicted Judy of manslaughter.338 At sentencing, the
defense emphasized her good character and other factors in arguing for
mitigation.339
335
See supra notes 265–280 (summarizing testimony of Dr. Tyson; his emphasis on degradation,
dehumanization, and the defeat of Judy’s help-seeking efforts; and Judy’s belief that she had to use deadly
force to defend herself and her family).
336
Transcript, supra note 1, at 224.
337
Id. at 218–19; see also Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heatof-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1685–86 (1986)
(discussing terror and provocation).
338
Transcript, supra note 1, at 226.
339
Her landlord, neighbor, and work supervisor spoke to her good character. Id. at 229–34. Judy’s
attorney also emphasized that she had cooperated with law enforcement after the shooting and
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Attorney Robert Wolf argued for rehabilitation, rebutting justifications
for criminal punishment. He emphasized that Judy posed no danger to the
public because the person who threatened her was gone and she had no
record of serious criminal acts (no need for incapacitation). Because of the
violence to which Judy had been subjected, she had already been punished
(no need for retribution).340 Furthermore, the community did not think that
Judy deserved punishment; people agreed that she should go home (no
support for retribution or deterrence). “Everyone is sympathetic to her, [and]
empathizes with what she went through.”341 In support of rehabilitation,
Wolf focused on her character as a mother and an employee with a good
chance of promotion to supervisor, and on her willingness to undertake
programs such as the GED.342
In conclusion, he spoke about Judy’s dignity and personhood.343 Some
legal scholars assume that arguments for battered women emphasize
passivity and victimhood.344 In contrast, Wolf’s argument emphasized
economic and social disadvantage:
So the final thing you have to look at is whether or not she can
be rehabilitated, and I would submit to Your Honor, that she
can. This lady has never had a break. She wasn’t born into the
high station in life that some of the rest of us have been
privileged to have. She has only an eighth-grade education.
She was married at fifteen. She’s got four children. She hasn’t
had the kind of breaks that allow you to move up socially,
economically, whatever. But, this is a lady that Bob Harris and
I both have come to realize has a lot going for her. She’s got
dignity. She is a kind compassionate lady. She’s got a sense of
humor. And, it’s been a privilege for us to represent her, and I
hope we’ve done a good job, but I’m afraid maybe we didn’t
do enough. But, I honestly submit to Your Honor, that she does
not deserve nor need to go to prison. And, rehabilitation would
be the most appropriate thing.345
acknowledged her actions, acted under duress or compulsion (even if insufficient to constitute a complete
defense), and acted under strong provocation. Id. at 243. He urged the court to consider Dr. Tyson’s
diagnosis of PTSD as a severe “mental/physical condition.” Id. at 243; see also id. at 237–38 (testimony
of Dr. Tyson).
340
Id. at 243–45.
341
Id. at 244.
342
Id.
343
Id. at 245–46.
344
See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 67 (1994) (arguing that a
“battered woman syndrome defense” “transforms the woman into a pet or thing that is brutally misused
by its owner”).
345
Transcript, supra note 1, at 245–46; see also id. at 244 (“[Y]ou could take your . . . robe and
walk through this courthouse and walk down any main street in this county, and no one in this community
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After the North Carolina Supreme Court reinstated Judy’s conviction,346
her attorneys turned to the community for support and executive clemency
for relief. Wolf and Harris distributed petitions for clemency in accessible
locations around Rutherford County, including convenience stores and gas
stations.347 The community responded, and the attorneys collected several
thousand signatures.348 Wolf and Harris submitted those petitions, with the
case record and additional files, in the petition for clemency.349 Two months
after Judy went to prison, “Governor James T. Martin commuted her
sentence to time already served.”350
In the world of justice, executive clemency is not law but relief from
law.351 Clemency for Judy Norman came shortly before some other
governors began systematic clemency reviews for battered women.352 The
extraordinary support from her attorneys and the community must have been
critically important. Clemency is not a “safety valve” on which battered
women can depend.353 Legal debates focused on Norman because the case
illustrated continuing issues of inequality and injustice in self-defense law.
2. Intimate Partner Violence—“Syndrome” Emerges in the Opinions
The appellate court held that sleep should not make self-defense
unavailable “as a matter of law.”354 The opinion by Judge (later Chief
is calling for you to, the Court, to put this lady in prison. Everyone is sympathetic to her, empathizes with
what she went through.”).
346
State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1989).
347
E-mail from Robert W. Wolf, Attorney for Judy Norman, to author (July 4, 2016, 11:16 AM)
(on file with author).
348
Id.
349
Id.
350
Rosen, supra note 30, at 391 n.56 (citing Mark Barrett, Norman Set Free, A SHEVILLE CITIZENTIMES, July 8, 1989, at 1).
351
See id. at 391 (describing executive clemency as a “safety valve” to correct injustice which arises
from application of the law).
352
See, e.g., Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a Governor’s
Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (1994)
(describing Ohio clemencies); Virginia Ellis, Two Women Given Clemency in Killings: Prison: Wilson
Considers Battered Spouse Syndrome as Mitigating Factor, L.A. TIMES (May 29, 1993),
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1993-05-29/news/mn-41281_1_battered-spouse-syndrome (describing
California clemencies); Al Schoch, Clemency Granted for Battered Woman, UNITED PRESS INT’L
(Mar. 10, 1993),
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1993/03/10/Clemency-granted-for-batteredwoman/9255731739600/ (describing Florida clemencies).
353
See Carol Jacobsen & Lynn D’Orio, Defending Survivors: Case Studies of the Michigan
Women's Justice & Clemency Project, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 4 (2015) (“[T]he notion that
clemency functions properly as a safety valve for justice creates the erroneous impression that those who
do not receive relief deserve their punishment while legitimating the current oppressive criminal legal
system.” (footnote omitted)); Rosen, supra note 30, at 391 (discussing clemency and concluding that
focusing on necessity over imminence in domestic violence cases will help battered women more than
executive clemency).
354
State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 590 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (“The State contends
that since decedent was asleep at the time of the shooting, defendant’s belief in the necessity to kill
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Justice) Parker set forth the facts in detail, including Judy’s efforts to get
help, the lethal threats from J.T. that stymied her efforts, and the ongoing
threat to her life.355 A jury could find “that decedent’s sleep was but a
momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror by the decedent, that
defendant merely took advantage of her first opportunity to protect
herself.”356 Taken together, the evidence “would permit reasonable minds to
infer that defendant did not use more force than reasonably appeared
necessary to her under the circumstances to protect herself from death or
great bodily harm.”357
The appellate opinion alternated between an approach based on a
reasonable person in Judy’s circumstances and an approach based on
characteristics of “battered spouse syndrome,” which the court defined by
“cycles of violence,” paralysis under attack, and “learned helplessness.”358
Toward reasonableness: “[T]he record is replete with sufficient evidence to
permit but not compel a juror, representing the person of ordinary firmness,
to infer that defendant’s belief was reasonable under the circumstances in
which she found herself.”359 In evaluating the reasonableness of Judy’s fear
of death or serious injury, the opinion considered J.T.’s rage, the evidence
that his battering on June 12th was constant and more violent than usual, her
previous efforts to get away, her fear that the beatings would resume, and
her belief that he would carry out the threat to kill her if she swore out a
warrant.360 “The inability of a defendant to withdraw from the hostile
situation and the vulnerability of a defendant to the victim are factors
considered by our Supreme Court in determining the reasonableness of a
defendant’s belief in the necessity to kill the victim.”361
Intertwined with that discussion of circumstances, lethal threat, and
crisis, the appellate court also treated “battered spouse syndrome” as a
crucial element in its own right. The opinion cited Walker’s “cycle of
violence” to explain a battered woman’s inability to fight back during “the
decedent was, as a matter of law, unreasonable.”). The court explained further that “a jury, in our view,
could find that decedent’s sleep was but a momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror by the
decedent, that defendant merely took advantage of her first opportunity to protect herself, and that
defendant’s act was not without the provocation required for perfect self-defense.” Id. at 592.
355
Id. at 587–89.
356
Id. at 592.
357
Id.
358
See id. at 591 (citing Loraine Patricia Eber, The Battered Wife’s Dilemma: To Kill or To Be
Killed, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 927 (1981); Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a
Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 38–39 (1986))
(“Through this repeated, sometimes constant, abuse, the battered spouse acquires what the psychologists
denote as a state of ‘learned helplessness,’ defendant’s state of mind as described by Drs. Tyson and
Rollins.”).
359
Id.
360
Id. at 588, 591.
361
Id. at 591. In addition, the court commented that the “existence of battered spouse syndrome . .
. distinguishes this case from the usual situation” Id.
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violent phase, the time when the traditional concept of self-defense would
mandate that defendant protect herself, i.e., at the moment the abusing
spouse attacks” and said that in this violent phase the battered spouse is
“immobilized by fear, if not actually physically restrained.”362
The conclusion wavered again between the circumstances generating
reasonable fear and “syndrome” phenomena. The penultimate paragraphs
treated “the realities of the condition” as the reason not to wait until the
beginning of an actual deadly attack.363 In conclusion, the court returned
again to the reasonable person in Judy’s circumstances, emphasizing the
“reign of terror” and the idea that deadly force “reasonably appeared
necessary.”364 That final review of her circumstances and danger did not
depend on whether Judy had a “condition.”365
The dual reasoning of the appellate opinion showed the pathologizing
effect of Walker’s approach. The court did not make the mistake of treating
the “syndrome” as a separate defense; it concluded that the jury should
weigh syndrome testimony “merely as some evidence to be considered along
with all other evidence in making its determination whether there is a
reasonable doubt as to the unlawfulness of defendant’s conduct.”366 But the
appellate opinion created the linkage to Walker’s framework that became
the basis for part of the majority opinion and for much of the commentary,
even though the case had been litigated as coercive control.
Justice Mitchell’s majority opinion in the state supreme court said the
appellate court had relied on evidence of worsening violence, “learned
helplessness,” and “meekness” in battered women.367 (The appellate court
had not used the term “meekness.”) The majority saw the core of the
appellate reasoning as dependent on the admission of “syndrome”

362
Id.; see also THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 214, at 55–70 (introducing Walker’s theory of
the cycle of violence and explaining why a woman could perceive it as futile to resist her attacker during
the violent phase of the cycle). This move toward Walker’s theory relied on opinions from other
jurisdictions and law review notes and articles citing Walker, as well as on Walker’s own work. See State
v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d at 591–92 (first citing Eber, supra note 358, at 927; then citing Rosen,
supra note 358, at 38–39; and then citing State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 821 (N.D. 1983)) (applying
a subjective standard to the beliefs of a defendant in a self-defense situation, rather than “[what] a jury
might determine to be objectively reasonable”).
363
Id. at 592 (“Given the characteristics of battered spouse syndrome, we do not believe that a
battered person must wait until a deadly attack occurs or that the victim must in all cases be actually
attacking or threatening to attack at the very moment defendant commits the unlawful act for the battered
person to act in self-defense. Such a standard, in our view, would ignore the realities of the condition.”
(emphasis added)).
364
Id. at 592.
365
See id. (instructing the jury to consider the condition only as a portion of the evidence).
366
Id
367
State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 15 (N.C. 1989). The appellate court had not used
the term “meekness.” See generally Norman I, 366 S.E.2d 586.
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368

testimony. This opinion summarized the testimony of Doctors Tyson and
Rollins in relation to “battered wife syndrome,” a “condition” characterized
by “such abuse and degradation that the battered wife comes to believe she
is unable to help herself and cannot expect help from anyone else. She
believes that she cannot escape the complete control of her husband and that
he is invulnerable to law enforcement and other sources of help.”369 The
opinion did quote testimony that Judy believed escape was impossible and
law would not protect her but did not quote the testimony on coercive
control.370
The justices saw no evidence that Judy had “any belief . . .—reasonable
or otherwise—that she faced a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm
from the drunk and sleeping victim.”371 The opinion was emphatic: the
phrase “reasonable or otherwise” appears three times on that page in addition
to another statement that there was no evidence of any “imminent threat nor
of any fear by the defendant of death or great bodily harm, imminent or
otherwise.”372 The majority ignored the aspects of the expert testimony that
supported the reasonableness of Judy’s belief.
By linking her perception to the “syndrome,” the opinion implied a
distinction from reasonable perception.373 The majority considered a
“battered woman’s defense” as a separate strategy that “could be extended
in principle to any type of case in which a defendant testified that he or she
subjectively believed that killing was necessary and proportionate to any
perceived threat.”374 This approach treats reasonableness and “syndrome”
testimony as if they were in tension with each other and appears to treat Judy
Norman’s perceptions as relevant only under a “subjective” standard.
However, the admission of expert testimony could not change the
requirements of imminent threat and reasonableness in self-defense, even if
Dr. Tyson had actually testified about Walker’s “battered woman syndrome”
and “learned helplessness.” The court erred in treating these ideas as a
change in self-defense.375
368

Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 9 (referencing the appellate opinion’s statement that “the defendant’s
evidence that she exhibited what has come to be called ‘the battered wife syndrome’ entitled her to have
the jury consider whether the homicide was an act of perfect self-defense and, thus, not a legal wrong”).
369
Id. at 11.
370
Id. at 17.
371
Id. at 14.
372
Id.
373
Id. (“We are not persuaded by the reasoning . . . that when there is evidence of battered wife
syndrome, neither an actual attack nor threat of attack by the husband at the moment the wife uses deadly
force is required to justify the wife’s killing of him in perfect self-defense.”).
374
Id. at 16 (citing Rosen, supra note 405, at 44).
375
See id. (declining to “expand” the “law of self-defense beyond the limits of immediacy and
necessity”). Feminists have not advocated for the creation of a separate defense. See, e.g., Maguigan,
supra note 250, at 426–27 (“By the offer of battered-woman-syndrome expert testimony, a defendant
does not assert her entitlement to a completely new defense. Rather, she asserts her right to explain to
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Although the majority recognized that J.T. was “angrier than ever” and
his abuse had become more frequent, they found no qualitative shift, no
lethal threat, and no possibility of mortal danger in his escalation.376 They
found predictions of lethal force against Judy “entirely speculative” because
J.T. had never “inflicted any harm . . . that approached life-threatening
injury, even during the ‘reign of terror.’”377 The discussion of previous lifethreatening injury probably responded to the fact that the judges saw no
imminent threat. However, relying on past violence makes it difficult to
address questions important in many battered women’s self-defense cases—
the increasing credibility of lethal threats and the need to respond to changes
in behavior from prior abuse.
As to the timing of threat and death, the majority stated that J.T. had
been asleep for “some time” when Judy got the gun.378 If taken literally, that
statement must be accurate, because “some time” could mean anything from
two minutes to twenty hours. But Judy’s testimony shows that the time was
actually very brief.379 Preoccupation with the appellate discussion of
“syndrome” theory and psychological response may have discouraged the
majority from grappling with the contrast between the idea that Judy had
“ample time and opportunity to resort to other means of preventing abuse”380
and the opposing view of the people around Judy who did not see a way for
her to escape or find help.
Inability to see threat interacted with reliance on the “syndrome.” The
failure to see any imminent threat supported the idea that the appellate court
had intended to justify a taking of a human life on a “purely subjective
speculation that the decedent probably would present a threat to life at a
future time and that the defendant would not be able to avoid the predicted
threat.”381 The majority saw a parade of horribles in these relaxed
requirements that could categorically legalize the opportune killing of
abusive husbands by their wives solely on the basis of the wives’ testimony
the jury the effects of intimate violence and the relationship of its effects to her self-defense claim under
existing self-defense law.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 427 n.169 (“No state has adopted a separate
defense based solely on the admission of expert testimony.”); Brief for California Alliance Against
Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae at 4 n.3, People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996) (stating
that in 1993, the California Senate considered a bill that would have created a special self-defense law
for battered women, and the California Alliance Against Domestic Violence opposed that legislation).
376
Id. at 10.
377
Id. at 15. Richard Rosen criticized this holding in light of North Carolina precedent. See Rosen,
supra note 30, at 374 n.5 (“It is hard to take this contention seriously, since Mr. Norman, among his other
actions, actually threatened to kill his wife. In any event, . . . the amount of bodily harm Mr. Norman
actually inflicted on his wife, as well as that threatened, easily meets [the standard for use of deadly force
in self-defense] under prevailing North Carolina law.” (citation omitted)).
378
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13.
379
See supra text accompanying note 186 (Judy Norman’s testimony).
380
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13.
381
Id. at 15.
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concerning their subjective speculation as to the probability of future
felonious assaults by their husbands. “Homicidal self-help would then
become a lawful solution, and perhaps the easiest and most effective
solution, to this problem.”382 The majority concluded: “[W]e decline to
expand our law of self-defense beyond the limits of immediacy and necessity
which have heretofore provided an appropriately narrow but firm basis upon
which homicide may be justified and, thus, lawful by reason of perfect selfdefense.”383
Despite the discussion of “reasonable perception” in the appellate court,
both the appellate and majority opinions linked expert testimony with
Walker’s syndrome and struggled with its relationship with reasonableness.
In contrast, the dissent discussed battered women and fear but did not rely
on the syndrome framework. The arguments in the dissent relied on both the
evidence of Judy’s actual perception of threat and the evidence that her
perception was reasonable.
3. “And Its Effects”—Reasonableness in the Dissent
The majority and dissent agreed on the legal standard for reasonableness
in self-defense: “[The defendant’s] belief must be reasonable . . . in that the
circumstances as they appeared to the defendant would create such a belief
in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness.”384 But they disagreed on the
application of that law to the Norman facts.
Justice Martin’s dissent began with precedent, stating that the duty of
the court was to instruct the jury on all defenses arising on the evidence,
even if the evidence had discrepancies or was contradicted by evidence from
the state.385 “This rule reflects the principle in our jurisprudence that it is the
jury, not the judge, that weighs the evidence.”386 Judy Norman was not
arguing for an expansion in the law of self-defense, but rather, that
self-defense law should protect her, and the dissent agreed, working through
the elements of self-defense and explaining why each could be met in
Norman.387
For the dissent, all the evidence established Judy’s actual belief that J.T.
was going to kill her.388 In discussing the way a jury would analyze the
reasonableness of her belief, the dissent emphasized several factors,
382

Id.
Id. at 16.
384
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 12 (citing State v. Gappins, 357 S.E.2d 654, 659 (N.C. 1987)); id. at
17 (Martin, J., dissenting) (describing the “ordinary firmness” element).
385
Id. at 17 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Dooley, 203 S.E.2d 815 (N.C. 1974)).
386
Id.
387
See id. (discussing the elements of self-defense and explaining how the evidence supported the
defendant).
388
See id. at 17–18 (stating that testimony from the defendant and the experts supported the
defendant’s actual belief).
383
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including the escalating crisis and the eyewitness testimony that showed that
her family shared her perceptions of threat and impossibility of escape.389
The dissent quoted extensively from the testimony on coercive control.390 It
quoted Dr. Tyson’s statements that he could find nothing in the record to
contradict Judy’s perception that she could not get help and that Judy had
begun to fear for her family and her children if she died or left.391
Justice Martin discussed articles that relied on Walker’s theory for their
description of a continuing state of threat and fear, but his dissent did not
use the terminology of “syndrome” or “learned helplessness.” He
emphasized Judy’s fear of imminent death and the impossibility of escape:
Defendant’s intense fear, based on her belief that her husband
intended not only to maim or deface her, as he had in the past,
but to kill her, was evident in the testimony of witnesses who
recounted events of the last three days of the decedent’s life.
This testimony could have led a juror to conclude that
defendant reasonably perceived a threat to her life as
“imminent,” even while her husband slept. Over these three
days, her husband’s anger was exhibited in an unprecedented
crescendo of violence. The evidence showed defendant’s fear
and sense of hopelessness similarly intensifying, leading to an
unsuccessful attempt to escape through suicide and
culminating in her belief that escape would be possible only
through her husband’s death.392
The dissent also emphasized Judy’s right to defend against great bodily
harm, taking that threat as seriously as the threat of death.393
The testimony of eyewitnesses supported Judy’s perception that she
could not escape; the family’s inability to resist J.T. or help her proved her
lack of options. Captivity was relevant to the reasonableness of her
perception of threat.394 In the dissent, “helplessness” was not a psychological
condition. Rather, it described Judy’s awareness of her lack of resources,
informed by her family’s inability to protect her and the failures of social
service agencies and the law:
In addition to the testimony of the clinical psychologist,
defendant presented the testimony of witnesses who had
actually seen defendant’s husband abuse her. These witnesses
389

See id. at 18 (noting that the testimony of the defendant’s family supported the reasonableness
of the defendant’s actual belief); id. at 19 (“[J.T.’s] rage was such that defendant’s mother feared he
might kill the whole family . . . .”).
390
Id. at 17–18. But see id. at 14 (majority opinion) (finding no evidence that she had any belief he
would kill her).
391
Id. at 17 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting Dr. Tyson’s testimony).
392
Id. at 19.
393
Id. at 20.
394
Id. at 17–18.
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described circumstances that caused not only defendant to
believe escape was impossible, but that also convinced them
of its impossibility. Defendant’s isolation and helplessness
were evident in testimony that her family was intimidated by
her husband into acquiescing in his torture of her. Witnesses
also described defendant’s experience with social service
agencies and the law, which had contributed to her sense of
futility and abandonment through the inefficacy of their
protection and the strength of her husband’s wrath when they
failed. Where torture appears interminable and escape
impossible, the belief that only the death of the oppressor can
provide relief is reasonable in the mind of a person of ordinary
firmness, let alone in the mind of the defendant, who, like a
prisoner of war of some years, has been deprived of her
humanity and is held hostage by fear.395
The crisis that the majority had treated as irrelevant was crucial to the
analysis of reasonableness in the dissent:
From this evidence of the exacerbated nature of the last three
days of twenty years of provocation, a juror could conclude
that defendant believed that her husband’s threats to her life
were viable, that serious bodily harm was imminent, and that
it was necessary to kill her husband to escape that harm. And
from this evidence a juror could find defendant’s belief in the
necessity to kill her husband not merely reasonable but
compelling.396
The dissent took a similar approach to reasonable belief about
imminence, citing the Model Penal Code approach while emphasizing that
“the question is not whether the threat was in fact imminent, but whether
defendant’s belief in the impending nature of the threat, given the
circumstances as she saw them, was reasonable in the mind of a person of
ordinary firmness.”397

395

Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.
397
Id. at 19 & n.1.
396
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III. JUDY NORMAN IN THE IMAGINATION OF LEGAL SCHOLARS—WHAT
WE MISSED AND WHY WE MISSED IT
A. Assumptions and Errors About Judy Norman, Battered Women, and
Expert Testimony
[The battered wife] does not even flinch during the beatings,
as we think all other animals instinctively do to escape the pain
caused, for example, by lighted cigarettes held against flesh. It
is almost impossible to imagine that a human being, rather
than a thing, could really be that passive when abused.398
Almost all of us in the legal academy have missed some aspects of Judy
Norman’s story, perhaps because the inventory of violence and degradation
was clearer than the trends and larger patterns in the story. The judicial
opinions recounted Judy’s strategies, but many readers could not grasp them.
In the epigraph to this section, Anne Coughlin confesses a difficulty that
reveals failure to see Judy’s desperate search for help, the combination of
strategies, and the terror that paralyzed Judy’s family members—all of which
separated the person Judy Norman from a passive “thing.”399 Coughlin’s
inability “to imagine” illustrates a larger problem: intimate partner violence
sometimes engenders fear and revulsion that make it difficult for judges,
jurors, and readers to process the facts in these cases.400
George Fletcher’s article focusing on Judy Norman states without
qualification that women can kill, if necessary, to protect their “sexual
autonomy”—in the context of his discussion, rape—but makes no mention
of Judy Norman’s sexual autonomy.401 For Fletcher, the violation in forced
prostitution was so different from rape as to merit no discussion.402 But why
use the phrase “sexual autonomy” and ignore violent trafficking?
Fletcher believes that those who perceive threat in Norman are justifying
killing in retaliation for past wrongs, even if they will not admit it. He thinks
the “standard maneuver in battered-wife cases” is to argue that “the actor
feared a recurrence of the past violence, thus [shifting the focus] from past
to future violence, from retaliation to an argument of defending against an
398
Coughlin, supra note 344, at 67 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing State v. Norman
(Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)) (using the cigarette burn in the Norman case as
an example).
399
See id. (citing Norman I, 366 S.E.2d at 587) (discussing Coughlin’s perception of Norman’s
passivity).
400
Legal scholars might read impairment into Judy Norman’s story because we are threatened by
the idea that these awful things could happen to someone who was not impaired.
401
George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
553, 560 (1996).
402
See id. at 555–56, 574 (discussing “when the impending violation is sufficiently proximate to
trigger a legitimate response”—notably, without discussing forced prostitution).
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imminent attack” and that “[i]n view of her prior abuse, the wife arguably
has reason to fear renewed violence.”403 This approach ignores the escalating
quality of threat that led Judy’s mother Laverne to arm herself and the
continuation of threat after separation.
Relying on Anne Coughlin’s critique of learned helplessness and
“battered woman syndrome,” Fletcher says that “[i]f married women can
now be held liable for their crimes . . . they can be held accountable for their
failure to leave abusive husbands.”404 By tying criminal responsibility to
lack of previous success at separation, Fletcher adopts the requirement that
Victoria Nourse calls “pre-retreat.”405 Fletcher’s forthright statement is
unusual in its candor. More commonly, “pre-retreat” appears in judicial
opinions that rely implicitly on the idea that a woman should have removed
herself before her husband’s violence became critical.406 As Nourse
explains, this approach is a departure from the usual law of self-defense.407
The Norman case seems to invite scholarly errors on facts and legal
points,408 and those errors reveal assumptions made by the authors. For
example, some say that Judy “retrieved” a gun.409 “Retrieve” means to
regain possession, to get something back.410 There is no indication in the
403

Id. at 558.
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 139
(1995) (emphasis added); cf. Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1596,
1618 (1996) (criticizing Fletcher for referring to the “gulag” Judy called home and then treating her as
autonomous and her actions as freely chosen: “[I]n a gulag, how is one ‘free’?”).
405
Nourse, supra note 18, at 1284–85.
406
Id. at 1284.
407
Id.
408
For example, some authors describe the issue in Norman as the admission of expert testimony.
See Jane Campbell Moriarty, “While Dangers Gather”: The Bush Preemption Doctrine, Battered
Women, Imminence, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 24 (2005)
(stating that Norman did not allow expert testimony because that testimony would have made
“‘[h]omicidal self-help . . . a lawful solution’” (citing State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 15
(N.C. 1989))); David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of
Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 81 (1997) (stating that “some courts remain adamantly opposed to the
introduction of this evidence on the basis of legal doctrine” (citing Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 12–14)).
409
Jeffrey P. Gray, Was the First Woman Hanged in North Carolina a “Battered Spouse?”, 19
CAMPBELL L. REV. 311, 323 (1997) (describing Judy as having “retrieved a pistol” (citing Norman II,
378 S.E.2d at 13)); see also id. at 311 n.* (noting in his biography that Gray was the assistant state
attorney who briefed and argued the only two cases the North Carolina Supreme Court considered on
battered woman syndrome); Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense,
Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 228–29 (2002) (“When her husband
got drunk and fell asleep, Norman retrieved a gun from her mother’s house and shot him.” (citing Norman
II, 378 S.E.2d at 9)); Anthony J. Sebok, Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense Demand Too Much?,
57 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 737 (1996) (“[T]he Norman court thought that the fact that Judy Norman walked
to her mother’s house to retrieve a gun while Mr. Norman was asleep suggests that she could have fled
her own house . . . .” (citing Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 13)); Faigman & Wright, supra note 408, at 84
n.100 (describing that Judy “retrieved a gun from her mother’s house” (citing Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at
12–16)).
410
See Retrieve, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (defining
retrieve as “to get back; regain”).
404
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record that Judy had handled this gun before or knew it was there; according
to the record, her purpose was first to bring the baby to her mother and then
to get something to help with her headache.411 The term “retrieve” implies a
suspicion that she had gone across the road with the purpose of getting the
gun, or that she had formed a more developed decision to end his life.412
Those concepts might affect the conclusion that she had enough time to
reach other decisions.413
The most important errors may be those that minimize the dangers
facing Judy Norman. Professor Dressler has access to the Norman
transcript—his casebook quotes Judy’s entire response to her lawyer’s
question about why she killed her husband, including her certainty that the
coming night at the truck stop would be worse than ever.414 Yet Dressler
asserts that there was no crisis: “As far as we know, tomorrow was going to
be no different than yesterday or the day after tomorrow.”415 That statement
contradicts all the judicial opinions416 and the eyewitness who had never
seen J.T. that angry before.417 Like the failure to consider the temporal
implications of “nap,” the inability to see crisis is a crucial factor in the

411
See Transcript supra note 1, at 85 (describing Laverne Laws’s testimony that Judy visited her
mother’s house to get medication for her headache and found the gun when Laverne directed Judy to her
purse to get pain pills for her headache); Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 11 (describing why Norman visited
her mother’s house).
412
See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 9, at 347 (“[A]fter returning home from the hospital, she decided
to take matters into her own hands. Her husband had been asleep for some time; Ms. Norman walked to
her mother's house, obtained a gun, and then returned and shot her husband three times in the back of the
head while he slept, killing him.”).
413
Joshua Dressler’s account condenses the chronology of June 11–12 and omits both the baby and
her fear of waking J.T. See Joshua Dressler, Criminal Law, Moral Theory, and Feminism: Some
Reflections on the Subject and on the Fun (and Value) of Courting Controversy, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1143, 1158–59 (2004) (mentioning that Judy Norman had four children and explaining the abuse she
endured in the days leading up to the incident but choosing not to mention the baby and Judy’s fear of
waking her husband). Dressler’s description implies that Judy went to her mother’s house with the
purpose of obtaining a gun and killing her husband and, like Kaufman, describes Judy as taking matters
“into her own hands.” Id. at 1158; Kaufman, supra note 9, at 347.
414
JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 521 (6th
ed. 2012).
415
Dressler, Feminist (or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law, supra note 29, at 1489–90.
416
See State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 588, 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (reciting the
overdose incident in which J.T. told emergency personnel that Judy “don’t [sic] deserve to live” and
describing the “decedent’s sleep [as] but a momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror”). But see
Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 12, 15 (holding that there was no evidence proving that Judy Norman was under
“imminent” threat of “death or great bodily harm” and arguing that a different holding could have the
effect of “mak[ing] opportune homicide lawful as a result of mere subjective predictions of indefinite
future assaults and circumstances”); id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting) (reciting Judy Norman’s intense fear
in the days before the killing and recounting the deceased’s attempt to interfere with the first responders
after Judy overdosed, telling them, “Let the bitch die”).
417
Transcript, supra note 1, at 57–58 (testimony of Mark Navarra).
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argument that no reasonable person could possibly have perceived the threat
in this situation.418
A similar minimization of violence and danger appeared in a study that
tested public perceptions of appropriate punishment using two
hypotheticals, one based on the case of New York subway shooter Bernhard
Goetz, and the other—the authors stated—on Norman.419 In each
hypothetical, an expert testified about a “syndrome”: “posttraumatic stress”
or “battered-spouse.”420 In both hypotheticals, the facts were arguably less
threatening than in the actual cases. In the male hypothetical, the facts
evoking threat were similar to Goetz except that the hypothetical defendant
was approached by only one teenager on a subway platform who stated,
“give me some money, man” rather than being approached by one or two of
a group of four teenagers who were together on the subway train.421 The
female hypothetical bore less resemblance to the facts of Norman, and the
418
The failure to see crisis may also explain Professor Dressler’s interpretation of the dissent. The
dissent concludes the argument about reasonableness by stating that “[J.T.’s] barbaric conduct . . .
reduced the quality of the defendant’s life to such an abysmal state that . . . the jury might well have
found that she was justified in acting in self-defense for the preservation of her tragic life.” Norman II,
378 S.E.2d. at 21 (Martin, J., dissenting). To Professor Dressler, this statement suggests that Justice
Martin considered J.T. to have forfeited his right to life by abusing Judy; Dressler criticizes “moral
forfeiture” theory but does not address Justice Martin’s arguments about reasonableness, the fears shared
by eyewitnesses, and the impossibility of escape. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
247–48 (7th ed. 2016) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 7TH ED.].
419
Donald Braman et al., Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531,
1587–88 (2010).
William had persistently abused Julie during their ten-year marriage. This mistreatment included
physical beatings, some of which resulted in injuries (facial cuts; broken ribs; twice a broken nose)
requiring emergency medical treatment. Three times the police arrested William for assaulting Julie, but
released him from custody each time after Julie declined to press charges.
Testifying in her own defense, Julie told the jury that William had beaten her on the morning of the
shooting after returning home from a night of hard drinking and then fallen asleep in the bedroom. Julie
testified that she then went to her mother’s nearby home and obtained the hand gun used in the shooting.
“I felt I had no choice except to shoot him,” she stated, “because I knew when he woke up this time he
was going to hurt me really bad.”
The defense also called an expert witness: Dr. Leonard Wallace, a Ph.D. psychiatrist on the faculty
of a major university. Based on a thorough psychiatric examination of Julie, Wallace offered his opinion
that Julie was suffering from “battered woman syndrome.” “Like other victims of chronic domestic
violence,” Wallace testified, “Julie believed that she was powerless to leave and that no one could or
would help her.” “In my opinion, Julie honestly perceived that her husband would attack her if she didn’t
kill him first; that belief was quite reasonable, given the beatings she had previously suffered, and the
effect of those beatings on her psyche,” he concluded.
Id. (quoting Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defense Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 25–26, 65 (2008)).
420
Id. at 1586–87.
421
Compare id. at 1586–88 (creating a hypothetical in which a fictitious forty-eight-year-old
white male shoots a seventeen-year-old African American male), with People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41,
43 (N.Y. 1986) (stating that four youths sat together on the subway train and that it appeared from the
evidence before the Grand Jury that one of them approached Goetz, possibly with a second youth beside
him, and stated, “give me five dollars”). The hypothetical also shifted location from subway car to
subway platform, which could also affect the interpretation of threat.
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differences were significant: it omitted the existence of children and Judy’s
frustrated efforts at help-seeking.422 It omitted all the factors that pointed to
lethal danger, including the abuser’s threats to kill, and it omitted forced
prostitution—the threat Judy had identified first on the witness stand.
One way to measure the difference between this hypothetical and the
published opinions in Norman is to apply the respected Danger Assessment
Scale, which asks about facts and patterns correlated with risks of
lethality.423 The published facts in Norman yield “yes” answers to nine of
the twenty questions in the Danger Assessment: whether physical violence
had increased in severity or frequency; whether he was unemployed;
whether he had avoided being arrested for domestic violence; whether he
threatened to kill her; whether he forced unwanted sex; whether he
controlled her daily activities; whether she had been beaten while pregnant;
whether she believed he was capable of killing her; whether he followed her;

422

See Braman et al., supra note 419, at 1587–88 (presenting a hypothetical based on Judy

Norman).
423
During the 1980s, Jacquelyn Campbell studied patterns and risk factors in femicides—the
deaths of battered women—and developed the Danger Assessment [DA] for use by counselors
collaborating with the women to assess their risks and choices. See Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Nursing
Assessment for Risk of Homicide with Battered Women, ADVANCES IN NURSING SCI., July 1986, at 36–
37 (explaining the study of risk and development of the DA); Campbell revised the DA in 2004 to create
a list of twenty questions still used today. See Jacquelyn C. Campbell et. al., The Danger Assessment:
Validation of a Lethality Risk Assessment Instrument for Intimate Partner Femicide, 24 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 653, 655 (2009) (reproducing revised DA questions); id. at 657–59
(describing revision of the original questionnaire and citing three validation studies); id. at 661–63
(describing the revision process); D. Alex Heckert & Edward W. Gondolf, Battered Women’s
Perceptions of Risk Versus Risk Factors and Instruments in Predicting Repeat Reassault, 19 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 778, 778 (2004) (finding an earlier version of DA combined with women’s
perceptions of risk to be among the accurate methods of prediction); id. at 778 (“Women’s perceptions
of risk by themselves were much better predictors than [two other risk assessment tools] and not quite as
accurate as the DAS”); Jill Theresa Messing & Jonel Thaller, The Average Predictive Validity of Intimate
Partner Violence Risk Assessment Instruments, 28 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1537, 1543 (2013)
(noting high values in DA when applied to attempted femicides and severe reassaults); cf. Amanda Hitt
& Lynn McLain, Stop the Killing: Potential Courtroom Use of a Questionnaire that Predicts the
Likelihood that a Victim of Intimate Partner Violence Will Be Murdered by Her Partner, 24 WIS. J.L.
GENDER & SOC’Y 277, 307 (2009) (describing research methods including interviews with close friends
or relatives of women killed by partners who provide information of their experience and patterns in their
relationships). Other threat assessment tools also emerged but in future studies. Among these, only the
DA proved to be more accurate than battered women’s predictions about abuse. The DA has been
validated repeatedly, but its application in law enforcement raises important questions. See, e.g., Hitt &
McLain, supra, at 307 (discussing the validation of risk factors); Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty,
Dignity, and Safety: The Impact of Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 519,
526 (2010) (discussing “weaknesses that undermine the DA’s effectiveness” when the DA is used in
screening by law enforcement, including a potentially flawed belief that separation from the abuser will
stop future violence).
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and whether he was an alcoholic or drug addict. (As to alcoholism, the
hypothetical mentions only a night of hard drinking.)425
Using the facts in the published opinions, the weighted result on the
Danger Assessment places Judy Norman’s risk in the highest category,
Extreme Danger.426 The statements about threats to children—in the
transcript but not the opinions427—would have raised the raw score but could
not have changed the assessment of lethal risk, simply because the Danger
Assessment scale has no higher risk category. In stark contrast, the facts
from the female hypothetical in the Braman law review article do not
produce a single “yes” answer to the Danger Assessment questions.428 The
hypothetical does not reflect—and may not have produced in readers—the
lethal danger that appears in the facts in Norman.
The gap between hypothetical facts and Norman may or may not have
affected the study. For the authors’ purposes, the hypothetical might stand
on its own, but they should not have associated it with Norman. That
association reveals a story we tell ourselves about Norman: a story that omits
constraint and danger. That story avoids hard questions about what
justification would mean if our sisters or our daughters faced a night at the
truck stop under J.T. Norman’s threat of death.
This hypothetical illustrates the academy’s overreliance on the idea of
a “syndrome” rather than the substantive content of expert testimony.
Uttering the word “syndrome” cannot, in itself, transform the trial of a
criminal defendant or the evaluation of threat by jurors. Experts do not speak
in a vacuum. They explain intimate partner violence; they discuss patterns
and common reactions; they analyze facts from this case or similar facts;

424

See supra Part IA (a history of the marriage), describing severe escalation in violence; J.T.s long
history of unemployment; the failure of police to arrest J.T. when they were called; forced prostitution;
extreme control of daily activities including preventing her from eating; J.T.’s violent attack during
Judy’s pregnancy that resulted in the premature birth of the baby; the testimony of Judy and her mother
that they feared J.T. would kill her; J.T.’s successful pursuit of Judy to the food stamp office and on
previous occasions when she fled seeking help; and J.T.s drinking and alcoholism).
425
See hypothetical and reference to “hard drinking,” supra note 419.
426
See Johnson, supra note 423, at 529–30 (defining the highest risk as “Extreme Danger”). The
published Norman facts score in the Extreme Danger category.
427
See Transcript, supra note 1, at 83 (recounting a situation in which the children were threatened).
428
Compare the hypothetical facts in Braman et al., supra note 419, at 1587–88 (portraying a less
severe set of facts and threats than Judy Norman experienced), with the DA factors listed in Johnson,
supra note 423, at 528 (enumerating DA scale). The authors of the hypothetical linked to Norman may
have believed that describing a record of arrests and failed prosecutions for domestic violence made the
abuser seem more dangerous—indeed, people responding to these questionnaires may have seen it that
way. However, the lethality factor in the DA involves avoiding arrest for domestic violence entirely—
which described J.T. Norman’s experience but not the experience of the abuser in the hypothetical. See
Johnson, supra note 423, at 529 (listing number seven on the DA scale as avoiding arrest for domestic
violence).
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429

they educate juries away from stereotypes.
Factors predicting lethal
danger are an important part of the substance a jury will consider in weighing
reasonableness.
B. A Vulgarized Version of the “Syndrome”—Evidence and Influence
Misogyny is not the cause of this persistent confusion among legal
scholars. Errors about the Norman case and “syndrome” testimony appear
in the work of men and women who define themselves as feminists.
Professor Dressler, who has written several articles rejecting any selfdefense claim for Judy Norman, has at the same time worked to find another
theory that would help her.430
The interesting question is why feminists and scholars who are not
misogynists turned day into night, missed the urgent crisis while imagining
that the threat had not grown more severe, missed the threat of sex slavery
entirely, and reframed testimony on “coercive control” as testimony on
“learned helplessness.”431 These misunderstandings spring in part from
stereotypes about passivity in battered women and about expert explanation
as defined by simplistic, vulgarized versions of Walker’s theory.
In addition, legal research methods may have perpetuated these
misunderstandings. Any search for the phrase “battered woman syndrome”
in legal sources will yield results that give disproportionate weight to older
precedent, such as cases that often cite Walker’s first book432—only one of
many works from that first wave of social science research. In contrast, the
expert at Judy Norman’s trial approached Norman’s experience through a
lens of coercive control, an approach that was valid in 1987 and even better

429
See, e.g., Osthoff & Maguigan, supra note 252, at 235 (explaining that social science testimony
is not limited to a woman’s psychological makeup even though psychological reactions are sometimes
important; experts also explain common patterns found in battering relationships, including general
dynamics and common responses to abuse or particular dynamics in a particular case; they educate juries
away from preexisting bias and expectations); VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE, supra note 220, at iv
(explaining that judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys are helping juries better understand the issues
surrounding battered women and helping to “dispel myths and stereotypes related to battered women”);
Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Cases, 11 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 75, 82 (1996) (explaining that experts have “expressed concern about the use of the term
‘syndrome’ in connection” with battered women).
430
See, e.g., Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 469 (discussing an
alternate theory for acquittal that is not based on the approach he saw as mental incapacity); Dressler,
Feminist (or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law, supra note 29, at 1491–92 (arguing for a duress
defense to apply in cases like Norman’s).
431
See discussion supra Part III.A.
432
See, e.g., United States v. Nwoye, 824 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Walker’s books
from 1979 and 1984); State v. B.H., 870 A.2d 273, 279 (N.J. 2005) (referring to Walker’s work to define
battered woman syndrome); State v. Stewart, 719 S.E.2d 876, 884–85 (W. Va. 2011) (citing Walker’s
work to define battered woman syndrome and noting that the syndrome has been part of West Virginia
jurisprudence for over 30 years).
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433

supported today. The concept of “learned helplessness” that gripped many
professors and judges trumped the actual testimony about coercive control
in the case.
Anne Coughlin contradicts virtually all serious scholars by treating
“battered woman syndrome” as a separate defense.434 Scholars who differ
on many other points agree that the “syndrome” is not a defense but a theory
that is part of the evidence provided by some experts.435 Indeed, Coughlin
cites several cases and articles that explain clearly this is not a defense.436
433

See DUTTON ET AL., supra note 247, at 1 (describing how battered women’s advocates have
defined intimate partner violence as a “‘pattern of coercive control’ . . . in which the batterer asserts his
power over the victim through the use of threats, as well as actual violence”) (citing ELLEN PENCE &
MICHAEL PAYMAR, EDUCATION GROUPS FOR MEN WHO BATTER: THE DULUTH MODEL (1993));
JOHNSON, supra note 234, at 7–8 (discussing “intimate terrorism” as a type of domestic violence that
“involves the general exercise of coercive control” that is “embedded in a general pattern of power and
control”); OKUN, supra note 217, at 86–87, 115–33 (discussing coercive control and woman abuse in a
book published in the mid-1980s); SCHNEIDER, supra note 218, at 124 (“[O]ther interpretive frameworks
to describe battering that have been proposed, such as ‘coercive control,’ do not focus exclusively on the
woman who has been battered, but on the batterer or the relationship.”); STARK, supra note 50, at 5
(discussing in a 2007 book coercive control as a framework for abuse); Dutton & Goodman, supra note
247, at 743, 746 (stating that, for decades, advocates have “placed the notion of coercive control squarely
at the center of their analysis of intimate partner violence,” exploring issues of coercive control and
setting forth a new model of coercion in intimate partner violence).
434
See Coughlin, supra note 344, at 6 (arguing that the “battered woman syndrome defense” is
sexist); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 509–10, 510 n.131
(1996) (noting that Coughlin is a scholar who believes there should be a separate battered woman
syndrome defense); cf. Maguigan, supra note 250, at 381–82 (suggesting that criminal law does not need
to be redefined to include battered woman syndrome as a specific self-defense claim).
435
Many cases had already held that the “syndrome” was not a separate defense. See, e.g., Chapman
v. State, 386 S.E.2d 129, 131 (GA 1989) (“Although evidence of the syndrome is admissible, . . . it is not
a separate defense.”). Most scholars recognize that “battered woman syndrome” is not a separate defense.
See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 218, at 124 (explaining that “battered woman syndrome” is not a
separate defense and that feminists did not advocate for a separate defense); Sarah M. Buel, Effective
Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S
L.J. 217, 296 (2003) (“BWS is not a defense, but rather a pattern of symptoms used to describe the effects
of abuse on the victim.” (footnote omitted)).
436
In these instances, Coughlin cited some point that suited her argument while ignoring other
statements in the same sources clarifying that the “syndrome” was not a defense. See, e.g., Coughlin,
supra note 344, at 56 n.279 (citing State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio 1990) (“[A]dmission of
expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome does not establish a new defense or
justification,” but assists the trier of fact in evaluating the defendant’s honest belief in imminent danger
of death or great bodily harm and that deadly force was “her only means of escape” (emphasis added)));
id. at 51 n.248 (citing State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122 (S.C. 1986) (emphasizing that the court was “not
recognizing the battered woman’s syndrome as a separate defense” but addressing the related testimony
as relevant to self-defense)); id. at 67 n.334 (citing State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1988) (“[N]o
jurisdictions have held that the existence of the battered woman syndrome in and of itself operates as a
defense to murder.”)); id. at 56–57, nn.281, 285, 286 (citing People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 388
n.8 (Ct. App. 1992), rev’d, 883 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1994) (“There . . . still exists a misconception by some
lawyers and judges that there is a defense called ‘battered woman syndrome’ giving women who are
battered some unique right simply because they are battered. That is not the law in California (or, as far
as we can tell, anywhere else).”); id. at 28 n.138, 49 n.233 (citing Maguigan, supra note 250, without
discussing Maguigan’s statements contradicting the idea of a separate defense).
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But Coughlin’s position is no accident. It is the intellectual foundation
of the central argument in her article—her analogy between “battered
woman syndrome” and the “marital coercion” defense.437 Coughlin read
Walker carefully and identified many points of contradiction within her
writings, yet failed to see that—from the beginning—Walker was defending
her terminology against feminist criticism.438 While Coughlin’s position is
an outlier, it exemplifies a more general problem: when Walker explained
that “learned helplessness” did not mean the woman was literally helpless,
that part of her work did not gain traction in legal scholarship.
George Fletcher misunderstood both the term “battered woman
syndrome” and the expert testimony in Norman: “The jury had heard expert
testimony about the battered women’s syndrome. Judy was allegedly a
paradigm of women addicted to abuse.”439 “Addicted to abuse” is a gross
mischaracterization of all contemporary experts, including Walker, whose
work sought to rebut earlier theories of battered women’s masochism.440 It
had nothing to do with Dr. Tyson’s testimony in Norman.
Accurate information has been available in law reviews for decades.
Mary Ann Dutton’s “redefinition” appeared in a 1993 law review
symposium on domestic violence.441 “Battered woman syndrome” appears
in the title, and the journal is available through Westlaw and Lexis—
research with conventional legal tools would have found this article
easily.442
Stereotypical ideas about expert evidence persisted. Even when citing
articles by psychologists relying on Dutton and others, law professors
sometimes failed to grasp the substance of those articles. For example,
Joshua Dressler described a study and used a quotation about the
pathologizing effect of testimony about battered woman syndrome: “[A]
juror simulation study has reported that ‘the presence of expert evidence
providing a diagnosis of [BWS], compared to a no expert control, [causes]
437
See Coughlin, supra note 344, at 29. Coughlin uses the term “marital coercion” to distinguish
this class of cases from the general defense of duress and argues, “The marital coercion defense was
available only to married women, and it had all but disappeared in this country by the mid-1970s, when,
as is my thesis, it reemerged in the guise of the battered woman syndrome defense.” Id.
438
See, e.g., id. at 56 (discussing Walker’s work and expert testimony); BWS 2d 2000, supra note
225, at 11 (“[M]any advocates who worked with battered women did not like the implications of the term
‘learned helplessness’ because they felt it suggested that battered women were helpless and passive.”).
439
FLETCHER, supra note 404, at 135 (emphasis added). Lynne Henderson rebuts Fletcher’s
paradigm: “She was not addicted to the violence; she was held prisoner by it—a fact relevant to a claim
of self defense.” Henderson, supra note 404, at 1618.
440
See BWS 2d 2000, supra note 225, at 102 (criticizing the concept of masochism in battered
women as “inconsistent with feminism” and criticizing the persistence of the construct of masochism).
441
Understanding Women’s Responses: A Redefinition, supra note 239, at 1195.
442
See id. at 1191 (showing “battered woman syndrome” in the title of Dutton’s article); see also
Meier, supra note 246, at 1314 (citing Understanding Women’s Responses: A Redefinition, supra note
239); Stark, supra note 246, at 974 n.6 (citing Understanding Women’s Responses: A Redefinition, supra
note 239).
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the jurors to view the defendant as more distorted in her thinking, and less
capable of making responsible choices, and less culpable for her actions.’”443
But Dressler took that quote out of context. The authors had summarized a
previous, less-sophisticated study. In contrast, their own study compared
three categories: (1) Lenore Walker’s “syndrome” approach; (2) a “social
agency” approach based on the work of Mary Ann Dutton and others; and
(3) no expert at all.444 Only Walker’s “battered woman syndrome”
framework made jurors more disposed to accept the idea of insanity in the
battered woman.445 The “social agency” framework characteristic of Mary
Ann Dutton’s work did not have the same effect.446 Dressler’s doublequotation out-of-context matched his own ideas about the “syndrome” but
missed the very point of the work he cited, which recognized and compared
different approaches.
In theoretical debates on self-defense, participants often built arguments
on these misunderstandings about expert evidence. The legal question in
Norman is not the concept of “learned helplessness” or a “syndrome” but
the availability of a jury instruction on self-defense. If the judge had allowed
a self-defense instruction, the Norman jury would not have been asked
whether Judy had “learned helplessness.” The jury had already heard about
her help-seeking efforts and the lessons she had learned. She had tried many
times to find help or safety, including at the hospital in Chicago, hotels, and
the homes of family members. J.T. had found her and brought her back
brutally so many times that she had become convinced he would find her
again. Judy would not go to a shelter because she was concerned for her
children. Her mother believed J.T. might kill the whole family.447 J.T. told
Judy he would kill her if she filed papers to commit him or a complaint for
domestic abuse. The police did not help her, and she came to believe no help
was available.448 Allowing the jury to consider self-defense would not have
changed the evidence introduced at trial, and admitting expert testimony
would not have reshaped the legal charge to the jury. The legal question
would be whether a reasonable person would have perceived the threat as
Judy saw it.
Professor Dressler rules out imminent threat as a matter of law because
of J.T.’s nap and then, to address the dangers Judy Norman faced without
443
See Dressler, Feminist or (“Feminist,”) Reform of Self-Defense Law, supra note 29, at 1488
(attributing the quote to Schuller & Hastings, supra note 249, at 169). For the actual context, see Schuller
& Hastings, supra note 249, at 169 (citing an earlier study by Norman J. Finkel et al., The Self-Defense
Defense and Community Sentiment, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 585, 597–98 (1991)).
444
Schuller & Hastings, supra note 249, at 171.
445
Id. at 184.
446
Id.
447
Id. at 80, 82.
448
Id. at 36. See Part IA (summarizing events in the history of the marriage) and Part IIB
(summarizing expert testimony at trial).
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allowing the jury to find her acts justified, proposes a new “non-syndrome”
approach based in duress—an argument that Judy had “no-fair-opportunity”
to find other solutions.449 But the points Dressler would cover are not really
new; Dr. Tyson covered them thoroughly. Dressler frames the inquiry:
Think about what a jury might have asked itself if it had been
given the opportunity. Could Judy have avoided the situation
by walking out the door? (Remember, we are not using
syndrome evidence, so the battered woman’s learned
helplessness, if it exists, is not relevant.) To answer that
question, the jury would likely ask itself other questions: Did
Judy Norman have children, thus making it more difficult for
her to leave? Yes. She had four living at the time of J.T.’s
death. What then were her options? Leave them with J.T.?
That would be unthinkable for any loving parent. Leave with
them? Where would she have gone? How would she have
supported the children? What safety nets had been set up in
her community to make such an option realistic? Moreover,
what would have prevented J.T. from finding her and
“punishing” her for her departure? Rather than leave, could
she have called the police for help? She did, and they did
nothing to protect her. And, so on.450
Because of Dressler’s beliefs about expert testimony, he fails to see two
crucial points: Dr. Tyson had indeed addressed those same facts, and Tyson
had not applied Walker’s framework to those facts.451 Part IV.E infra
explores the duress proposal and its link to ideas about experts.
Imagine these professors as jurors with no expert to help them. They
hear the evidence and retreat to deliberate. Probably, they could have
avoided the error of “midnight shooting” if they had heard the facts
themselves. But they might have told each other what they told the world
after reading the facts: Judy retrieved a gun and took matters into her own
449
Dressler makes this argument repeatedly. Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers,
supra note 29, at 469; Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters, supra note 10, at 278.
450
Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 470; cf. supra text
accompanying notes 270–312 (quoting and discussing Dr. Tyson’s testimony about Norman’s fears for
her family, inability to get help from agencies and authorities, and J.T.’s ability to find her).
451
Also based on those misconceptions about experts, Dressler argues that expert (“syndrome”)
testimony should be excluded from the determination of reasonable perception of imminent threat. See
Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 464 (arguing that testimony on
battered woman syndrome should be excluded because it “essentially converts the battered woman’s
claim from the justification of self-defense to a mental incapacity defense”); see also Dressler, Feminist
(or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law, supra note 29, at 1486–88 (arguing that a “reasonable
person” would not believe a sleeping man was an “instantaneous threat”); Dressler, supra note 10, at
266–69 (arguing that evidence of “battered woman syndrome” provides reasons to excuse the act but
cannot justify it).
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hands because she decided to act as judge, jury, and executioner. They might
dismiss eyewitnesses who believed as firmly as Judy did that she could not
escape and that her life was in danger. When the professor-jurors talked
about sleep, they might forget that on the last day of his life, J.T. had feigned
sleep to surprise Judy by kicking her in the head when the need to control
the car left her no way to defend herself.452 (At the time of the shooting,
Judy’s actions were consistent with a belief that J.T. was asleep, but his
practice of surprise attacks made the appearance of sleep less useful for
predicting the presence or absence of a threat). Her help-seeking might
disappear into the idea that years of abuse are a sign of passivity; the
professors might express dismay or disbelief and wonder that any human
being could be this passive.
Listening to Dr. Tyson would have helped legal scholars. The label
under which his testimony was admitted—“forensic psychology,” “battered
woman syndrome,” or “intimate partner violence and its effects”—would
not have determined the content of his testimony. Consistent with Mary Ann
Dutton’s redefinition, jurors would have heard the description of violence
and degradation and the functions of those behaviors in the dynamic between
them, heard about Judy’s efforts and defeats in help-seeking, and heard Dr.
Tyson say that he could not identify any options she had overlooked.453 If
the trial happened today, the expert would also provide knowledge from
decades of subsequent research, including findings on patterns in intimate
partner violence. The professors would learn that “why didn’t she leave” is
the wrong question to ask, that lethal danger often increases at separation,
and that women like Judy Norman attempt many solutions, including
leaving, without success.
Law professors are analytical by training, skilled at reading arguments
and applying theories. Most jurors will have no preconceived ideas about
the content of expert testimony. The expert will educate jurors away from
their own misconceptions. The task for jurors will be to work with the
evidence presented, including the information from experts. The legal
academy should also take that approach instead of relying on old summaries
of expert frameworks.
C. Locating the Helpful Points in the Debates
Victoria Nourse proposes a powerful, simple way to cut through
confusion about “subjective” and “objective” aspects of self-defense law:
It is an open secret that courts adopt a self-defense standard
that is both objective and subjective; as a doctrinal matter,
then, there simply is no debate, except at the margins . . . .
[P]erform a simple test. Open up a self-defense case using
452
453

Id. at 20.
See supra Section II.C.2 (discussing intimate partner violence and its effects).
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objectivity and subjectivity to describe self-defense law. Now
black out those adjectives. You will probably be left with a
better text and nothing will have been lost. The law can still
speak of state of mind and conduct, it can even speak of the
reasonable person and her perceptions, it can apply the age-old
“appearances” test in self-defense, and announce the proper
rules of aggression and proportionality. History makes it quite
clear that the law of self-defense does not need the discourse
of subjectivity for any of that.454
I agree with and support Professor Nourse’s approach. Confusion about
expert testimony became entangled with the “discourse of subjectivity” to
make it difficult for the debates on Norman to reach productive conclusions.
The debates suffered further from the idea of a “midnight shooting” and
from the inability of scholars and judges to see the threat of forcible
trafficking. Nonetheless, the debates on battered women and self-defense in
which Norman has played such an important role have been extensive, and
they include many thoughtful points.
Legal scholars need a way to evaluate the strengths of those arguments
without holding onto stereotypes and misconceptions. Taking a cue from
Professor Nourse’s critique of the discourse of subjectivity, we should strike
and replace outdated terminology before using these concepts in legal
analysis.455 Except when discussing Lenore Walker’s work specifically, we
should replace references to testimony on “battered woman syndrome” or
the “cycle of violence” with testimony on “intimate partner violence.” For
“learned helplessness,” substitute “the effects of intimate partner violence.”
Then, evaluate the points that remain. That simple measure should help
distinguish the core of each scholarly argument and eliminate the residual
effects of outdated concepts. And that, in turn, should allow us to make the
best possible use of the substantial body of literature that scholars have built
around the Norman case.
IV. REVISITING REASONABLENESS, IMMINENCE, AND JUSTIFICATION
A. Interrogating Sleep—Context vs. “A Matter of Law”456
Sleep happens in a context. The word “sleep” describes a condition that
varies with different times, circumstances, and sleepers. A person might
sleep for a minute or a full night and might sleep lightly or deeply.
454

Nourse, supra note 18, at 1295–96 (footnotes omitted).
This proposal adapts Nourse’s suggestion that we eliminate the often-misleading adjectives
“subjective” and “objective” and instead focus on the substance of self-defense requirements. Id.
456
State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 590 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (“The State contends
that since decedent was asleep at the time of the shooting, defendant’s belief in the necessity to kill
decedent was, as a matter of law, unreasonable.”).
455
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If it should matter to self-defense that there is more than one kind of
sleep, then how should it matter? The debates on Norman include many
arguments on the nature of the imminence requirement, how it should be
interpreted, and whether it should be covered in the evaluation of necessity
for the use of deadly force.457 But the literature on self-defense has not
grappled much with the variations in sleep.
Some scholars assume that sleep should create a per se rule against
reasonable self-defense, 458 even though courts divide on this question.459
Paul Robinson answers the idea that the attack must be happening
immediately by giving the example of an attacker who kidnaps and confines
his target and announces his intention to kill one week later.460 Robinson
argues that the law must permit the prisoner to kill the attacker and escape
one morning before the week has passed:
The proper inquiry is not the immediacy of the threat but the
immediacy of the response necessary in defense. If a
threatened harm is such that it cannot be avoided if the
intended victim waits until the last moment, the principle of
self-defense must permit him to act earlier—as early as is
required to defend himself effectively.461
The kidnapping example recognizes both the exceptional danger and the
continuing threat in that crime. Many states include kidnapping as one of the
grounds for use of deadly force in self-defense.462 A similar example would
457
See, e.g., Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 458, 467 (arguing
that some degree of imminence is required to justify killing); Kaufman, supra note 9, at 369 (concluding
that the imminence requirement is a “crucial, independent restriction on the individual right to resort to
violence against others, especially deadly violence”).
458
See, e.g., id. at 458, 467 (arguing that a battered woman is not justified in killing her sleeping
abuser because the abuser may change his behavior).
459
Some courts have allowed a self-defense instruction when the defendant killed a sleeping abuser.
See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d 822, 823 (Mich. App. 1992) (“Defendant admits shooting the
victim while he slept, but claims she acted in self-defense following forty-eight hours of abuse and death
threats and years of battery.”); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Minn. 1989) (describing facts in
which a battered defendant killed her husband while he was asleep); id. at 797 (“The court has determined
not to preclude, as a matter of law, the defense or theory of self-defense.”); People v. Emick, 481
N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (N.Y. App. 1982) (defendant shot while her boyfriend was asleep); id. at 560 (quoting
self-defense instruction given at trial); id. at 562–63 (reversing her conviction because of the admission
of evidence “extremely prejudicial to her defense of justification” and because the self-defense
instruction had incorrectly included a duty to retreat). Other courts have ruled out self-defense when the
defendant killed a sleeping abuser. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 589 (Kan. 1988) (“[T]he
giving of the self-defense instruction was erroneous. Under such circumstances, a battered woman cannot
reasonably fear imminent life-threatening danger from her sleeping spouse.”).
460
ROBINSON, supra note 21, at § 131I(1).
461
Id.
462
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (Westlaw through Act 2018-579); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
627:4(I(c) (2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a)(2)(B) (West 2007) (authorizing the use of deadly
force to stop a kidnapping). For an extended discussion of kidnapping and battered women, see Gregory
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involve a hijacker who takes cold medicine and falls asleep while guarding
captive passengers. Assuming other exit was unavailable, most scholars
would find justification if passengers killed the hijacker when he dozed off.
Questions about imminence can arise outside the crime of kidnapping.
Imagine a man who controls his wife by setting the alarm system so the
doors and windows beep when they open. He wakes whenever the system
beeps. He ran track in high school—he can always catch her before she
reaches a nearby house. If she finds a gun under the bed, must she try running
before she can use it even though he will catch her? Perhaps a sufficiently
dangerous threat will make it unnecessary for him to run quickly. He might
say, “You are free to leave any time, but when you go through that door, it
will beep, and I will kill your child in the other room.” Even if she is not
chained physically, a reasonable person could believe that she cannot simply
leave—even while he sleeps.
In a house in Cleveland, a man named Ariel Castro kept three women
chained and confined for years and raped them.463 Rape justifies the use of
deadly force in self-defense in almost every state,464 but Castro’s victims
were prisoners, chained, without weapons. If Castro fell asleep after one of
those rapes and a knife fell out of his pocket, would sleep have ruled out, as
a matter of law, the woman’s need to act immediately?
Dressler argues for a per se rule against a lethal attack during sleep
because a living abuser might change his mind.465 But every time Ariel
Castro slept, it was possible that in the morning he would change his mind
about committing more rapes. Would that possibility make the act of killing
Castro while he slept into what Fletcher saw in Norman466—unlawful
vengeance for past rapes instead of self-defense against the next rape?
The legal questions here must be: What threat would a reasonable
woman in her circumstances perceive? And would that reasonable woman
in her circumstances find it necessary to act immediately before her abuser
could wake up and begin again?
A. Diamond, Note, To Have but Not to Hold: Can “Resistance Against Kidnapping” Justify Lethal SelfDefense Against Incapacitated Batterers?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 729, 732 (2002) and the sources gathered
therein.
463
For articles reporting on this event, see Trip Gabriel et al., Cleveland Man Charged with Rape
and Kidnapping, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/09/us/clevelandkidnapping.html?pagewanted=1; Caroline Porter, Kidnapper Castro Gets Life Without Parole, Plus
1,000
Years,
WALL
ST.
J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323681904578641924168692486 (last updated Aug.
1, 2013, 7:21 PM).
464
See Don B. Kates, Jr. & Nancy Jean Engberg, Deadly Force Self-Defense Against Rape, 15 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 873, 881 (1982) (discussing the “long standing recognition of the right to resist rape with
deadly force”).
465
Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 467.
466
Cf. Fletcher, supra note 401, at 558 (“Those who defend the use of violence rarely admit that
their purpose is retaliation for a past wrong.”).
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In the late 1990s, the Cadena sex trafficking ring forced between twentyfive and forty young women into prostitution in Florida.467 A woman
recruited girls in Mexico with the promise of jobs in the United States.
Instead, they found themselves trapped in brothels, beaten, and forced to
have sex with up to twenty-five or thirty men per day, six days a week.468
“Armed pimps were omnipresent,”469 and guards accompanied women who
left for errands.470 The women were transported to different houses every
two weeks.471 During the transit between brothels, they had a few moments
without supervision to use public restrooms, but escape was impossible.472
The girls could not run because they feared threats they found credible: harm
to their families, brutal beatings, and death.473 It is worth noting that Judy
Norman also believed her husband’s threats of harm to her family, brutal
beatings, and death.
Some clients tried to help by offering to facilitate escapes, and some
called police, but lookouts with cell phones warned the traffickers before
police arrived.474 When one girl found a phone in the closet and called 9-11 several times, neither the dispatchers nor the police who came to the house
spoke Spanish. The police left.475
What rights to use force would those young women have in their own
defense? If an armed guard in that brothel fell asleep where a woman could
steal his gun and efforts to escape might wake him, would the law demand
that she wait until he woke up and began another attack to justify deadly
force? Would the law of self-defense demand that she try calling the police
again before using deadly force, even though several previous calls had
brought no help? Put another way, would a reasonable person in her position
467
FLA. STATE UNIV., CTR. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FLORIDA RESPONDS TO
HUMAN TRAFFICKING 37–38 (2003), https://cahr.fsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/thereport.pdf
(hereinafter FLORIDA RESPONDS TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING). This report explains how the Cadena ring
entrapped women:

[T]he traffickers controlled them by a variety of means. Beatings, rapes, and death
threats were the crudest forms of discipline utilized by their captors. Equally effective
however, were psychological forms of coercion: ignorance of where they were,
inability to speak English, an acute and constant sense of isolation, and threats that
their families in Mexico would be killed were they to try to escape from the traffickers.
One woman was trafficked along with her sister, and the Cadenas saw to it that the
girls were always held in separate locations, each knowing that the other would suffer
consequences if she tried to escape.
Id. at 42.
468
Id. at 39–41.
469
Id. at 44.
470
Id. at 43.
471
Id. at 44.
472
Id. at 43.
473
Id. at 42.
474
See FLORIDA RESPONDS TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 467, at 45, 47.
475
Id. at. 48.
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believe that police might help this time, and therefore, she must try calling
again before using deadly force to escape?
In situations like the Cadena brothels or the Cleveland house, the right
to resist with deadly force if necessary should not depend on the particular
requirements for kidnapping in each state. In a state that required removing
the victim from one place to another, a right to self-defense against
kidnapping might not arise until after the women were moved between
brothels. That right, if it exists, must spring from the nature of the harm of
violent sexual trafficking—a different crime than rape, but a crime that
subjects a woman to repeated sexual violation, coerced by threat of death or
violently enforced. For a full discussion of sex trafficking and self-defense,
scholars will need to discuss many issues—the topic is complex. The next
section of this Article will focus on questions of timing, threat, and selfdefense in trafficking. This section looks at sexual slavery with its ongoing
confinement and coercion to ask specifically about sleep—should sleep rule
out imminent threat?
Law faces a choice here. If these women would not be justified in using
deadly force to escape because an armed guard is sleeping, then the
requirement for instantaneous threat during sleep is more dangerous than a
duty to retreat that would be limited by the woman’s safety.476 On the other
hand, if these women were not required to wait until the guards woke up and
the attacks began again, then sleep itself must not be the factor upon which
justification turns.
Either imminence is always a contextual evaluation—temporal urgency
of threat in these circumstances—or the essence of the imminence
requirement must lie in necessity, not in some particular amount of time on
the clock. Either way, sleep should not create a per se rule. The idea of
“learned helplessness” interferes with the ability to evaluate threat in each
particular set of facts. Judy Norman should have been able to ask the jury
whether a reasonable person in her circumstances could have believed that
she had to act immediately, even though he was asleep.
B. Timing, Sex, and Death—Temporal Urgency and the Threat of Sexual
Slavery
George Fletcher takes for granted that Judy Norman could have used
deadly force to defend against the harm of rape (given imminent threat and

476
Cf. Nourse, supra note 18, at 1285 (“[T]here may be a problem with applying an implied ‘preretreat’ rule in battered woman cases if American law does not apply that rule to the man in the dangerous
bar or neighborhood. To ask of battered women that they leave—in whatever doctrinal guise (imminence,
retreat, threat, etc.)—raises serious questions about whether the law of self-defense treats battered women
less favorably than others.”).
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necessity). That right is available in almost all states. It is worth noting,
however, that some states, including North Carolina, limit rape to forced
vaginal penetration.478
In North Carolina, the state supreme court had already stated that the
harm of forcible sodomy could also justify the use of deadly force in
self-defense. 479 But J.T. was not committing forcible sodomy on Judy as that
term is generally understood. He was using force to compel her to sell oral
sex to strangers against her will. There are few cases addressing forcible
sodomy in North Carolina and none that address this question, so it is
difficult to determine whether North Carolina could have treated J.T. as an
attacker based on a form of accomplice liability.
Most states do not include trafficking among the enumerated crimes that
justify deadly force in self-defense, but some frequently enumerated crimes
might address Judy Norman’s situation.480 Transporting her to the truck stop
depended on violence and, perhaps, on her fear that resistance could be
fatal.481 In most states, deadly force can be used against kidnapping,482 and
J.T.’s violent movement of Judy from place to place might have qualified.
In North Carolina, as in most states, kidnapping depends on the purpose for
which the person is held and moved.483
On the other hand, most cases of kidnapping wives or intimate partners
involve estrangement or separation.484 Because the Norman court did not
477

See Fletcher supra note 401, at 560 and accompanying text (“No legal system in the Western
world would expect a woman to endure a rape if her only means of defense required that she risk the
death of her aggressor.”).
478
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.21(a) (2017) (“A person is guilty of first-degree forcible rape if
the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person by force and against the will of the other
person . . . .”). The Model Penal Code also makes deadly force available to defend against rape and
defines rape as vaginal, oral, or anal intercourse. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04 (2)(b), 213(2), 213.1(1)
(AM. LAW INST. 2017).
479
State v. Hunter, 286 S.E.2d 535, 540 (N.C. 1982).
480
Human Trafficking Enactments 2005–2012, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/human-trafficking-laws-in-the-states-updatednov.aspx (last updated Dec. 31, 2012) (providing an overview of state human trafficking laws).
481
State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
482
See, e.g., A LA. CODE § 13A-3-23(a), (a)(3) (LexisNexis 2016) (“A person may use deadly
physical force . . . if the person reasonably believes that another person is . . . [c]ommitting or about to
commit a kidnapping in any degree . . . .”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704(2), (2)(c) (2003) (“Deadly
physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes . . . [t]he other person is committing or
reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping . . . .”); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108(2), (2)(A)(2)
(2017) (“A person is justified in using deadly force upon another person . . . [c]ommitting or about to
commit a kidnapping . . . .”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a), (a)(2), (a)(2)(B) (West 2017) (“A person
is justified in using deadly force against another . . . to prevent the other’s imminent commission of
aggravated kidnapping . . . .”).
483
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39(a)(1)–(6) (2006) (listing purpose elements of the crime of
kidnapping).
484
Diamond, supra note 462, at 754 (reporting that the author had found only one case that involved
a battered woman confined at home by a batterer with whom she cohabits “rather than being abducted in
public by husbands or boyfriends from whom they have separated or want to separate”).
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treat the rapid escalation of violence and abuse as intensifying the threat to
Judy, they would probably have found it difficult to distinguish her case
from a more ordinary situation in which a husband took his wife’s arm
forcefully and marched her out to the car—even if that ordinary case could
have been charged as battery or false imprisonment. A few weeks after Judy
shot J.T., North Carolina enacted a law making “felonious restraint” a lesserincluded offense of kidnapping.485 The application of that law would have
been obvious, though the courts would still have had to consider whether
deadly force was available to defend against the lesser included offense.
Let us assume for this discussion that defending oneself against the
transportation, violence, and unwilling commercial sex acts involved in
forcible trafficking can, under appropriate circumstances and necessity,
justify the use of deadly force in resistance. It is not surprising that, in the
mid-1980s, attorneys and courts did not treat this as the basis for Judy’s
defense. The term “sexual slavery” had been coined only recently; the issue
had not yet drawn the advocacy, activism, and scholarly energy that had by
then been invested in work on intimate partner violence.486 Forced
prostitution looked more like a particularly awful form of abuse than a
separate crime generating its own rights to self-defense.487
In the decades that followed, only a handful of law review articles
treated forced prostitution seriously in analyzing Judy Norman’s use of
defensive force.488 So far, none have addressed the relationship between the
particular threat of violent trafficking and the temporal urgency of the
threat—her need to act immediately. Although the question of deadly
defensive force in prostitution and trafficking also raises questions about
autonomy, choice, and captivity, the discussion that follows here focuses on
485

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-43.3 (1994).
See BARRY, supra note 15, at 6 (noting that when the author “began to write Female Sexual
Slavery in the mid-1970s, the subject had been . . . effectively buried” and to “study female ‘sexual
slavery,’ [she] could only start with the slender file of material [she] had developed over the previous ten
years”).
487
See id. at 6, 9–11 (discussing assumptions and findings regarding forced prostitution).
488
See, e.g., Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, The Values and Costs of Imminence, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS, supra note 10, at 419 (treating the forced prostitution of Judy Norman as repeated rape
that did justify the use of deadly force and therefore distinguishing Norman from the general discussion
of the imminence requirement); Angel, supra note 10, at 76 (“Is not forced prostitution, known as rape,
grave bodily harm? . . . She correctly perceived increased violence leading to grave bodily harm and
possible death because J.T.'s abuse was more frequent and worse than ever.”); Mahoney, supra note 10,
at 91 n.449 (alteration in original) (“Forced prostitution—essentially, third-party rape—must by the terms
of the discussion [in the majority opinion] have been considered something other than ‘great bodily
harm.’ Or, perhaps, since she had experienced this particular bodily harm for many years, it no longer
amounted to ‘great’ harm.”); Shana Wallace, Comment, Beyond Imminence: Evolving International Law
and Battered Women’s Right to Self-Defense, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1749, 1780 (2004) (“[T]here was no
question about the magnitude of harm she would face when her husband awoke. Forced prostitution,
rape, severe beatings, and possible death were what she was promised[—]all forms of harm well within
the traditional protections of self-defense law.”).
486
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the timing of threat and defense in a pattern of violent, recurrent, interrelated
criminal acts.
When does the trafficking event begin, and at which points would selfdefense be justified? On the witness stand, Judy said that she shot J.T.
because when he woke up, the same thing would begin again, and that night
at the truck stop, his brutality and the experience of forced prostitution would
be worse than it had ever been.489 The harmful event would take hours, and
during those hours she would be under violent control in the car and at the
truck stop.490 Was the right to use deadly force equally applicable at all
points? If not, what would distinguish the crucial points or permissible
moments for the use of deadly force? Put another way, in a search for a legal
standard to clarify when victims of forced prostitution may or may not use
deadly force, how should law choose which events mark the line across
which that force becomes permissible?
Common sense indicates that Judy must be able to resist initial
transportation to the truck stop. But the law should not limit Judy’s options
based on the possibility that while they drove, J.T. might change his mind
about the destination.491 The fact that she had endured previous trafficking
events should not affect her right to resist this one, especially when she had
reasonable grounds to believe this time would be worse.
If the urgency of using deadly force depends in part on the unavailability
of legal protection, then it should matter that Judy would have had difficulty
seeking help from police against violent trafficking. She probably feared
confessing to illegal sex acts for which she had previously been arrested
while J.T. evaded criminal responsibility.492 While Judy and J.T. were in
Chicago, the North Carolina legislature had made it a crime to hold a person
in involuntary servitude and to kidnap a person for the purposes of
involuntary servitude, but that legislation focused on labor and arose from
an effort to protect farm workers.493 Twenty years passed before North
Carolina expanded its laws to cover sex trafficking victims, criminalizing

489

Transcript, supra note 1, at 142.
State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
491
But cf. Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 467 (arguing that a
sleeping abuser who plans to kill might experience a change in behavior or mindset).
492
Id. at 36, 136.
493
1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 771 (defining the crime of involuntary servitude and amending the
kidnapping statute to reflect the new statutory definition of involuntary servitude); see also Kelle Barrick
et al., Labor Trafficking Victimization Among Farmworkers in North Carolina: Role of Demographic
Characteristics and Acculturation, 2 INT’L J. RURAL CRIMINOLOGY 225, 234–35 (2014) (stating that
about twenty-five percent of migrant workers experience trafficking in North Carolina); Charlotte Gail
Blake, North Carolina's New Involuntary Servitude Statute: Inadequate Relief for Enslaved Migrant
Laborers, 62 N.C. L. REV. 1186, 1186 (1984) (explaining that the legislature enacted the involuntary
servitude bill in response to cases in which defendants were found to have violated the 1866 Civil Rights
Act and the Thirteenth Amendment by enslaving agricultural workers).
490
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human trafficking and sexual servitude and including both crimes in the
kidnapping statute.494
Until 2011, self-defense was a judicially created common law doctrine
in North Carolina.495 Therefore, on one hand, the absence of express
coverage in the kidnapping law did not rule out self-defense against violent
trafficking. After 2011, when the legislature enacted a self-defense law, the
new statute preserved existing common law rules.496 If judges had seen the
harm of sexual slavery at the time of the Norman case, they could have
considered whether the harm was comparable to forcible sodomy and
whether courts should allow similar use of defensive force. On the other
hand, even if judges perceived the harm of sexual slavery, they might have
discounted the gravity of a harm committed many times or had trouble
seeing the escalating threat that made Judy Norman turn to deadly force.497
Future legal scholarship can help by exploring the complex issues in selfdefense against the brutal recurring criminal acts and particular harms
involved in the forcible trafficking.
C. Reasonable Belief and Eyewitnesses
I looked at my dad’s head. I seen the blood . . . and I ran out
of the room and hollered that he killed her. I kept on hollering,
‘He killed her.’498
These witnesses described circumstances that caused not only
[the] defendant to believe escape was impossible, but that also
convinced them of its impossibility. Defendant’s isolation and
helplessness were evident in testimony that her family was
494
See Act of July 27, 2006, No. 2006-247, § 20(c) 2006 N.C. Laws 1084 (rewriting the offense of
kidnapping to include “[t]rafficking another person with the intent that the other person be held in
involuntary servitude or sexual servitude” and “[s]ubjecting or maintaining such other person for sexual
servitude”). The federal government also took action against sex trafficking. In 2000, Congress made it
safer for trafficking victims from other countries to testify against those who exploited them. Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386, § 1513, 114 Stat. 1464, 1533–
34 (2000) (codified in scattered sections of Title 8 of the United States Code) (creating a new
nonimmigrant visa classification to strengthen the ability of law enforcement to prosecute cases of human
trafficking).
495
See, e.g., State v. Rawlings, 762 S.E.2d 909, 913 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that North
Carolina recognized the common law right to self-defense prior to the statute).
496
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51.2 (West 2011).
497
See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 10, at 91 (criticizing the majority opinion because “[f]orced
prostitution—essentially, third-party rape—must by the terms of the discussion have been considered
something other than ‘great bodily harm.’ Or, perhaps, since she had experienced this particular bodily
harm for many years, it no longer amounted to ‘great harm.”); Angel, supra note 10, at 87 (arguing that
the majority either forgot or ignored that severe beatings and forced prostitution constitute grievous
bodily harm); People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 20 (Cal. 1996) (quoting the prosecutor’s argument that
because the abuser had threatened to kill her many times, this time could not be taken seriously).
498
Transcript, supra note 1, at 61 (emphasis added).
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intimidated by her husband into acquiescing in his torture of
her.499
People around Judy thought J.T. was going to kill her.500 Judy believed
his death threats.501 When she attempted suicide, J.T. tried to block
intervention and then increased his threats of mayhem and death.502 The
family found his lethal threats so credible that Laverne armed herself. Phyllis
showed her belief in the imminent deadly threat to her mother when she
reacted to the sight of her dying father by shouting repeatedly that he had
killed her mother. J.T.’s threats to kill might have seemed routine because
he repeated them so frequently but the witnesses around Judy took those
lethal threats seriously.503 Justice Martin’s dissent emphasized the
conviction of those around Judy that she could not escape and could not find
help.504 Judy believed it, and the people around her believed it. The family
believed they could not help her and stood by, “intimidated by her husband
into acquiescing in his torture of her.”505 In some cases, intimate partner
violence takes place in secret; in other cases, family, friends, or others see
incidents of violence. J.T. may have liked having witnesses to his
performances of violent power and control. “[H]e did it a lot when other[s]
. . . [were] around; he was showing off . . . .”506
Eyewitness belief presents an important issue in self-defense. When
evidence is available that a defendant’s actual fear of a threat was shared by
eyewitnesses, that shared belief speaks to the very essence of reasonableness
in self-defense—the question of whether others familiar with her
circumstances would share her perception. Similarly, when witnesses share
a perception that escape is impossible, the jury should be allowed to consider
that evidence when weighing imminence and necessity.507 The dissent relied
on that approach in its conclusion: “If the evidence in support of self-defense
is sufficient to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of a rational juror
499

Norman II, 378 S.E.2d 8, 18 (N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting).
See Angel, supra note 10, at 70–71 (discussing witness testimony that addressed the abuse and
Judy’s mother’s belief that J.T. would kill Judy).
501
Supra text accompanying note 189 (quoting Judy that she believed J.T.’s threat to kill her).
502
Transcript, supra note 1, at 36–37; Mahoney, supra note 10, at 92 (“[T]he day before he died,
her husband had essentially attempted her murder: rather than fulfilling his duty to save her life when
she attempted suicide, he had done all he could to cause her to die and prevent others from saving her.”);
Angel, supra note 10, at 70–71.
503
Angel, supra note 10, at 71.
504
See State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 18 (N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting) (noting
that witnesses were convinced Judy could not escape and that witness accounts described Judy’s
interactions with social service agencies and the law that convinced Judy she could not find help).
505
Id. at 269-70.
506
See supra text accompanying note 90 (quoting testimony of Mark Navarra).
507
In his dissent, Justice Martin cited the belief of witnesses that Judy could not escape the family’s
inability to defend her against torture and the testimony of witnesses about Judy’s fear that J.T. would
kill her. Norman II, 378 S.E.2d at 17–19 (Martin, J., dissenting).
500
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whether the state has proved an intentional killing without justification or
excuse, self-defense must be submitted to the jury. This is such a case.”508
Indeed, Norman had so many eyewitnesses that we must remember not to
create a standard that would demand a similar abundance of eyewitness
evidence to reach the jury.
If courts ignore that shared perception of threat, judges can create a
different moral problem by disqualifying or disregarding the perceptions of
the closest witnesses. Even though Laverne was still struggling to help,
intimate terrorism had persuaded the family that Judy could not escape. Her
help-seeking continued to fail. A juror might find that the witnesses had
evaluated the situation correctly. These witnesses’ perceptions of danger
cannot be treated as relevant only to “subjective” belief—that approach
would move away from the core principle that gives the determination of
reasonableness to the jury.
If courts fail to treat shared terror as relevant to the “objective” prong of
self-defense, they will create a new moral hazard in which the most lethal
batterers could convince more people of lethal danger without adding to the
evidence in favor of reasonable self-defense. The fact that witnesses shared
Judy’s belief would not automatically validate her perception as reasonable,
but their belief must be relevant to whether the jury must evaluate
reasonableness. Scholarly debates suffered from the idea of impaired
perception in battered women. The debates on Norman should have
recognized the importance of the discussion of eyewitness perception in the
dissent.
D. Was it Possible to Help Judy Norman?
Was help more available than Judy and her family believed? What kind
of intervention or assistance would have made Judy Norman safe? An
example from a rural area in the early 1990s illustrates some elements of a
successful intervention. Kathy Strahm, a young prosecutor in rural Brown
County, Indiana, met Martha Boroughs, a defendant charged with writing a
bad check who sought a continuance to allow her to repay the money.509
Martha Boroughs said that her husband John Boroughs had written the
check, but begged Strahm to allow her to pay it off anyway; she feared her
husband. The next week, a state police detective told Strahm that Martha
was in “real trouble” because John had begun choking her into
unconsciousness and might kill her soon. Together, the detective and the
prosecutor arranged for John to begin serving a jail sentence on traffic
charges in another county. Then they offered Martha an opportunity to press
508

Id. at 21.
This account of Martha Boroughs’s experience is based on an interview with Kathy Strahm
reported in Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency, in
THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 59, 83–84 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk
eds., 1994).
509

758

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:3

charges. After John had been in jail for more than a month, Martha felt safe
enough to reveal a story of grotesque violence in a marriage that lasted only
two years. Repeatedly, John had beaten and raped her; he had kicked,
confined, and choked her. The battering caused an abscess in the bone that
scarred her face. John tortured her with electric shocks, and during his calls
from jail, Martha recorded his threats to apply electrical shocks to her eyes
when he returned.
Martha Boroughs had made complaints to police, but that record looked
like complaints filed by many women—separate incident reports, each on a
recent episode of abuse. She had not pursued prosecution. John always
eventually got out of jail. He had threatened that if she left, he would punish
her and force her to return by killing her children and her father, one after
another, and she believed him.
The state brought fifty-two criminal charges against John Boroughs,
including five counts of attempted murder, eight counts of battery, fourteen
counts of intimidation, and several counts of rape and deviate sexual
conduct. Every incident of violence became part of the pattern of controlling
and abusive behavior. The judge split the case into several separate trials
covering different time periods. In the first trial, the jury convicted John
Boroughs and the judge sentenced him to eighty-five years; the appellate
court affirmed his conviction. Strahm concluded that serious concern for
Martha’s safety had been crucial to successful prosecution.510
Such an intervention might have helped Judy Norman, but that
intervention required a knowledge of households and relationships that
exists in very few communities, then or now. Saving Martha Boroughs
brought together a young prosecutor and a veteran detective who paid
attention to details and people. Is this a story of alert law enforcement, or is
it a fairy-tale ending possible only in a small community under ideal
conditions?511 What would it take to institutionalize this kind of support and
to enable domestic violence victims to rely on it?
Many years later, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washington, D.C.
developed a Victim-Informed Prosecution program to serve victimwitnesses who had the most severe histories of violence: “A special team,
including criminal prosecutors, civil lawyers, and victim advocates provides
intensive and fully coordinated legal, social, and safety services for these
women. Team members receive extensive training and meet bimonthly to
engage in detailed planning and strategy sessions that uniquely meet each

510

Id. at 83–85.
In 1990, Brown County had a population of about 14,000 people. IND. BUS. RESEARCH CTR. AT
THE IND. SCH. OF BUS., 1990 Census of Population and Housing, STATSINDIANA,
http://www.stats.indiana.edu/c90/counties/brown_prof.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
511

2019] MISUNDERSTANDING JUDY NORMAN: THEORY AS CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCE

759

512

victim’s needs.” Perhaps multiple team members, specializing in fully
coordinated services, could have protected Judy Norman with her
nontraditional household. But Victim-Informed Prosecution was a pilot
program.513 It could not have served everyone in need, and it is not clear
whether any victim could rely on finding such extensive help. When family
networks and local police did not protect her, Judy Norman had no
comparable resources to which to turn.
E. Context and Imminence, Justification and Excuse
Imminence is a contextual evaluation. It must matter to temporal
urgency whether the person threatened is mobile or chained in place; it must
matter whether an attacker appears capable of moving quickly or slowly.
The legal evaluation of threat is based on both what the defendant actually
perceived and what a reasonable person in her situation would have
perceived. 514 Scholars err when they treat the perception of threat in
battering as if arguing for imminence in Norman necessarily involves
making reasonableness more “subjective.”515 The claim that no reasonable
person could possibly see imminent threat in a sleeping man depends on
unspoken premises that death is the only relevant threat, escape is possible,
and sleep will last for a while.
Professor Dressler has written extensively in this field, rejecting justified
self-defense for Judy Norman. He argues that no reasonable person could
see imminent threat in J.T. Norman as he slept. “Indeed, if Judy Norman did
believe, because of BWS, that her sleeping husband represented an
instantaneous threat, . . . [i]t should suggest that there was something wrong
with Judy Norman’s psychological connection to reality.”516 He sees expert
evidence as incompatible with the reasonableness standard because
reasonableness cannot be judged “from the perspective of someone who, by
definition, is experiencing a set of symptoms that renders her state of mind
abnormal[.]”517
512

See Goodman et al., supra note 56, at 331 (citation omitted) (proposing that these programs may
help address the needs of women for whom social support networks do not diminish the recurrence of
abuse).
513
See Lauren Bennett Cattaneo et al., The Victim-Informed Prosecution Project: A
Quasi-Experimental Test of a Collaborative Model for Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 15(10)
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1227, 1228 (2009) (evaluating whether the program increased the sense of
voice for women who participated).
514
See Nourse, supra note 18, at 1295–96 (“[C]ourts adopt a self-defense standard that is both
objective and subjective.”).
515
See id. at 1239, 1277–78; Mahoney, supra note 218, text accompanying notes 324-44
(recounting a long history of majority and minority trends in self-defense standards that are later
categorized as “subjective” and “objective”).
516
Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 464 (asserting that lack of
connection to reality “is an argument of excuse, not justification by self defense.”).
517
Id.
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Dressler seeks a defense for Judy Norman consistent with perceived
lack-of-threat in the facts. He argues for the adoption of an excuse defense
based in duress rather than justified self-defense in cases like Norman.518 His
reasoning illustrates the interaction of ideas about the “syndrome” with
arguments about substantive law.519 Treating the subject of expert evidence
as “intimate partner violence and its effects” and replacing “learned
helplessness” with “the effects of intimate partner violence” can change
these debates.
There are two kinds of errors built into the argument as Dressler
constructs it. There are underlying factual mistakes involving time and the
nature of the threat: a nap or a “midnight shooting”; the threat of death or
the threat of violent, forcible sex trafficking. But the argument also rests on
mistaken ideas about “syndrome” evidence. Even if Dressler reconsidered
the time of day and trafficking, some of his objections to a self-defense
instruction rest on his concepts of “battered woman syndrome” and “learned
helplessness.”
His argument against justification was built on the idea that expert
evidence on intimate partner violence necessarily describes pathology and
also on the idea that a pathologizing account or an account of impairment is
inconsistent with a finding of reasonableness.520 The first of these linked
concepts misunderstands expert evidence on intimate partner violence, but
the second misunderstands reasonableness itself. For example, if Judy
Norman had been intoxicated, impairment would be relevant but would not
rule out self-defense if a sober person would have perceived the same threat.
The vulgar version of “learned helplessness” influences this treatment of
impairment, especially when applied to the prior conclusion that reasonable
perception of imminent threat is impossible in the Norman facts.521 There is
some circular reasoning here: expert testimony seems to support or justify a
threat perception that—if honestly held—would necessarily show impaired
perception; therefore, support for the perception of imminence must rest on
treating impaired perception as reasonable. This reasoning led Dressler to
reject justified self-defense and turn to duress.
518
See Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters, supra note 10, at 278 (“As
it turns out, the no-fair-opportunity claim suggested here looks a great deal like the rationale for the
existing defence of duress.”).
519
Id. at 276–77 (criticizing “syndrome-type” evidence as potentially demeaning to an accused, and
promoting “no-fair-opportunity” excuses as providing a “potential syndrome-free zone” where an
accused can show that she is not blameworthy because she “acted as an ordinary individual might have
behaved in similar circumstances”).
520
See, e.g., id. at 268–69 (“The conceptual—and even practical—effect of BWS evidence is to
pathologize the Judy Normans of the world. . . . Even if [BWS] evidence [supports] a . . . belief that the
sleeping abuser is an imminent threat . . . there is no basis for claiming that such a belief is reasonable . .
. .”).
521
Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 463.
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Professor Dressler understands that imminence is contextual. He
approves the Model Penal Code approach that “asks whether the necessity
to use the defensive force is immediately at hand.”522 Invoking Norman,
Dressler offers an illustration of the difference between the Model Penal
Code and common law:
For example, suppose that Judy Norman had been in her
kitchen making dinner when J.T. entered the kitchen and said
to her, “This is it, bitch. Today you die. I am going to the
bedroom, getting my gun, and killing you here and now.” He
then turns toward the bedroom, and Judy takes this moment
with his back turned to lethally stab him in the back with a
large kitchen knife . . . . Judy would very likely win in a Model
Penal Code jurisdiction: The use of force was “immediately
necessary . . . on the present occasion.” If she waited for J.T.
to return with the gun, to be sure that he meant business, she
would have been helpless.523
His view of context and imminence has evolved or been clarified over
time. In an exchange with Professor Holly Maguigan at Fordham in 2011,
Dressler found sufficient evidence to send self-defense to the jury in some
hypotheticals that involved a sleeping abuser: one in which the abuser had a
baby in the bed and said he would shoot the baby as soon as he woke up,
and one in which the abuser had a weapon and said he would shoot the
woman as soon as he woke up.524 He went even further with a hypothetical
in which the man had made no explicit threat and had previously attacked
without killing her.525 Although Dressler noted those facts were weaker, he
would allow a self-defense instruction if the woman testified that she could
tell circumstances had changed, and that the abuser was going to kill her
when he woke up.526 He would trust the jury to evaluate the timing of sleep
and danger to determine the reasonableness of deadly force.527 “The longer
522

Id. at 468 n.27 (emphasis omitted).
Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2016)). I agree with this discussion
of the Model Penal Code standard and its application to the kitchen hypothetical.
524
Dressler & Maguigan, supra note 11, at 13–14.
525
See id. at 14–15 (“I knew, I could tell from the look in his eye, I knew. He had never done this
before. I knew that when he woke up he was going to blow me away.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
526
Id.
527
Id. at 14–15. This approach represents some shift in Dressler’s position from previous work in
which he used the term “nonconfrontational” broadly and opposed justified self-defense in
“nonconfrontational” homicides. See Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at
457 (grouping together as nonconfrontational situations in which abusers are sleeping, watching
television, and eating dinner); Dressler, Feminist (or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law, supra
note 29, at 1485 (grouping together as nonconfrontational situations in which abusers are sleeping or
watching television).
523
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the period of time during the night between when she did it and when he was
going to wake up, and whether or not she should have really believed his
threat, given everything we know about them, etc., etc., I would let the jury
make that determination.”528
Professor Dressler’s 2011 position moves toward a time-frame that
might allow a self-defense instruction in Norman if his analysis recognized
the difference between the nap and “midnight”529 and addressed self-defense
against violent sexual slavery. He did not choose any bright line for the
length of sleep that a jury could evaluate. But if the Model Penal Code allows
the jury to consider self-defense in his kitchen hypothetical,530 it should
allow that instruction in Norman. J.T. might awaken from his nap in less
time than would be required to get a gun from another room in Dressler’s
hypothetical. The uncertain time involved in leaving the kitchen and
returning with a gun undermines the moral argument against allowing any
time lapse because an abuser might have a change of heart.531 Uncertainty
does not answer the question of reasonableness: the timing of a nap is more
difficult to estimate than a walk to and from another room. Nonetheless, if a
reasonable juror could find that in the kitchen Judy had a right to stab J.T. in
the back, then a nap should not make jury consideration unavailable as a
matter of law.
Most scholars writing on imminence and justification have not yet
addressed Judy’s statement that she could not endure more trafficking with
increased violence.532 Recognizing that looming threat would not ensure a
528
Dressler & Maguigan, supra note 11, at 14 (emphasis added). Dressler also said that it would be
a “different situation” if there were a specific statement of intent, for example, “when I wake up I’m
going to kill you.” Id. Of course, the imminent trafficking in Norman was so well-established that the
judicial opinions and scholars treated it as a fact, not a threat. However, consistent with almost all
scholarly discussion, the hypothetical facts posed to Dressler and Maguigan in the Fordham exchange
included only the threat of death, not a threat of trafficking.
529
Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abuser, supra note 29, at 468 n.27.
530
See hypothetical in text accompanying note 523, supra.
531
A change of heart remains a possibility in the kitchen hypothetical. J.T. might get to the other
room and reach for the gun but, seeing a family Bible nearby, be overcome by awareness that murder is
wrong and divorce is a better option. (Religion did appear briefly in the Norman record when Mark
Navarra testified about an exchange between Judy and her niece about going to church. Transcript, supra
note 1, at 51–52. Or, J.T. might trip and break his leg on the way, creating a period of disability in which
Judy could organize the family to reach safety—or his heart might soften. Dressler concedes that a
reasonable person would not be required to rely on a possible change in the threat. See Dressler, Battered
Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 468 n.27 (“The common law, if strictly followed, would
probably suggest that she acted prematurely . . . . But, Judy would very likely win in a Model Penal Code
Jurisdiction . . . . If she waited for J.T. to return with the gun, to be sure that he meant business, she would
have been helpless.”). That should also be true of J.T. Norman’s nap.
532
Dressler’s casebook quotes her full statement from the transcript about this fear, see DRESSLER
& GARVEY, supra note 414, at 521, but that fear is not part of Dressler’s analysis of threat. This omission
is similar to George Fletcher’s unqualified statement that Judy could kill to defend her sexual autonomy
and his simultaneous lack of discussion of the threat of violent trafficking that Judy described from the
stand. Fletcher, supra note 405.
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jury finding that deadly force was reasonable. The crucial point is that the
invisibility of trafficking in the legal imagination has been a silent basis for
arguments that reject self-defense in Norman. This issue of resistance to
violent trafficking invites scholarly debate to address its ramifications.533
At Fordham, Dressler explained that his objection to self-defense in
Norman depended on his ideas about the “syndrome”: “My criticism of that
case . . . is the infusion of the Battered Woman Syndrome evidence as the
way to prove imminence . . . .”534 That statement might change if he
reconsidered expert evidence as testimony on intimate partner violence and
its effects. It would also be necessary to reevaluate the relationship of expert
evidence to the jury instruction. A tactical decision to call or not call an
expert cannot trigger a per se rule against relevance to a self-defense
instruction—expert evidence is part of all the evidence in a case. The legal
question involves the burden on the state to disprove self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt: once the defendant has introduced evidence toward selfdefense, might even one juror conclude that the prosecution had failed to
prove that a reasonable person in Judy’s position would not find it necessary
to act immediately while J.T. slept? Understanding intimate partner violence
and its effects (or a close reading of Dr. Tyson’s testimony on coercive
control) should answer Dressler’s concern that “syndrome” evidence would
use impairment to prove reasonableness in the perception of imminence.
The argument for an excuse defense based in duress seeks to avoid
“learned helplessness” while framing an explanation for the reasons Judy
had not separated from J.T.535 (Here, substituting “the effects of intimate
partner violence” for “learned helplessness” should address his concerns.)
Dressler’s proposal builds on earlier suggestions that duress claims are
appropriate when a defendant has had “no-fair-opportunity”536 take other
actions.537
The duress proposal has serious problems. As others have pointed out
and Professor Dressler has recognized, J.T. did not compel Judy to kill him
in a way similar to the legal concept of duress.538 In some domestic violence
533

Dressler & Maguigan, supra note 11, at 1, 15.
Id. at 15.
535
See Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 470 (asserting that
“battered woman’s learned helplessness . . . is not relevant” and proposing alternative reasons Judy did
not separate from J.T).
536
See id. at 469 (discussing situations in which a defendant has no fair opportunity).
537
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 7TH ED., supra note 418, at 245; see also Rosen, supra note
358, at 22, 24 (discussing excuse and the lack of fair opportunity in battered women’s self-defense cases,
citing Joshua Dressler’s earlier discussion of no-fair-opportunity).
538
See Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers, supra note 29, at 470 n.31 (discussing
duress and the Model Penal Code § 2.09); Krause, supra note 32, at 567–68 (comparing Dressler’s
approach to the Model Penal Code’s duress defense). See also Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of SelfDefense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV.11,
22 (1986) (discussing excuse when the circumstances allow “no fair opportunity to choose whether to
534
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cases, the facts sound in both self-defense and duress—for example, if an
abuser puts a gun in the middle of the table and says, “Kill me or I will kill
you.”539 But basic self-defense inquiries about threat, reasonableness, and
initial aggressor can address those facts without turning to the law of duress.
The criminal defense of duress—the claim that someone acted because
another person made a threat that a reasonable person could not withstand—
speaks to Judy’s circumstances but does not address the reasons she gave for
killing J.T.540 J.T. compelled Judy to live in a way that allowed no escape,
but he did not make her kill him. He held her there through pain, deprivation,
and credible threats including death; duress forced her to commit
prostitution. He was going to commit acts worse than the terrible things he
had already done to her. She was trying to avoid trafficking more violent
than ever, and she was trying not to die. Duress does not capture that
struggle.
The duress proposal falls short in several ways. It does not eliminate
questions about reasonableness, since both approaches require that a “person
of reasonable firmness”541 would have responded the same way. Applying
duress to homicide would abandon one of its bright-line rules.542 And duress
creates a slope at least as slippery as self-defense. Duress would not solve
concerns about jury nullification—a jury that cannot bear to convict can use
whichever theory the instructions offer. If it is appropriate to change the
duress rule itself, the arguments for and against such a change should not
rest on the Norman case.
Dressler’s criticism of self-defense in Norman does not address the
question jurors must answer. Placing the imminence of a threat in context
does not mean asking jurors whether J.T. was a bad man. It asks the jury to
look closely at what Judy feared in the context she faced. J.T. created
circumstances in which the family believed Judy was going to die while
simultaneously ensuring that, if she did not take the steps for which he had
threatened instant death, no one could predict the exact moment when death
would come. Brutal trafficking loomed. Judy saw no way to escape, neither
did her family, and Dr. Tyson saw nothing in the record to contradict her

commit the harm,” citing several sources including Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A
Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 421, 444–50 (1982)).
539
Cf. R v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, 857 (Can.) (recounting the defendant’s statement that
her boyfriend pulled her out of the closet where she was hiding from him, hit her repeatedly, then handed
her a gun; she considered killing herself but did not; then she shot him after he told her “something to
the effect of ‘either you kill me or I’ll kill you’” and turned around.).
540
See Duress, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining duress and providing
examples).
541
Krause, supra note 32, at 567.
542
Id. at 568 (“Few jurisdictions have followed the MPC . . . and the defense cannot be invoked for
homicides.”).
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belief that help was unavailable. The reasonable evaluation of imminent
threat should consider both escalating danger and J.T.’s strategic
destabilization and defeat of all other methods of coping with those threats.
Persistent ideas about “learned helplessness” shape Professor Dressler’s
discussion of duress and excuse. Even though Dressler acknowledged in the
Fordham exchange that testimony on “battering and its effects” might be
relevant to the question of reasonableness,544 his subsequent work has not
been not consistent on this point.545 Although that discussion receded from
opposition to a self-defense instruction in all cases involving sleeping
abusers, “syndrome” misconceptions still interact with the analysis of selfdefense doctrine.
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION
Judy Norman lived in the same area of North Carolina until she died in
2007 after an extended illness. Her online obituary noted that she had lived
in both Chicago and North Carolina, and that she had worked at Cone
Mills.546 Three of her children survived her, as did her sister and her
mother.547 She probably did not know that her losing appeal became an
iconic case that generated decades of debates in criminal law.
In the end, what should legal scholars learn from the Norman case? We
could start with humility. When it seems to us that social scientists and
courts have been foolish, contradictory, and trapped within outdated puzzles,
legal scholars should check to see whether there is anything we have missed.
(That lesson, of course, applies broadly—the mistakes about Norman
become an example of the cost of failing to take that approach.) Here, much
of the scholarly debate missed evidence in the published opinions and vast
543

State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 18 (N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting Dr.
Tyson’s testimony at trial: “Mrs. Norman didn't leave because she believed, fully believed that escape
was totally impossible . . . . [S]he believed the law could not protect her; no one could protect her, and I
must admit, looking over the records, that there was nothing done that would contradict that belief”).
544
Dressler & Maguigan, supra note 11, at 16–17. Responding to Maguigan’s description of a
different framework on “battering and its effects,” Dressler acknowledged that his earlier opinion that
expert evidence was relevant to subjective belief was based on “the old Lenore Walker-type testimony”
and seemed to reconsider relevance to reasonableness, stating: “[T]he crux of it will be whether or not it
is relevant to the objective portion of the standard, whether it was a reasonable belief. And, as you say,
it depends on the facts and it depends on exactly what the nature of the testimony is.”
545
See UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 7TH ED., supra note 418, at 245–47 (discussing whether
“a battering victim who kills in nonconfrontational circumstances” should be able to claim self-defense);
id. at 246 n.147 (explaining why the “syndrome” label should be avoided); JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 243–44 (6th ed. 2012) (treating “battering and its effects” only as a
label designed to avoid the word syndrome, continuing to equate expert testimony with Walker’s theories,
and arguing against the relevance of syndrome testimony to reasonableness in cases involving sleeping
abusers).
546
Harrelson Funeral and Cremation Services, Judy Norman, http://hosting9639.tributes.com/obituary/show/Judy-Norman-95106577 (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
547
Id. (noting that her surviving family also included brothers, another sister, seven grandchildren
and two great-grandchildren).
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changes in the world of social science that had already entered legal cases
and law reviews.
We should reckon with the threats women describe. Judy Norman
testified to both her fear of death and her inability to face a night of violent
trafficking worse than she had ever known. The failure of scholars to reckon
with that second threat was an unforced error that has warped our debates.
More broadly, we must remember that struggle is relevant and important
to understanding oppression, whether or not that struggle succeeds. It is a
mistake to treat defeat as if it meant failure to try. It is a mistake to define a
woman’s traits by the defeat of her efforts. When Judy Norman leaves her
husband repeatedly and is caught again and again, when she calls for help
repeatedly and cannot find it, when she decides against strategies that he
says and the witnesses around her believe would mean instant death—those
desperate circumstances should not turn into a narrative about passivity.
Recognizing those struggles would discourage the tendency to misread
expert testimony as an explanation for passivity.
Finally, Norman is only one of many examples of the misunderstandings
that the concepts of “syndrome” and “learned helplessness” have brought to
legal scholarship. Moving away from these outdated and misunderstood
constructs is vital for legal work on intimate partner violence, not only for
work on the Norman case. Making that change will allow us to see more
clearly the real dangers women face from violent intimate partners, the
efforts these women make, the interventions they need, and the respect with
which we should treat their capacity for resistance, survival, and change.
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APPENDIX: MODEL OF COERCION IN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (MARY
ANN DUTTON & LISA A. GOODMAN)

SOURCE: Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner
Violence: Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743, 746 fig.1 (2005).

